Empiricism at the Crossroads The Vienna Circle's Protocol-Sentence Debate Revisited

by Uebel, Thomas

• ISBN13: 9780812696400
• ISBN10: 0812696409
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2007-12-28
• Publisher: Open Court

Summary

How can we understand empirical evidence? This was the topic of the Vienna Circle's protocol-sentence debate, which in its main thrust lasted from 1929 to 1936 and ended with the three major disputants still at odds. Contrary to recent legend, none of the leading Vienna Circle theorists were foundationalist empiricists in any traditional style. The one who came closest, Moritz Schlick, pursued a highly individualistic course that sought to satisfy empiricism's concern with the reliability of its basic data by showing parts of everyday discourse to be securely grounded in our 'form of life'.

Author Biography

Thomas Uebel is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Manchester

Table of Contents

Preface	p. XV
Introduction: Naturalism, Deflationism, the Vienna Circle and the Protocol-Sentence Debate	p. 1
Neurath's Boat as a Motto for Naturalism	p. 2
Neurath's Boat and the Theory of Scientific Knowledge	p. 3
Neurath and Quine on Naturalism	p. 5
Naturalism and Deflationist Philosophy of Science	p. 8
The Vienna Circle: Basic Doctrines and Aims	p. 11
The Challenge to Empiricism	p. 12
"Logical Empiricism"	p. 14
The Unity of Science	p. 16
The Point of "Scientific Philosophy"	p. 17
Different Interpretations of Viennese Scientific Philosophy	p. 19
The Traditional View of Vienna Circle Philosophy	p. 20
The Neo-Kantian Reading of Carnap and its Deflationist Critics	p. 21
The Neurathian Wing of Vienna Circle Scholarship	p. 23
Approaching the Protocol-Sentence Debate	p. 24
The Thematic Setting of the Debate	p. 25
The Structure of the Debate	p. 27
Course of Investigation	p. 30
The Background of the Protocol-Sentence Debate: Carnap's Aufbau	p. 33
Carnap, Language Constructor: Overview of the Aufbau	p. 34
Reconstructional Choices: The Mechanics of the Aufbau	p. 37
The Phenomenalist Choice of the Object Domain	p. 37
The Structuralist Choices of Language Form	p. 38
The Compatibility of Ground Plan and Method	p. 41
The Aim of the Aufbau-Project: Three Readings	p. 42
The Traditional Reading: Phenomenalist Foundationalism	p. 43
An Alternative Reading: Structuralist Neo-Kantianism	p. 44
The Two Readings Compared	p. 47
A Third Contender: Radical Deflationism	p. 48
The Neo-Kantian and Deflationist Readings Evaluated	p. 51
The Problem of the Basic Relation	p. 51
Rational Reconstructionism and Conventionalism	p. 54
The Crucial Tension in the Aufbau	p. 57
Towards the Protocol-Sentence Debate	p. 60
Phase One, Stage Right: Schlick's Antiformalist Challenge to the Aufbau	p. 63
Schlick before the Aufbau	p. 63
The Central Problem of Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre	p. 65
The Method of Coincidences	p. 67
The Role of Coordinative Definitions	p. 70
Schlick's and Carnap's Early Agreements	p. 73
Axiom Systems and Constitution Systems	p. 73
Against Intuitive Content	p. 74
Schlick's Conception of Philosophy ca. 1930	p. 77
Meaning Determination Through Acts	p. 78
The Point of Experiential Meaning Determination	p. 80
The Certainty of Philosophical Knowledge	p. 82
Schlick's Root Objection to the Aufbau	p. 84
Wittgenstein and the Aufbau	p. 84
The Representability of Logical Form	p. 88
Carnap on the Representability of Logical Form	p. 90
The Tension in Schlick's New Conception of Philosophy	p. 93
Phase One, Stage Left: Neurath's Naturalistic Challenge to the Aufbau	p. 97
The Points of Agreement between Carnap and Neurath	p. 97
Neurath before the Aufbau	p. 98
Neurath's Agreement with Carnap's Aufbau	p. 99
Early Opposition to Wittgenstein's Ineffability Thesis	p. 101
Neurath's Criticisms of the Aufbau	p. 103
Neurath's 1926 Qualms	p. 103
Neurath's 1928 Criticisms	p. 105
Carnap's Response	p. 106
The Scope of Neurath's Criticism	p. 108
