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Chapter One
"The Lord Looks out
for Drunks,
Little Children,
and CVEs"
On 3 September 1939, when German troops surged across the Polish border and World War II was ignited, the German Navy had only fifty-seven U-boats. Just twenty-two of these (the 626-ton Type VII and 1,032-ton Type IX) were really operational. The rest were smaller types useful only for training or coastal work. Kommodore Karl Doenitz (promoted to Rear Admiral and Flag Officer, U-boats, or Befehlshaber der U-boote, in October) had stated prior to the outbreak of war that at least 90 submarines would be needed in the Atlantic and 300 needed overall. Hitler (believing the war would be short) did not authorize a building program for some time, however, to the later good fortune of the Allies. On the same date on the other side of the Atlantic, a weapon that would later come into direct conflict with the U-boat was hardly a gleam in the eye of U.S. naval planners, let alone built. This weapon was the escort carrier. Still, the seeds that germinated into the escort carriers of World War II had been planted years before. Just after World War I the Americans became interested in British activities in the field of aircraft carrier development. In 1916 the British had converted a merchant ship to a carrier and thus obtained the 15,775-ton HMS Argus, which could carry twenty aircraft and steam over 20 knots. (It is interesting to note that the Argus could steam a bit faster and was a bigger vessel than the World War II Bogue-class and Casablanca-class carriers.) Noting the success of the Argus, the Americans began planning their own aircraft carriers. The first fruit of these plans was the Langley, converted from a seven-year-old collier. Conversion of the ship began in 1919, and the Langley was commissioned on 20 March 1922. The Langley displaced 11,050 tons, had a flight deck 534 feet long, and could steam at a leisurely 15 knots. The "Covered Wagon" was frankly considered an experiment, but the tests she was involved in regarding equipment, training, and operational techniques led directly to the successful U.S. carriers of World War II. During World War I the British had also been experimenting with conversions of light cruisers to carriers, though when the war ended these studies were discontinued. The idea of a cruiser-hulled carrier kept generating interest, however. When the Washington Fleet Conference of 1921-22 imposed limits on the total tonnage of aircraft carriers for the great naval powers, and the 1930 London Fleet Conference placed further limits on the building of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, the idea of small carriers was rekindled. Several loopholes in the Washington agreement left the Americans with the chance to use up to 25 percent of the alloted cruiser tonnage for conversion to ships with flight decks. However, in the mid-1920s the Navy's General Board decided that it would not be a good idea to "sacrifice" a cruiser for a carrier that would displace less than 10,000 tons. The minimum displacement for a satisfactory carrier had to be 14,000 tons. But the idea of a small, or light, carrier would not go away. In May of 1927, Lieutenant Commander Bruce G. Leighton wrote an impressive paper on light carriers. His forecast of possible use for these smaller vessels proved to be remarkably prescient. In his paper Leighton foresaw the use of these ships in antisubmarine warfare, fleet operations support, reconnaissance, attacks on enemy warships, and the reduction of enemy shore bases. Leighton was also concerned that the loss of the Lexington or the Saratoga, both just becoming operational, would seriously weaken fleet operations, whereas the small carriers could operate in groups, and the destruction of one would not be a serious setback. About this time the Navy was quite taken with the idea of a "flying deck cruiser." This hybrid vessel of approximately 10,000 tons would be a cross-pollination of light cruiser and aircraft carrier. About 650 feet long, the forward half of this vessel would be a 6-inch gunned, triple-turreted cruiser. The after half would have a 350-foot angled flight deck (a design years ahead of its time), with hangar space for twenty-four aircraft. It was an imaginative concept. The only comparable designs actually built were the two Japanese battleships Ise and Hyuga, which were fitted with short flight decks in World War II. The flying deck cruiser would never be built. When Franklin D. Roosevelt became president in 1933, the Navy became the beneficiary of a new emphasis on shipbuilding. With money now available for the construction of true carriers, the need for a hybrid carrier was gone. The idea of the flying deck cruiser, though kept alive until 1940, finally disappeared into the land of what-might-have-been. The concept of a small, or escort, carrier