Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

by Daron Acemoglu , James A. Robinson

• ISBN13: 9780521671422
• ISBN10: 0521671426
• Edition: Reprint
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2009-02-09
• Publisher: Ingram Book Co

Summary

This book develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. Different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Thus democracy is preferred by the majority of citizens, but opposed by elites. Dictatorship nevertheless is not stable when citizens can threaten social disorder and revolution. In response, when the costs of repression are sufficiently high and promises of concessions are not credible, elites may be forced to create democracy. By democratizing, elites credibly transfer political power to the citizens, ensuring social stability. Democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentives to overthrow it. These processes depend on the strength of civil society, the structure of political institutions, the nature of political and economic crises, the level of economic inequality, the structure of the economy, and the form and extent of globalization.

Table of Contents

Preface	p. xi
Questions and Answers
Paths of Political Development	p. 1
Britain	p. 2
Argentina	p. 5
Singapore	p. 8
South Africa	p. 10
The Agenda	p. 14
Our Argument	p. 15
Democracy versus Nondemocracy	p. 16
Building Blocks of Our Approach	p. 19
Toward Our Basic Story	p. 22
Our Theory of Democratization	p. 23
Democratic Consolidation	p. 30
Determinants of Democracy	p. 31
Political Identities and the Nature of Conflict	p. 42
Democracy in a Picture	p. 43
Overview of the Book	p. 46
What Do We Know about Democracy?	p. 48
Measuring Democracy	p. 48
Patterns of Democracy	p. 51
Democracy, Inequality, and Redistribution	p. 58
Crises and Democracy	p. 65
Social Unrest and Democratization	p. 65
The Literature	p. 75
Our Contribution	p. 80
Modeling Politics
Democratic Politics	p. 89
Introduction	p. 89
Aggregating Individual Preferences	p. 91
Single-Peaked Preferences and the Median Voter Theorem	p. 92
Our Workhorse Models	p. 99
Democracy and Political Equality	p. 113
Conclusion	p. 117
Nondemocratic Politics	p. 118
Introduction	p. 118
Power and Constraints in Nondemocratic Politics	p. 120
Modeling Preferences and Constraints in Nondemocracies	p. 128
Commitment Problems	p. 133
A Simple Game of Promises	p. 144
A Dynamic Model	p. 151
Incentive-Compatible Promises	p. 161
Conclusion	p. 171
The Creation and Consolidation of Democracy
Democratization	p. 173
Introduction	p. 173
The Role of Political Institutions	p. 173
Preferences over Political Institutions	p. 176
Political Power and Institutions	p. 177
A Static Model of Democratization	p. 181
Democratization or Repression?	p. 186
A Dynamic Model of Democratization	p. 193
Subgame Perfect Equilibria	p. 201
Alternative Political Identities	p. 203
Targeted Transfers	p. 207
Power of the Elites in Democracy	p. 207
Ideological Preferences over Regimes	p. 211
Democratization in a Picture	p. 214
Equilibrium Revolutions	p. 215
Conclusion	p. 218
Coups and Consolidation	p. 221
Introduction	p. 221
Incentives for Coups	p. 224
A Static Model of Coups	p. 225
A Dynamic Model of the Creation and Consolidation of Democracy	p. 231
Alternative Political Identities	p. 246
Targeted Transfers	p. 246
Power in Democracy and Coups	p. 247
Consolidation in a Picture	p. 249
Defensive Coups	p. 251
Conclusion	p. 253
Putting the Models to Work
The Role of the Middle Class	p. 255
Introduction	p. 255
The Three-Class Model	p. 259
Emergence of Partial Democracy	p. 262
From Partial to Full Democracy	p. 267
Repression: The Middle Class as a Buffer	p. 273
Repression: Softliners versus Hardliners	p. 278
The Role of the Middle Class in Consolidating Democracy	p. 283
Conclusion	p. 285
Economic Structure and Democracy	p. 287
Introduction	p. 287
Economic Structure and Income Distribution	p. 290
Political Conflict	p. 292
Capital, Land, and the Transition to Democracy	p. 293
Costs of Coup on Capital and Land	p. 296
Capital, Land, and the Burden of Democracy	p. 300
Conflict between Landowners and Industrialists	p. 307
Industrialists, Landowners, and Democracy in Practice	p. 312
Economic Institutions	p. 313
Human Capital	p. 316
Conjectures about Political Development	p. 317
Conclusion	p. 319
Globalization and Democracy	p. 321
Introduction	p. 321
A Model of an Open Economy	p. 325
Political Conflict - Democratic Consolidation	p. 331
Political Conflict - Transition to Democracy	p. 334
Financial Integration	p. 338
Increased Political Integration	p. 343
Alternative Assumptions about the Nature of International Trade	p. 344
Conclusion	p. 347
Conclusions and the Future of Democracy
Conclusions and the Future of Democracy	p. 349
Paths of Political Development Revisited	p. 349
Extensions and Areas for Future Research	p. 355
The Future of Democracy	p. 358
Appendix
Appendix to Chapter 4: The Distribution of Power in Democracy	p. 361
Introduction	p. 361
Probabilistic Voting Models	p. 361
Lobbying	p. 367
Partisan Politics and Political Capture	p. 373
Bibliography	p. 381
Index	p. 401
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