On the Beginnings of Theory Deconstructing Broken Logic in Grice, Habermas, and Stuart Mill

by Bornedal, Peter

• ISBN13: 9780761833901
• ISBN10: 0761833900
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2006-03-06
• Publisher: UPA

Summary

In three exemplary essays, author Peter Bornedal promotes Deconstruction as a cogent analytical method whose distinctive critical object is foundational knowledge. In this, he wants to restore Deconstruction as a rational discourse, while continuing to emphasize it as a critique of metaphysics. Two of the essays discuss the works of Paul Grice and Jürgen Habermas and their theories on language and communication. In these essays, the author demonstrates that despite the attempts of Grice and Habermas to give ontological foundations for inherent communicative rationality, their endeavors are unsuccessful. The third essay discusses John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism and argues that Mill's attempts to decide what is in principle good remain futile and incomplete. Ultimately, Bornedal argues that we cannot give metaphysical reasons for rationality or the good life. We can only decide to pursue these ideals, but there is nothing beyond the decision that makes the pursuit necessary or inherent. According to this position, Deconstruction becomes a kind of Pragmatism; or, as the author states, by way of paradox, "Analytic Deconstruction gives Pragmatism a scientific foundation."

Author Biography

Peter Bornedal is Associate Professor of Civilization Studies at American University of Beirut

Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION	1	(18)
(i) What is Metaphysics; Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Derrida?	1	(3)
(ii) The Project: A Non-Defeatist Deconstructive Analytic	4	(3)
(iii) Two Incompatible Notions: Interpretational Instability and Structural Instability	7	(2)
(iv) Three Objections to the Notion of 'Interpretational Instability'	9	(4)
(v) The Enigma of Metaphysics	13	(3)
(vi) Linear Thinking Versus Repetitious Thinking	16	(2)
(vii) A Final Remark About Conception	18	(1)
THE SPIRAL AND THE PLANE—ON FOUNDATIONAL PROBLEMS IN GRICE'S THEORY OF CONVERSATIONAL LOGIC	19	(50)
1) INTRODUCTION	19	(3)
(i) What is Deconstructive Analysis?	19	(1)
(ii) Intention as Foundation of Meaning	20	(2)
(iii) A Reluctant Recourse to Conventionalist Explanation Models	22	(1)
2) GRICE'S PROJECT IN BRIEF	22	(5)
(i) The Distinction between Timeless and Occasion Meaning	22	(3)
(ii) Intending the Understanding of the Other	25	(2)
(iii) The Rational Foundation of Communication	27	(1)
3) GRICE'S COOPERATIVE SUBJECT	27	(7)
(i) Foundation and Imperative of the Cooperative Principle	27	(3)
(ii) Teleological Regulation of Discourse in the Cooperative Principle	30	(1)
(iii) How Cooperation Causes Misunderstandings; Criticism: Presupposing Sincerity	31	(2)
(iv) How Cooperation Causes Misunderstandings; 2nd Criticism: Mis-Recognizing Speaker's Intention	33	(1)
4) RECOGNIZING SPEAKER-INTENTIONS BY UNDERSTANDING CONVENTIONS: THE PLANE	34	(12)
(i) A Theory of Meaning or a Theory of Interpretation? The Theoretical Implication of Grice's Indecision	34	(3)
(ii) The Meaning of a Hand-Wave; Is Intention the origin of Meaning, or an After-Reconstruction from Meaning Already Understood?	37	(5)
(iii) The Desideratum and the Supplement	42	(4)
5) EMPTY-INNER-MENTAL CONSTITUTION OF MEANING: THE SPIRAL	46	(5)
(i) Redundant Multiple Intentions	46	(3)
(ii) A Spiral of Still Deeper Nested Intentions as the Foundation of Meaning	49	(2)
6) HERMENEUTICAL TOTALITARIANISM: MEANING AS INTENDED RESPONSE IN AN AUDIENCE	51	(3)
7) EXCURSUS: REVISITING THE VENERABLE PROBLEM OF 'THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE'	54	(15)
(i) Reintroducing the Problem of 'The Origin of Language' in the 'High-Tech' Jargon of Analytic Philosophy	54	(2)
(ii) The Origin as the Other: Rousseau and Herder	56	(4)
(iii) The Origin as the Same: Grice and Schiffer	60	(9)
A DESIRE FOR REASON—ON THE THEORY OF RATIONAL COMMUNICATION IN HABERMAS	69	(68)
(A) THE IDEAL; DETERMINING THE DESIDERATA OF THE THEORY
1) RECONSTRUCTING THE A PRIORI OF COMMUNICATION	69	(12)
(i) Introduction to Habermas' Project.	69	(3)
(it) Developing Kant and Chomsky in Pragmatic Directions	72	(3)
(iii) Habermas' Emphatic Sense of 'Understanding'	75	(4)
(iv) Reconstructing Self-Presence	79	(2)
2) PHILOSOPHICAL PROFESSIONALISM: NEUTRALIZING THE EFFECTS OF ONE'S DESIDERATUM	81	(6)
(i) The Ideal and the Possible	81	(4)
(ii) A General Notion of Play	85	(2)
(B) THE INSIDE AND THE OUTSIDE
1) THE LEGITIMATE INSIDE	87	(6)
(i) Within the Text, and Beyond	87	(1)
(ii) The Inside of Three Validity-Claims; The Meaning of the Number Three in Habermas	88	(5)
2) THE ILLEGITIMATE OUTSIDE	93	(16)
(i) Reinventing the Perlocutionary Component of Speech-Acts as Strategic Use of Language	93	(4)
(ii) Concealed Strategic Use of Language	97	(5)
(iii) Open Strategic Use of language	102	(7)
3) AT THE INSIDE OF THE INSIDE	109	(4)
(i) The Intrinsic Anaseme of the Theory of Communicative Action	109	(1)
(ii) Recursive Definitions and Self-Reference	110	(3)
(C) STRATEGIES OF SELF-IMMUNIZATION
(1) CHIASMATIC CRITICISM	113	(7)
(i) The Fallacy of Escaping a Fallacy	113	(1)
(ii) Who is Collapsing What and How Much	114	(2)
(iii) A Critique of Reason must Employ Reason	116	(2)
(iv) The 'Pre-Postmetaphysical ' Assumptions Behind the Critique of Metaphysics	118	(2)
2) THE NOTION OF 'FALLIBILISM' AS SELF-IMMUNIZING STRATEGY	120	(8)
(i) A Postmetaphysical Theory Making Universalistic Truth-Claims	120	(1)
(ii) First and Third Person	121	(2)
(iii) Habermas' Double-Bind	123	(1)
(iv) The Superficiality and Necessity of the Concept 'Fallibilism.'	124	(2)
(v) 'Fallibilism' as a Self-Immunizing Stratagem	126	(2)
3) THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF REFUTATING STRATEGIES	128	(6)
(i) Philosophical Style and Self-Immunization	128	(1)
(ii) Performative Contradiction as Philosophical Defense-Mechanism	129	(2)
(iii) The Anatomy of the Performative Contradiction	131	(1)
(iv) The Performative Contradiction and Its Phono-Logocentric Foundation	132	(2)
4) CONCLUSION	134	(3)
THE USES AND ABUSES OF PLEASURE—THE MANY INCOMPATIBLE VOICES IN STUART MILL'S UTILITARIANISM	137	(48)
1) INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	137	(5)
(i) How to Interpret Mills Inconsistencies	137	(2)
(ii) The 'Naturalistic Fallacy' and the 'Anasemic Fallacy'	139	(1)
(iii) Three Distinctions Between Logical Analysis and Deconstructive Analysis	140	(1)
(iv) Elements of a Logic of Illogicality or an Oneiric Logic	141	(1)
2) FORMALIZING NONSENSE	142	(23)
(i) Reinterpreting the Term 'Utility.'	142	(2)
(ii) The Extreme Definitions of Utilitarianism and their Impossible Medium	144	(1)
(iii) A First Formula for 'Reasonableness.'	145	(2)
(iv) The Pleasure-Principle of Utilitarianism Simultaneous Defense and Rejection of a Principle	147	(1)
3.1) DEFINITIONS AND REDEFINITIONS OF PLEASURE	148	(3)
(i) Higher and Lower Pleasures	148	(1)
(ii) Replacing Quantity with Quality	149	(2)
3.2) DEFINITIONS AND REDEFINITIONS OF PLEASURE	151	(5)
(i) Voting on Pleasures—How to Rig the Vote Philosophy-Wise	151	(2)
(ii) Preferable Unbearable Pleasures	153	(1)
(iii) Pleasures for Pigs and Fools—Arguing One's Repressions	154	(2)
3.3) DEFINITIONS AND REDEFINITIONS OF PLEASURE	156	(9)
(i) The Standard and the Exception—A Fragile Hierarchy	156	(1)
(ii) The Pleasure of Promoting Pleasure	157	(1)
(iii) Condensation as a Means to Erase Discrepancy	158	(1)
(iv) The Value of Self-sacrifice—The Pleasure of Promoting Pleasure Continued	159	(1)
(v) Happiness as a Coin—The Pseudo-Logic of Economy	160	(1)
(vi) A Fourth Paradoxical 'Pleasure': Renunciation of Pleasure	161	(2)
(vii) Five Incompatible Pleasures—The 'Moral Passion' Behind the Moral Theory	163	(2)
4) THE NATURAL AND THE ACQUIRED	165	(6)
(i) The Supplemental Fallacy	165	(2)
(ii) Cultivating What Comes Naturally	167	(1)
(iii) Subjective and Social Feelings as Natural Supplements	168	(3)
5) VIRTUE AS 'PROOF' OF UTILITARIANISM	171	(10)
(i) Desired and Desirable	171	(2)
(ii) Explaining Self-Contradiction	173	(2)
(iii) Condensing Means and Ends	175	(2)
(iv) 'Virtue' as Pseudo-Solution to the Transition-Problem	177	(4)
6) CONCLUSION	181	(4)
NOTES, LIST OF LITERATURE, INDEX	185
NOTES	187	(28)
LIST OF LITERATURE	215	(10)
INDEX	225