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Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics : The Myth of Neutrality,9781107032613
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Bankers, Bureaucrats, and Central Bank Politics : The Myth of Neutrality



Pub. Date:
Cambridge Univ Pr
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This is the edition with a publication date of 4/15/2013.

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Most studies of the political economy of money focus on the laws protecting central banks from government interference; this book turns to the overlooked people who actually make monetary policy decisions. Using formal theory and statistical evidence from dozens of central banks across the developed and developing worlds, this book shows that monetary policy agents are not all the same. Molded by specific professional and sectoral backgrounds and driven by career concerns, central bankers with different career trajectories choose predictably different monetary policies. These differences undermine the widespread belief that central bank independence is a neutral solution for macroeconomic management. Instead, through careful selection and retention of central bankers, partisan governments can and do influence monetary policy - preserving a political trade-off between inflation and real economic performance even in an age of legally independent central banks.

Table of Contents

Agents, institutions, and the political economy of performance
Career theories of monetary policy
Careers and inflation in industrial democracies
Careers and the monetary policy process
Careers and inflation in developing countries
The uses of autonomy: what independence really means.
Partisan governments, labor unions, and monetary policy
The politics of central banker appointment
The politics of central banker tenure
Conclusion: the dilemma of discretion
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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