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Games, Strategies, and Decision Making,9780716766308
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Games, Strategies, and Decision Making

by
Edition:
1st
ISBN13:

9780716766308

ISBN10:
0716766302
Format:
Hardcover
Pub. Date:
7/25/2008
Publisher(s):
Worth Publishers
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Summary

This new text offers a wealth of diverse, intriguing applications to show where game theory works, where it doesn't, and why. Accessible to all college students, the book conveys the power, appeal, and beauty of game-theoretic logic, emphasizing problem solving over answers. Especially relevant for majors in economics/business and political science/international relations.

Author Biography

Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. is Professor of Economics at Johns Hopkins University. He has served on numerous editorial boards, including the RAND Journal of Economics, Foundations and Trends in Microeconomics, and the Southern Economic Journal. His research has appeared in top journals in a variety of disciplines including economics (e.g., the American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, and Games and Economic Behavior), political science (Economics and Politics, Public Choice), sociology (American Journal of Sociology), organizational behavior (Management Science), and psychology (Journal of Mathematical Psychology). He is a co-author of the leading textbook Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, which is currently in its fourth edition.

Table of Contents

PART I: LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC REASONING
1.1 Who Wants To Be a Game Theorist?
1.2 A Sampling of Strategic Situations
1.3 Whetting Your Appetite: The Game of Concentration
1.4 Psychological Profile of a Player
1.4.1 Preferences
1.4.2 Beliefs
1.4.3 How Do Players Differ?
1.5 Playing the Gender Pronoun Game

CHAPTER 2: BUILDING A MODEL OF A STRATEGIC SITUATION
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Extensive Form Games: Perfect Information
Baseball
Galileo Galilei and the Inquisition
Haggling at an Auto Dealership
2.3 Extensive Form Games: Imperfect Information
Mugging
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Court
The Iraq War and Weapons of Mass Destruction
2.4 What is a Strategy?
2.5 Strategic Form Games
Tosca
Competition for Elected Office
The Science 84 Game
2.6 Moving from the Extensive Form and Strategic Form
Baseball
Galileo Galilei and the Inquisition
Haggling at an Auto Dealership
2.7 Going from the Strategic Form to the Extensive Form
2.8 Common Knowledge
2.9 A Few More Issues in Modeling Games
 
PART II: SOLVING STRATEGIC FORM GAMES
CHAPTER 3: ELIMINATING THE IMPOSSIBLE: SOLVING A GAME WHEN RATIONALITY IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Solving a Game When Players Are Rational
3.2.1 Strict Dominance
White Flight and Racial Segregation in Housing
Banning Cigarette Advertising on Television
3.2.2 Weak Dominance
3.2.3 Bidding at an Auction
The Proxy Bid Paradox at eBay
3.3 Solving a Game When Players Are Rational and Players Know Players Are Rational
Team-Project Game
Existence of God Game
Boxed Pigs Game
3.4 Solving a Game When Rationality is Common Knowledge
3.4.1 The Doping Game: Is it Rational for Athletes to Use Steroids?
3.4.2 Iterative Deletion of Strictly Dominated Strategies
3.5 Appendix: Strict and Weak Dominance
3.6 Appendix: Rationalizability (Advanced)
 
CHAPTER 4: STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DISCRETE GAMES WITH TWO OR THREE PLAYERS
4.1 Defining Nash Equilibrium
4.2 Classic Two-Player Games
Prisoners' Dilemma
A Coordination Game: Driving Conventions
A Game of Coordination and Conflict: Telephone
An Out-guessing Game: Rock-Paper-Scissors
Conflict and Mutual Interest in Games
4.3 Best-Reply Method
4.4 Three-player Games
American Idol Fandom
Voting: Sincere or Devious?
Promotion and Sabotage
4.5 Foundations of Nash Equilibrium
4.5.1 Relationship to Rationality is Common Knowledge
4.5.2 The Definition of a Strategy, Revisited
4.6 Appendix: Nash Equilibrium
 
