| PART III THE PROBLEM OF THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL (THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS) |
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xi | |
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Section I PRELIMINARY CRITICAL QUESTIONS |
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I. THE CONNECTIONS OF THE PROBLEM |
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19 | (10) |
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(a) Man's Power to Choose |
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19 | (2) |
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(b) Man as the Mediator between Value and Actuality |
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21 | (1) |
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(c) Freedom Independent of Decisions in Single Cases |
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22 | (3) |
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(d) Extreme Cases as a Test |
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25 | (2) |
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(e) The Problem of Freedom, Its Methodological Position |
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27 | (2) |
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM |
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29 | (8) |
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29 | (3) |
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(b) The Detachment of the Ethical from the Religious Problem of Freedom |
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32 | (1) |
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(c) The Kantian Antinomy of Freedom |
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33 | (4) |
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III. ERRONEOUS CONCEPTIONS OF FREEDOM |
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37 | (16) |
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(a) The Three Typical Sources of Error in the Treatment of the Problem |
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37 | (2) |
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(b) Moral and Legal Freedom, Can and May |
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39 | (1) |
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(c) Freedom of Action and Freedom of Will |
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40 | (2) |
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(d) "Outward" Freedom, as Misunderstood |
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42 | (2) |
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(e) "Inner" (Psychological) Freedom, as Misunderstood |
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44 | (4) |
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(f) The Fundamental Error in Negative Freedom of Choice |
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48 | (5) |
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Section II THE CAUSAL ANTINOMY |
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IV. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF KANT'S SOLUTION |
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53 | (9) |
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(a) The Projection of the Intelligible World into the World of Appearance |
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53 | (1) |
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(b) The Causal Nexus and the Something More in Determination |
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54 | (2) |
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(c) Kant's Transcendental Idealism, Its Solution |
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56 | (3) |
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(d) The Twofold Stratification of the World, Causal Nexus and Moral Law |
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59 | (3) |
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V. DETERMINISM AND INDETERMINISM |
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62 | (11) |
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(a) The Radical Elimination of Conceptual Errors |
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62 | (1) |
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(b) The Mistake of Ethical Naturalism and Psychologism |
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63 | (2) |
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(c) The Error of Indeterminism |
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65 | (2) |
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(d) The Teleological Conception of the World, its Claim in the Question of Freedom |
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67 | (2) |
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(e) The Error of Finalistic Determinism |
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69 | (4) |
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VI. DETERMINISM, CAUSAL AND FINALISTIC |
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73 | (13) |
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(a) Metaphysical Paradoxes |
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73 | (2) |
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(b) A Reference Back to the Law of Categorial Dependence |
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75 | (2) |
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(c) The Ontological Dependence of the Finalistic upon the Causal Nexus |
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77 | (2) |
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(d) Categorial Freedom of Teleology above the Causal Nexus |
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79 | (2) |
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(e) Causal Monism, its Inversion of the Categorial Law of Freedom |
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81 | (1) |
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(f) Finalistic Monism, its Inversion of the Basic Law of the Categories |
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82 | (2) |
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(g) Metaphysical Mechanism and Pantheism |
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84 | (2) |
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VII. ONTOLOGICAL REGULARITY AS THE BASIS OF FREEDOM |
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86 | (15) |
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(a) The Appearance of Determinative Dualism |
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86 | (2) |
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(b) Types of Determination, their Ontological Relation to Stratification |
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88 | (4) |
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(c) The General Twofold Law of Strength and Freedom |
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92 | (4) |
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(d) The General Grades of Categorial Freedom and the Special Case of Freedom of Will |
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96 | (5) |
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Section III THE ANTINOMY OF THE OUGHT |
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VIII. CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM |
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101 | (10) |
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(a) The Causal Antinomy: its Limit |
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101 | (1) |
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(b) The πρωτommicronν ψepsilonupsilonδomicronζ of "Transcendental Freedom" |
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102 | (2) |
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(c) The Ought and the Will: the Second Antinomy of Freedom |
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104 | (4) |
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(d) The Kantian Problem of Freedom and That of the Religious Scholastics |
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108 | (3) |
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IX. FALSE WAYS OF PROVING THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL |
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111 | (15) |
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(a) The So-Called "Proofs" of the Freedom of the Will in General |
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111 | (1) |
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(b) Fichte's Freedom Behind Consciousness |
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112 | (3) |
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(c) The "Nullification of Freedom" by Fichte in his Later Years |
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115 | (2) |
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(d) Schelling: Freedom, Apparent and Absolute |
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117 | (3) |
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(e) Leibniz' Theory of the Absolute Self-Development of the Monad |
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120 | (3) |
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(f) Schopenhauer's Doctrine Concerning Intelligible Character |
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123 | (3) |
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X. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE PROBLEM |
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126 | (11) |
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(a) Conclusions Concerning the Nature of Freedom |
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126 | (1) |
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(b) The Aporia; Inherent in Moral Freedom |
