| Introduction |
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1 | (8) |
| PART I Early Greek thinkers: moral determinism and individual responsibility |
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9 | (60) |
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1 Homer and the Iliad: necessity and grace |
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11 | (10) |
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1 War: its hazards and necessities |
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11 | (2) |
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2 Simone Weil on the Iliad: necessity and grace |
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13 | (3) |
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3 Homer's objectivity: love and detachment |
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16 | (2) |
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4 The world of human bondage and the possibility of freedom |
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18 | (3) |
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2 Sophocles' Oedipus: fate, human destiny and individual responsibility |
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21 | (14) |
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1 The meaning of fate and its way of working in Oedipus' life |
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21 | (2) |
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2 Oedipus's lack of self-knowledge and the way it seals his fate |
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23 | (6) |
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3 Freud's Oedipus complex and the play |
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29 | (2) |
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4 Oedipus' lack of freedom and his downfall |
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31 | (2) |
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5 Conclusion: was Sophocles a determinist? |
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33 | (2) |
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3 Plato and moral determinism |
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35 | (14) |
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1 Good, evil and self-mastery--the Phaedrus |
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35 | (4) |
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2 Freedom and self-mastery--the Gorgias |
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39 | (3) |
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3 Love of goodness and slavery to evil |
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42 | (5) |
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4 Conclusion: moral knowledge and freedom |
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47 | (2) |
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4 Aristotle: moral knowledge and the problem of free will |
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49 | (20) |
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1 Aristotle's treatment of voluntary action and moral responsibility |
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49 | (5) |
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54 | (5) |
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3 Self-mastery and weakness of will |
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59 | (6) |
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65 | (4) |
| PART II The coming of age of Christianity: morality, theology and freedom of the will |
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69 | (42) |
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5 St Augustine: free will, the reality of evil, and our dependence on God |
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71 | (18) |
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71 | (2) |
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2 The reality of free will |
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73 | (2) |
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3 Good and evil: free will and God's grace |
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75 | (7) |
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4 Free will and God's foreknowledge |
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82 | (4) |
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86 | (3) |
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6 St Thomas Aquinas: reason, will and freedom of decision |
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89 | (22) |
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89 | (1) |
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2 The will as rational appetite and its freedom |
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90 | (7) |
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3 The will and the intellect: good and evil |
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97 | (5) |
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4 Free will, goodness and grace |
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102 | (2) |
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5 Free will and God's foreknowledge |
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104 | (2) |
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106 | (5) |
| PART III The rise of science: universal causation and human agency |
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111 | (52) |
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7 Descartes' dualism: infinite freedom with limited power |
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113 | (14) |
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113 | (6) |
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2 Human action and the will |
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119 | (4) |
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3 Freedom of the will in Descartes |
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123 | (4) |
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8 Spinoza: human freedom in a world of strict determinism |
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127 | (14) |
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127 | (4) |
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2 The most fundamental of Spinoza's conceptions of determinism |
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131 | (3) |
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3 Detachment, acceptance and self-knowledge |
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134 | (2) |
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4 Finding freedom through yielding to the inevitable |
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136 | (5) |
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9 Hume and Kant: reason, passion and free will |
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141 | (22) |
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1 `Passion and reason, self-division's cause' |
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141 | (2) |
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2 Hume and Kant: a conceptual dichotomy |
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143 | (7) |
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3 Kant and Hume on free will and determinism |
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150 | (8) |
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4 Kant's conception of psychology as an `anthropological science' |
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158 | (5) |
| PART IV The age of psychology: reason and feeling, causality and free will |
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163 | (104) |
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10 Schopenhauer: free will and determinism |
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165 | (14) |
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1 Schopenhauer's arguments for determinism |
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165 | (5) |
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2 Flaws in Schopenhauer's arguments |
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170 | (5) |
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175 | (3) |
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178 | (1) |
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11 Freud: freedom and self-knowledge |
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179 | (11) |
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1 Freud on the psychological limitations of human freedom |
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179 | (3) |
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2 Self-knowledge and change in psycho-analytic therapy |
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182 | (6) |
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188 | (2) |
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12 Sartre: freedom as something to which man is condemned |
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190 | (16) |
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1 Freedom, consciousness and human existence |
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190 | (3) |
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2 Absolute freedom in the face of obstacles, necessities and an irrevocable past |
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193 | (6) |
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3 The burden of freedom, bad faith and autonomy through self-knowledge |
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199 | (2) |
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201 | (5) |
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13 Simone Weil: freedom within the confines of necessity |
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206 | (15) |
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206 | (3) |
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209 | (3) |
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3 Free will and necessity |
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212 | (5) |
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4 Freedom in a world of necessity: Simone Weil and Spinoza |
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217 | (2) |
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219 | (2) |
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14 G E Moore: free will and causality |
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221 | (13) |
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1 G E Moore on free will and determinism |
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221 | (4) |
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2 J L Austin's criticism of Moore |
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225 | (4) |
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3 The principle or law of causality |
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229 | (4) |
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233 | (1) |
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15 Wittgenstein: freedom of the will |
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234 | (21) |
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1 Science and the freedom of the will |
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234 | (4) |
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2 Wittgenstein and Simone Weil: the thief and the falling stone |
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238 | (3) |
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3 Wittgenstein and Schopenhauer: determination of our decisions |
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241 | (4) |
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4 Choice and causality: `He was brought up to think as he does' |
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245 | (3) |
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5 Freedom and predictability |
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248 | (3) |
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251 | (4) |
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16 Conclusion: human freedom and determinism |
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255 | (12) |
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255 | (2) |
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2 Relative freedom and bondage: autonomy and bad faith |
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257 | (3) |
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3 Theological dimension: human freedom and God's foreknowledge |
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260 | (1) |
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261 | (6) |
| Notes |
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267 | (1) |
| Bibliography |
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268 | (3) |
| Index |
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271 | |