The Aufbau, Scheinprobleme and Neurath's K.3	p. 112
K.3: "Unclean" Concept Formation	p. 113
K.3: "Unclean" Cognition	p. 116
Aufbau and Scheinprobleme: The Given as a Sign	p. 119
Scheinprobleme: The Practical Irrelevance of 'Factual' Representations	p. 121
Neurath's Prague Address	p. 123
Against the 'Ideal Language' and the A Priori in Epistemology	p. 123
Against Correspondence Truth	p. 126
Neurath's Naturalism and Materialism	p. 127
The Problem of Intersubjectivity	p. 128
Carnap's Change of Position between 1928 and 1930	p. 129
Intersubjectivity in the Aufbau	p. 131
Neider's Argument Explicated	p. 133
The Inception of Physicalism	p. 134
The Background of Phases Two and Three: Carnap's Logical Syntax Project	p. 139
Phase Two and Logical Syntax	p. 140
The Emergence and Point of Carnap's Logical Syntax Project	p. 140
The Different Stages of the Logical Syntax Project	p. 144
Neurath's Adoption of Carnap's Syntactic Turn	p. 146
The Distinctive Doctrines of Carnap's Logical Syntax	p. 150
The Dissolution of Philosophical Disputes through Logical Tolerance	p. 151
The Material and the Formal Modes of Speech	p. 154
The Anomalies of Carnap's Syntacticism	p. 156
Analyticity as a Syntactic Notion	p. 156
Form as Meaning	p. 159
Carnap's Syntacticism Reconsidered	p. 162
Neurath's Adoption of the Syntactic Turn Assessed	p. 164
Phase Two, Overview and Substage One: Two Early Physicalisms	p. 169
Overview of Phase Two	p. 170
The Three Substages	p. 171
The Influence of Wittgenstein-in-Transition: Waismann's "Theses"	p. 174
Phase Two, Wittgenstein and the Development of the Syntax Project	p. 179
Substage One	p. 181
The Documentation of Substage One	p. 182
The Significance of Substage One	p. 186
Substage One and Wittgenstein: Waismann in the Circle, July 1930	p. 188
Carnap's Proto-Physicalism	p. 191
Two Universal Languages	p. 192
Epistemology in Carnap's Proto-Physicalism	p. 196
Neurath's Proto-Physicalism	p. 200
The Uniformity of the Domain of Unified Science	p. 200
Antifoundationalist Holism	p. 204
The Physical Languages of Unified Science	p. 207
Phase Two, Substage Two: Neurath's Challenge Radicalized	p. 211
Discussions of Physicalism in Early 1931	p. 212
In the Circle, February 1931: Against Elementary Propositions	p. 212
Carnap's Physicalism in Early 1931	p. 217
Neurath's Physicalism in Early 1931	p. 222
Neurath's 1931 Physicalist Charge in Publications	p. 226
Neurath's Private Language Argument: A First Analysis	p. 226
Neurath on Truth and Confirmation	p. 231
Neurath's Naturalistic Theory of Scientific Knowledge	p. 233
Carnap's Physicalism in Early 1932	p. 238
The "Primitive" Protocol Language Retained	p. 238
The Physicalization of the Autopsychological and the Material/Formal Mode Distinction	p. 241
The Epistemological Privilege of "Primitive" Protocol Statements	p. 244
Carnap's and Neurath's "Essential" Agreement	p. 246
Phase Two, Substage Three: Neurath's Challenge Sustained	p. 253
The State of the Debate, Spring 1932	p. 253
Carnap's and Neurath's Protocols Compared	p. 253
Did Carnap and Neurath Misunderstand Each Other?	p. 255
Neurath's Rejoinder	p. 259
The Anti-Carnapian Argument of "Protocol Statements"	p. 260
Neurath's Alternative Proposal for Protocol Statements	p. 264
Carnap's Considered Response	p. 267
The Defense of the Phenomenalistic Protocol Language	p. 268
The Preference for a Physicalistic Protocol Language	p. 269
The Outcome of Substage Three of Phase Two	p. 271
Two Surface Disagreements and a Deep Suspicion	p. 271
Zilsel's Query To Carnap	p. 272
Carnap's Problematic Defense of Empiricism	p. 274
Popper's Contribution to the Protocol-Sentence Debate	p. 276
The Birth of Critical Rationalism: The Clash of Two Narratives	p. 277
Popper's Criticisms of the Aufbau	p. 279
Popper's Characterization of Vienna Circle Positions Queried	p. 281
Popper's Characterization of Neurath's Position Assessed	p. 284
Carnap and Popper's Anti-Psychologisms	p. 287