was not dead, however. As early as 1935 the Navy's Bureau of Construction and Repair had been considering the conversion of ten fast passenger ships to carriers. Plans had been developed "for quick action when the war emergency required the conversion of merchant type vessels to auxiliary aircraft carriers." These plans were allowed to lapse in 1940, though such individuals as Captain John S. McCain, then commanding the Ranger, were pleading in early 1939 for eight "pocket-sized" carriers capable of cruiser speeds. But the war in Europe was beginning to have an impact on American naval planners as they watched the British fighting the U-boats. Supplies, including aircraft, had to reach England. Small carriers could be used to deliver these aircraft as well as provide convoy escort. The instigator of what would become the escort carrier turned out to be President Roosevelt. In late October 1940 Roosevelt, through his naval aide, directed the chief of naval operations to obtain a merchant ship for conversion to an aircraft carrier. This ship was to displace 6,000 to 8,000 tons and have a speed of not less than 15 knots. She was to be capable of operating eight to twelve helicopters (though the Navy had none yet, nor would have any for some time) or aircraft. The purpose of this vessel was to carry aircraft for convoy escort, submarine detection, and the dropping of smoke bombs to mark the position of submarines located for surface craft to attack. In a series of conferences held in the office of the chief of naval operations between 31 December 1940 and 23 January 1941, it was decided to obtain two diesel-powered C-3 merchant ships from the Maritime Commission. Use of helicopters/autogiros was ruled out for these vessels. Because of the need for aircraft, these vessels would have a full-length flight deck. Speed of construction was essential, as the president continually pointed out to the chief of naval operations. Nevertheless, the Navy believed that it would take a year and a half to convert the ships. Roosevelt was in no mood for this timetable and told the Navy that any plan that would take more than three months would be unacceptable. Finally, by 17 January 1941 the Navy presented a proposal that was acceptable. On the 27th the Maritime Commission told the Navy that the C-3 diesel Mormacmail would be available for conversion about 1 March. A second ship, the Mormacland, was also to be available for conversion and assignment to the British. Further impetus for this conversion program was received in February of 1941 when then-Rear Admiral William F. Halsey (with strong endorsement from his superior officer, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel) urged the conversion of merchant vessels to carriers, and the sooner, the better. On 4 March 1941, the Navy acquired the Mormacmail. At a cost of $1,500,000 she was converted at Newport News, Virginia. On 2 June, just a few days before the president's time limit of three months expired, she was commissioned as the Long Island. Initially she was designated APV-1, but this was changed to AVG-1 on 31 March 1941. [The designation of escort carriers changed two more times during the war. From AVG (Aircraft Escort Vessel), the carriers were redesignated ACV (Auxiliary Aircraft Carrier) in August 1942, and finally CVE (Escort Carrier) in July 1943. These changes reflected the growing importance, or "respectability" as Henry Dater puts it, of these vessels in the U.S. Navy.] The Long Island was 492 feet long overall, with a beam of 69 feet 6 inches. Initially she displaced 13,500 tons with a full load. She could make up to 16 1/2 knots. To handle the proposed complement of SOC Seagull aircraft safely, a flight deck of 362 feet was built. She was fitted with one elevator aft and had one catapult forward on the port side. The carrier had no island; her bridge was just below the level of the flight deck at its forward end. When tests showed that a longer flight deck was needed, the Long Island went back into the yard in the summer of 1941 to have an additional 77 feet added. Because this additional length extended over the bridge, the ship now had to be conned from wings on either side of the flight deck. Certain other improvements were also made at this time. After she came out of the yards, she had a full-load displacement of 14,953 tons, but her speed had increased to over 17 knots. The Mormacland was acquired at the same time as the Mormacmail and was converted to a similar configuration. The main difference between the two ships was the small island on the Mormacland's starboard side. She was transferred to the Royal Navy as HMS Archer in November 1941. Before receiving the Archer, the Royal Navy had been experimenting with several types of vessels that could be used for convoy escort. One stopgap measure was the CAM-ship (Catapult Aircraft Merchant ship). This