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13 | (8) |
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21 | (46) |
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II.1 What is an Institution? |
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21 | (4) |
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II.2 The Different Approaches to Social Institutions |
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25 | (12) |
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25 | (2) |
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II.2.2 Game Theory versus Power-based Theories |
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27 | (6) |
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II.2.3 The Power-based Institutional Model |
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33 | (2) |
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II.2.4 Game Theory versus Power Theory |
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35 | (2) |
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II.3 The Theory of Social Institutions |
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37 | (30) |
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38 | (5) |
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43 | (4) |
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47 | (3) |
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50 | (2) |
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52 | (4) |
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II.3.6 Social Institutions |
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56 | (6) |
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II.3.7 The Knight and his Village |
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62 | (5) |
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III. General Equilibrium Theories |
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67 | (22) |
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III.1 Historical and Conceptual Development of GET |
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68 | (2) |
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70 | (15) |
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III.2.1 Behavioral Theory of the Firm |
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70 | (8) |
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III.2.2 Equilibrium Theory |
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78 | (4) |
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III.2.3 Transaction Cost Theory |
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82 | (3) |
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III.3 Structuralist Representations of Economic Theories |
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85 | (4) |
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89 | (20) |
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IV.1 Commodities and Prices |
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90 | (2) |
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92 | (2) |
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94 | (3) |
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IV.3.1 Consumption Plans and Consumption Sets |
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94 | (1) |
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95 | (1) |
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96 | (1) |
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96 | (1) |
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IV.3.5 Budget Constraints |
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96 | (1) |
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IV.4 POE (private ownership economy) |
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97 | (2) |
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IV.5 Equilibrium and State of the Economy |
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99 | (4) |
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IV.6 The ARROW-DEBREU Equilibrium |
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103 | (2) |
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IV.7 The Core of the General Equilibrium Theory |
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105 | (4) |
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V. Merging of the Theories |
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109 | (12) |
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109 | (1) |
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110 | (5) |
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110 | (1) |
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V.2.2 Additional Modifications |
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111 | (4) |
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V.3 Merging of SIT and GETD |
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115 | (6) |
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VI. Application of the Theory |
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121 | (16) |
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VI.1 The Knight and his Village revisited |
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121 | (9) |
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VI.1.1 Exchange and Influence |
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122 | (4) |
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VI.1.2 The Role of Transactions |
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126 | (4) |
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130 | (7) |
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137 | (22) |
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VII.1 Critic of the General Equilibrium Theories |
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138 | (5) |
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VII.2 The Role of Hidden Assumptions |
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143 | (4) |
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147 | (8) |
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155 | (4) |
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VIII. Observations on the Method |
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159 | (30) |
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VIII.1 Elements of the structuralist theory concept |
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160 | (8) |
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160 | (3) |
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163 | (5) |
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VIII.2 Theory of Social Institutions |
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168 | (9) |
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168 | (1) |
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169 | (2) |
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171 | (2) |
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VIII.2.4 Social Practises |
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173 | (2) |
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VIII.2.5 Social Institutions |
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175 | (2) |
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177 | (4) |
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177 | (2) |
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VIII.3.2 The ARROW-DEBREU Equilibrium |
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179 | (1) |
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VIII.3.3 The Core of the General Equilibrium Theory |
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180 | (1) |
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181 | (1) |
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VIII.5 The Empirical Claim |
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182 | (2) |
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VIII.6 Specialization versus Enhancement |
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184 | (3) |
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VIII.7 Enhancement of a Theory Element |
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187 | (2) |
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IX. Symbols and Conventions |
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189 | (2) |
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191 | |