Popper's Role in the Development of Carnap's Views	p. 292
Phase Three: Schlick's Critique of Radical Physicalism	p. 295
The End of an Era	p. 296
From Phase Two to Phase Three: In the Circle	p. 300
The Darkening Political Situation	p. 300
Phase Three Begins: The Circle after Hahn	p. 302
Phase Three, Substage One: The Schlick-Neurath Exchange	p. 304
Schlick's Rejection of Radical Physicalism	p. 304
Neurath's Rejoinder to Schlick	p. 310
The Outcome of Substage One: Communication Breakdown	p. 313
Phase Three, Substage Two: The Hempel-Schlick Exchange	p. 315
Hempel's Intervention	p. 316
Schlick's Response and Hempel's Rejoinder	p. 319
The Outcome of Substage Two: A Twist in the Tale	p. 321
Phase Three, Substage Three: Schlick's Coda	p. 322
Schlick's "On 'Affirmations'"	p. 323
The Appropriation of Wittgenstein's "Grammar"	p. 327
The Outcome of Substage Three: Schlick's Position Clarified	p. 332
Phase Four: Carnap's New Turn and Schlick's Last Stand	p. 333
Phase Four: Carnap at the Paris Congress	p. 333
Carnap's Discovery of Tarski's Theory of Truth	p. 335
The Distinction between Truth and Confirmation	p. 336
The Liberalization of Empiricism	p. 340
Schlick's Critique of Carnap	p. 342
The Interpretation of Wittgenstein	p. 342
How to Theorize about Language	p. 346
The Limits of Conventionalism	p. 348
Different Conceptions of Language and Philosophical Concerns	p. 354
Schlick's "Foundationalism" Assessed	p. 356
Getting the Measure of Schlick's Affirmations	p. 356
Interpreting Schlick's Affirmations	p. 361
Evaluating Schlick's Theory of Affirmations	p. 367
Neurath's Theory of Protocol Statements	p. 371
The Viennese Reception of Neurath's Proposal	p. 371
Neurath's Continuing Advocacy of his Proposal	p. 374
Further Remarks on Protocol Statements	p. 375
How to Answer Neurath's Critics	p. 380
Neurath's Proposal Decoded	p. 381
The Decomposition of Neurath's Protocols	p. 382
The "Formal" Conditions on the Acceptance of Protocol Statements	p. 385
The "Pragmatic" Condition on Theory Testing	p. 388
Protocol Statements as Scientific Testimony	p. 390
Neurath's Proposal Vindicated	p. 393
The Inapplicability of the Standard Criticisms	p. 393
Carnap's Non-Psychologistic Alternative	p. 394
Comparison with Quine's Observation Sentences	p. 397
Comparison with Contemporary Work on Observation	p. 400
Comparison with Contemporary Work on Testimony	p. 402
Neurath and Carnap: Naturalism or Rational Reconstructionism?	p. 405
Neurath's pre-Wittgensteinian Private Language Argument	p. 405
Carnap's and Neurath's Private Language Arguments Compared	p. 406
Logic of Science versus Behavioristics of Scholars?	p. 409
Later Uses of Neurath's Private Language Argument	p. 410
The Prehistory of Neurath's Argument	p. 412
Carnap's Deflection of Neurath's Argument Assessed	p. 417
Is Neurath's Naturalism Incompatible with Carnap's Reconstructionism?	p. 418
Neurath's Ballungen Against Rational Reconstruction?	p. 419
The Commensuration of Observation and System Language	p. 421
Neurath's Naturalism Is Compatible With Carnap's Reconstructionism	p. 425
Neurath and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction	p. 425
On the Unity and Objectivity of Science	p. 427
On Truth, Semantics and Logic	p. 429
Open Issues	p. 432
Conclusion: Three Defenses of Empiricism	p. 437
The "Critical" Protocol-Sentence Debate	p. 438
The Content, Form and Status of Basic Evidence Statements	p. 442
The Content of Basic Evidence Statements	p. 442
The Form of Basic Evidence Statements	p. 443
The Epistemological Status of Basic Statements	p. 444
The Answers to the Basis Question	p. 444
Foundationalism Again: The Case of Carnap	p. 445
The Underlying Problems of the Debate	p. 450
Three Conceptions of the Theory of Scientific Knowledge	p. 453
Coda: The Image of Scientific Reason in the Protocol-Sentence Debate	p. 456
Bibliography	p. 461
Index	p. 507
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