Infinitism is an ancient view in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification, according to which there are no foundational reasons for belief. The view has never been popular, and is often associated with skepticism, but after languishing for centuries it has recently begun a resurgence. Ad Infinitum presents new work on the topic by leading epistemologists. They shed new light on infinitism's distinctive strengths and weaknesses, and address questions, new and old, about its account of justification, reasoning, epistemic responsibility, disagreement, and trust, among other important issues. The volume clarifies the relationship between infinitism and other epistemological views, such as skepticism, coherentism, foundationalism and contextualism, and it offers novel perspectives on the metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics of regresses and reasons.
John Turri specializes in epistemology, cognitive science, philosophy of language, and experimental philosophy and currently holds an Early Research Award from the Ontario Ministry of Economic Development and Innovation.
Peter Klein has written on many topics in epistemology over the years: scepticism, the nature of knowledge (especially the Gettier Problem), and the epistemic regress problem.
Table of Contents
1. Knowing Better, Cognitive Command, and Epistemic Infinitism, Scott F. Aikin
2. Klein and the Regress Argument, Michael Bergmann
3. Reasons Require Reasons, Andrew D. Cling
4. Infinitism, Richard Fumerton
5. Virtue and Vice Among the Infinite, Michael Huemer
6. Reasons, Reasoning and Knowledge: A Proposed Rapprochement between Infinitism and Foundationalism, Peter D. Klein
7. Infinitist Justification and Proper Basing, Jonathan L. Kvanvig
8. Klein's Case for Infinitism, Ram Neta
9. Can an Infinite Regress Justify Everything?, Jeanne Peijnenburg and David Atkinson
10. Can Perception Halt the Regress of Justifications?, Michael Rescorla
11. Infinitism, Ernest Sosa
12. Creative Reasoning, John Turri
13. Avoiding the Regress, Michael Williams
14. First Person and Third Person Reasons and the Regress Problem, Linda Zagzebski