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127 | (3) |
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(c) The Third Antinomy of Freedom Behind the Second |
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130 | (7) |
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Section IV ETHICAL PHENOMENA, THEIR EFFICACY AS PROOFS |
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XI. "PROOFS" OF METAPHYSICAL OBJECTS |
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137 | (6) |
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(a) The Impossibility of Proving the Freedom of the Will |
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137 | (2) |
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(b) Phenomena and Metaphysical Objects |
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139 | (1) |
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(c) Possible Methods of Proof, the Different Types |
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140 | (3) |
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XII. MORAL JUDGMENT AND THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF-DETERMINATION |
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143 | (11) |
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(a) The Argument from Moral Judgment |
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143 | (2) |
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(b) The Consciousness of Self-Determination as a General Accompaniment of Action |
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145 | (1) |
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(c) The Consciousness of Self-Determination and the Self-Determination of Consciousness |
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146 | (3) |
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(d) The Reverse Side of the Alternative and the Burden of Proof for Scepticism |
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149 | (2) |
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(e) The Phenomenon, Its Metaphysical Import |
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151 | (3) |
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XIII. RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY |
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154 | (18) |
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(a) Responsibility as a Fact of Ethical Reality |
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154 | (1) |
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(b) Bearing of Responsibility as a Sign of Personal Freedom |
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155 | (2) |
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(c) Accountability and the Capacity and Claim Thereto |
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157 | (4) |
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(d) The Basic Ethical Capacity of the Person |
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161 | (2) |
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(e) The Categorial Self-Suppression of Ethical Scepticism |
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163 | (3) |
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(f) The Reality and the Appearance of Freedom. Metaphysical Weight of the Argument |
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166 | (6) |
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XIV. THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT |
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172 | (7) |
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(a) The Sense of Guilt, Conscience, Remorse and the Will to Guilt |
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172 | (3) |
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(b) The Strength of the Argument |
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175 | (2) |
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(c) The Ideal and Real Essence of the Individual Person |
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177 | (2) |
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XV. SUPPLEMENTARY GROUPS OF FACTS |
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179 | (3) |
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182 | (23) |
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182 | (1) |
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(b) The Weft of the Non-Identity of the Ought and the Will |
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183 | (2) |
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(c) The Part Played by the Purely Valuational Antinomies and by the Empirical Conflict of Values |
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185 | (2) |
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(d) The Part Played by the Values of Personality as the Basis of Freedom |
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187 | (3) |
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(e) Personality, Its Ideal and Actual Autonomy |
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190 | (2) |
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(f) Freedom under Law and Freedom above Law |
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192 | (4) |
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(g) The Antinomy of the Autonomies |
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196 | (9) |
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Section V ONTOLOGICAL POSSIBILITY OF PERSONAL FREEDOM |
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XVII. AUTONOMY OF THE PERSON AND DETERMINATION OF VALUES |
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205 | (8) |
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(a) The Question of the Possibility of Personal Freedom |
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205 | (1) |
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(b) The Threefold Stratification of the Determinational Types |
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206 | (3) |
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(c) The Finalistic Difficulty in Freedom and Its Solution |
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209 | (4) |
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XVIII. SOLUTION OF THE OUGHT-ANTINOMY |
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213 | (18) |
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(a) The Inner Conflict in Free Will as the Moral Will |
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213 | (1) |
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(b) Solution of the Conflict. Exposure of Equivocations |
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214 | (3) |
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(c) The Conflict of the Two Factors in Moral Freedom |
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217 | (1) |
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(d) The Complementary Relation behind the Apparent Conflict |
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218 | (3) |
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(e) The Recurrence of "Negative Freedom" in the Ought-Antinomy |
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221 | (2) |
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(f) The Scope of "Negative" Freedom and its True Relation to "Positive" Freedom |
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223 | (2) |
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(g) Reciprocal Conditionality of Positive and Negative Freedom with regard to Values |
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225 | (3) |
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(h) Two-sided Freedom in the Self-Determination of the Person |
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228 | (3) |
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XIX. PROBLEMS STILL UNSOLVED |
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231 | (20) |
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(a) The Difficulty Concerning Individuality in Moral Freedom |
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231 | (1) |
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(b) The Positive Relation between Universal and Individual Autonomy |
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232 | (2) |
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(c) The Question as to the Nature of the Indi vidual Determinant |
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234 | (3) |
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(d) Personal Teleology as a Determinational Mode of Positive Freedom |
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237 | (2) |
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(e) The Ontological Difficulty in Personal Freedom |
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239 | (1) |
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(f) The Categorial Structure of the Complex Conditioning-Relationship |
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240 | (3) |
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(g) Moral and Categorial Freedom |
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243 | (3) |
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(h) The Limit to the Problem |
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246 | |
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Section VI APPENDIX TO THE DOCTRINE OF FREEDOM |
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XX. APPARENT AND REAL DEFECTS OF THE THEORY |
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251 | (9) |
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XXI. ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM |
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260 | (15) |
| INDEX |
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275 | |
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