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Given the influence and impact of public bureaucracies in policy implementation, and the accountability they owe to the American public, their performance must be assessed in a systematic manner. With this new edition, Gormley and Balla revisit their four key perspectives-bounded rationality, principal-agent theory, interest group mobilization, and network theory-to help students develop an analytic framework for comprehensively evaluating bureaucratic performance.
William T. Gormley Jr. is university professor and professor of government and public policy of Georgetown University. He is also a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration and a past president of the Public Policy Section of the American Political Science Association. Steven J. Balla is associate professor of political science, public policy and public administration, and international affairs at george Washington University. He is also a research associate at the George Washington Institute of Public Policy and a senior scholar at the Regulatory Studies Center.
Table of Contents
|Tables and Figures||p. xi|
|Bureaucracies as Policymaking Organizations||p. 1|
|The Contours of Public Bureaucracy||p. 6|
|Accountability and Performance in Public Bureaucracies||p. 7|
|Accountability and its Many Faces||p. 12|
|The Evolution of Accountability||p. 14|
|The Limits of Accountability||p. 15|
|The Push for Performance||p. 16|
|The Government Performance and Results Act||p. 19|
|The Program Assessment Rating Tool||p. 21|
|Agency Reputations in the Real World||p. 23|
|Accountability and Performance: Theories and Applications||p. 25|
|Bureaucratic Reasoning||p. 34|
|The Bounded Rationality Model||p. 37|
|Simplified Problem Solving||p. 40|
|Problem Disaggregation||p. 41|
|Standard Operating Procedures||p. 42|
|Sunk Costs||p. 46|
|Simulations and Tests||p. 47|
|Evidence-Based Research||p. 48|
|Implications for Policy Analysis||p. 49|
|Empathy and Commitment||p. 51|
|Representative Bureaucracy||p. 53|
|Money as a Motivator||p. 54|
|Attitudes toward Risk||p. 55|
|Organizational Advancement||p. 56|
|Promoting Organizational Cohesion||p. 58|
|Consequences of Bounded Rationality||p. 60|
|A Narrow Search||p. 60|
|Problem Disaggregation||p. 61|
|Standard Operating Procedures||p. 63|
|The Bureaucracy's Bosses||p. 71|
|Delegation, Adverse Selection, and Moral Hazard||p. 73|
|Why Bureaucracy?||p. 76|
|Why Delegation Varies||p. 78|
|Implementing Child Care Legislation||p. 81|
|Managing Delegation||p. 83|
|Presidential Power||p. 84|
|Congressional Control of the Bureaucracy||p. 95|
|Judicial Review||p. 103|
|Principal-Agent Theory and the Bureaucracy's Clients||p. 108|
|Principals and Principles||p. 109|
|The Bureaucracy's Clients||p. 117|
|The Benefits, Costs, and Politics of Public Policy||p. 119|
|The Rise and Fall of Iron Triangles||p. 122|
|The Venues of Client Participation||p. 127|
|The Notice and Comment Process||p. 127|
|Advisory Committees and Other Venues of Collaboration||p. 130|
|Political Intervention||p. 133|
|Client Participation and the Internet||p. 134|
|Client Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking||p. 139|
|Business Organizations||p. 141|
|Public Interest Groups||p. 143|
|State and Local Governments||p. 145|
|Clients and the Institutions of Government||p. 148|
|Client Participation: Three Lessons and Beyond||p. 149|
|Who Participates Varies||p. 149|
|Venues Vary||p. 150|
|Influence Varies||p. 150|
|Bureaucratic Networks||p. 158|
|Networks versus Hierarchies||p. 161|
|Network Theory||p. 162|
|The Tools Approach||p. 165|
|Types of Bureaucratic Networks||p. 167|
|Intergovernmental Relationships||p. 167|
|Environmental Protection||p. 168|
|Health Policy||p. 172|
|Race to the Top in Education||p. 176|
|Welfare Reform||p. 177|
|Public-Private Partnerships||p. 177|
|Contracting Out||p. 178|
|Partnerships without Contracts||p. 181|
|Interagency Networks||p. 183|
|The Cabinet||p. 184|
|Office of Management and Budget||p. 185|
|Interagency Coordination||p. 186|
|Network Effectiveness||p. 194|
|The Effectiveness of Policy Tools||p. 195|
|Networks and Public Bureaucracy||p. 201|
|The Politics of Disaster Management||p. 212|
|The Gulf of Mexico: Two Crises with Precedent||p. 214|
|Hurricane Katrina||p. 214|
|FEMA's Evolution||p. 215|
|Katrina Strikes||p. 218|
|Applying the Theories||p. 220|
|The Coast Guard and Other Success Stories||p. 224|
|The Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill||p. 226|
|Bounded Rationality on the Deepwater Horizon||p. 227|
|Networks and Oil Exploration||p. 228|
|The Minerals Management Service: A Problematic Principal||p. 230|
|Of Booms, Berms, and Client Politics||p. 232|
|September 11, 2001: A Crisis without Precedent||p. 236|
|The First Response||p. 237|
|Bureaucracy after 9/11||p. 239|
|The Iraq War and the Intelligence Community||p. 242|
|Bureaucratic Theories and the Politics of Homeland Security||p. 244|
|Avian Influenza: A Crisis in the Making?||p. 248|
|National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza||p. 250|
|Using the Theories to Forecast||p. 252|
|Evaluating Bureaucracy in Light of the Theories||p. 256|
|Why are Some Bureaucracies Better than Others?||p. 267|
|Rating the Performance of Agencies||p. 268|
|Explaining Variations in Performance||p. 269|
|Political Support||p. 277|
|Alternative Rating Systems||p. 285|
|Bureaucracy in the Twenty-First Century||p. 287|
|Web Resources||p. 295|
|Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.|