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Jaegwon Kim has taught at Cornell University, Johns Hopkins University, and the University of Michigan. He is currently the William Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He has authored and edited several philosophical texts, including Supervenience and the Mind (1993) and Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (2005).
Jeremy Fantl is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Calgary. He and Matthew McGrath are writing a book entitled Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology.
Matthew McGrath is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Missouri-Columbia. He is the author of Between Deflationism and the Correspondence Theory (2000) and is co-authoring Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology with Jeremy Fantl.
Table of Contents
|Preface to the Second Edition||p. ix|
|The Problem of the External World||p. 7|
|Proof of an External World||p. 26|
|Four Forms of Scepticism||p. 29|
|How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism||p. 35|
|Epistemological Realism||p. 51|
|The Structure of Knowledge and Justification||p. 73|
|The Myth of the Given||p. 80|
|Does Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?||p. 94|
|Epistemic Principles||p. 99|
|Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?||p. 109|
|A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge||p. 124|
|A Foundherentist Theory of Empirical Justification||p. 134|
|The Raft and the Pyramid||p. 145|
|Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons||p. 165|
|Defining Knowledge||p. 187|
|Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?||p. 192|
|Thought, Selections||p. 194|
|The Inescapability of Gettier Problems||p. 207|
|A State of Mind||p. 213|
|Epistemic Closure||p. 231|
|Epistemic Operators||p. 237|
|Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure||p. 247|
|Knowledge and Skepticism||p. 255|
|How to Defeat Opposition to Moore||p. 280|
|Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?||p. 290|
|Theories of Epistemic Justification||p. 303|
|Skepticism and Rationality||p. 322|
|What Is Justified Belief?||p. 333|
|Reliabilism Leveled||p. 348|
|Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge||p. 363|
|Internalism Exposed||p. 379|
|Externalism and Skepticism||p. 394|
|Internalism Defended||p. 407|
|Virtue Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge||p. 423|
|Warrant: A First Approximation||p. 429|
|Virtues of the Mind, Selections||p. 442|
|Virtues and Vices of Virtue Epistemology||p. 454|
|Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues||p. 462|
|The Place of Truth in Epistemology||p. 477|
|Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?: Meno Problems and Epistemological Axiology||p. 492|
|True Enough||p. 507|
|Naturalized Epistemology and the A Priori||p. 521|
|Epistemology Naturalized||p. 528|
|What Is "Naturalized Epistemology"?||p. 538|
|Quine as Feminist: The Radical Import of Naturalized Epistemology||p. 552|
|There is at Least One A Priori Truth||p. 585|
|Revisability, Reliabilism, and A Priori Knowledge||p. 595|
|A Priori Knowledge and the Scope of Philosophy||p. 612|
|Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions||p. 625|
|Investigating Knowledge Itself||p. 647|
|Knowledge and Context||p. 661|
|Solving the Skeptical Problem||p. 669|
|Elusive Knowledge||p. 691|
|Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the Lottery||p. 706|
|Knowledge and Practical Interest, Selections||p. 721|
|Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification||p. 742|
|Sensitive Moderate Invariantism||p. 760|
|The Assessment Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions||p. 779|
|Testimony, Memory, and Perception||p. 801|
|Trust and Rationality||p. 807|
|Against Gullibility||p. 815|
|Content Preservation||p. 836|
|Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission||p. 855|
|The Problem of Memory Knowledge||p. 868|
|Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge||p. 876|
|Knowing How to Believe With Justification||p. 892|
|Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.|