cargo vessel could carry only one Hurricane fighter, which, when catapulted, could not be recovered. Nevertheless, a number of these ships provided very valuable service in 1941 and into 1942. While the CAM-ships were being converted, the British were proceeding with a different type of conversion. In early 1941 they captured the German merchantman Hannover. Work was begun immediately to convert her into an "escort carrier." In June of 1941 she was placed in service as HMS Audacity. She was small-only 6,000 tons-and could carry just six aircraft. But she proved to be very successful in a brief career, being sunk by U-751 on 21 December 1941. The experience the British gained with her and the Archer whetted their appetite for more escort carriers. To satisfy this appetite the Americans converted five other C-3 hulls for the British based on the improved Long Island plan. These had a flight deck 440 feet long, with a small island to starboard, but still only one elevator. One of these ships, the Charger (BAVG-4, then AVG-30, and finally CVE-30), was returned to the U.S. Navy on 2 March 1942. The Charger spent virutally her entire career on the East Coast in a training role. It would be some time before the British would receive more CVEs, because of higher priorities in both the United States and England. So they cast about for other possibilities. What the British came up with was the MAC-ship. Nineteen of these Merchant Aircraft Carrier ships were converted in 1942-43; they were former grain carriers or tankers that would still be used in a cargo capacity. A flight deck was added to their superstructures, and the ships carried four Swordfish torpedo planes. By mid-1943, however, more true escort carriers were becoming available, and the MAC-ships operated in secondary roles for the remainder of the war. Meanwhile, like the Langley, the Long Island was being used quite extensively for experimental purposes. Results of the tests with this ship indicated the need for another aircraft elevator, a longer flight deck, and an increase in antiaircraft armament. The outcome of these tests would be the Bogue-class escort carrier. War came to the United States on 7 December 1941 at Pearl Harbor, and four days later Germany declared war on the United States. Doenitz wanted to take advantage of the confusion that would surround America's entry into the war, but commitments elsewhere left him with only about twelve submarines that could operate at any one time off the United States. Of these twelve boats only five or six actually initiated Operation Paukenschlag off the U.S. East Coast on 13 January 1942. Nevertheless, these few U-boats created havoc off America, encountering "the greenest pasture the war was ever to offer." United States defenses took an inordinately long time to organize countermeasures to the U-boat threat, and merchant sinkings along the East Coast skyrocketed. In the first six months over 400 ships totaling over 2,000,000 tons were sunk in the area. But the Germans couldn't keep up the pace, and, finally faced with more convoy operations and increased antisubmarine forces, Doenitz moved many of his boats back out into the North Atlantic in May. A number of submarines remained in the Caribbean and Antilles areas, however, to create trouble throughout the summer. In the meantime, the United States had been at war less than three weeks when the secretary of the navy on 26 December 1941 approved the conversion of twenty-four C3-S-A1 hulls for the 1942 escort carrier program. Because the diesel-powered Long Island and the first British carriers were thought to be too slow, these ships employed steam turbines and a single shaft to drive them at speeds up to 18 knots (which was really not much faster than the earlier vessels). Small smokestacks just aft of amidships vented the exhaust gases overboard. At 442 feet 3 inches long and 80 feet 10 inches wide, the flight decks of the Bogue-class ships were slightly longer and wider than the Long Island's deck. Most of the vessels had a single catapult on the port side forward and inboard about 10 feet. Benefiting from the experience of the Long Island, these carriers had two elevators, nine arresting wires, and three barriers. The hangar deck was much larger than the Long Island's, extending about 240 feet between the elevators. However, the shear of the main deck had been retained in the hangar, which created some plane-handling problems. A small island about 6 feet wide was an important improvement to these vessels. The island incorporated the captain's and navigator's cabins, an open bridge and lookout platforms, and a chart room.
Armament of the Bogue-class carriers was greatly improved. Main
deck sponsons to hold two 5-inch 51's were built on the starboard and
port quarters. These guns were eventually changed to 5-inch 38's.
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