CHAPTER 5: STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN DISCRETE N-PLAYER GAMES 5.1 Introduction
5.2 Symmetric Games
The Sneetches
Airline Security
Operating Systems: Mac or Windows?
Applying for an Internship
5.3 Asymmetric Games
Entry into a Market
Civil Unrest
5.4 Selecting Among Nash Equilibria
 
CHAPTER 6: STABLE PLAY: NASH EQUILIBRIA IN CONTINUOUS GAMES
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Solving for Nash Equilibria without Calculus
Price Competition with Identical Products
Neutralizing Price Competition with Price-Matching Guarantees
Competing for Elected Office
6.3 Solving for Nash Equilibria with Calculus (optional)
Price Competition with Differentiated Products
Tragedy of the Commons: Extinction of the Wooly Mammoth
Charitable Giving and the Power of Matching Grants
 
CHAPTER 7: KEEP 'EM GUESSING: RANDOMIZED STRATEGIES
7.1 Police Patrols and the Drug Trade
7.2 Making Decisions under Uncertainty
7.2.1 Probability and Expectation
7.2.2 Preferences over Uncertain Options
7.2.3 Ordinal vs. Cardinal Payoffs
7.3 Mixed Strategies and Nash Equilibrium
7.3.1 Back on the Beat
7.3.2 Some General Properties of a Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies
7.4 Examples
Avranches Gap in World War II
Entry into a Market
7.5 Advanced Examples
Penalty Kick in Soccer
Slash’em Up: Friday the 13th
Bystander Effect
7.6 Games of Pure Conflict and Cautious Behavior
7.7 Appendix: Formal Description of Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies
 
PART III: SOLVING EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
CHAPTER 8: TAKING TURNS: SEQUENTIAL GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION 8.1 Introduction
8.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
8.3 Examples
Cuban Missile Crisis
Enron and Prosecutorial Prerogative
Racial Discrimination and Sports
8.4 Waiting Games: Pre-emption and Attrition
8.4.1 Pre-emption
8.4.2 War of Attrition
8.5 Do People Reason Using Backward Induction?
8.5.1 Experimental Evidence and Backward Induction
8.5.2 A Logical Paradox with Backward Induction
 
CHAPTER 9: TAKING TURNS IN THE DARK: SEQUENTIAL GAMES OF IMPERFECT INFORMATION
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
British Intelligence
9.3 Examples
OS/2
Agenda Control in the Senate
9.4 Commitment
9.4.1 Entry Deterrence
9.4.2 Managerial Contracts and Competition: East India Trade in the 17th Century
 
PART IV: GAMES OF INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
CHAPTER 10: I KNOW SOMETHING YOU DON'T KNOW: GAMES WITH PRIVATE INFORMATION
10.1 Introduction
10.2 A Game of Incomplete Information: The Munich Agreement
10.3 Bayesian Games and Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
Gunfight in the Wild West
10.4 When All Players Have Private Information: Auctions
Independent Private Values and Shading Your Bid
Common Value and the Winner's Curse
10.5 Voting on Committees and Juries
Strategic Abstention
Sequential Voting in the Jury Room
10.6 Appendix: A More Formal Definition of Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
10.7 Appendix: First Price Sealed Bid Auction with a Continuum of Types
10.7.1 Independent Private Values
10.7.2 Common Value
 
CHAPTER 11: WHAT YOU DO TELLS ME WHO YOU ARE: SIGNALING GAMES
11.1 Introduction
11.2 Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium
Management Trainee
11.3 Examples
Lemons and the Market for Used Cars
Courtship
Brinkmanship
11.4 Appendix: Bayes’ Rule and Updating Beliefs
 
CHAPTER 12: LIES AND THE LYING LIARS THAT TELL THEM:
CHEAP TALK GAMES
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Communication in a Game-Theoretic World
12.3 Signaling Information
Defensive Medicine
Stock Recommendations
12.4 Signaling Intentions
12.4.1 Pre-play Communication in Theory
12.4.2 Pre-play communication in Practice
 
PART V: REPEATED GAMES
CHAPTER 13: PLAYING FOREVER: REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY-LIVED PLAYERS
13.1 Trench Warfare in World War I
13.2 Constructing a Repeated Game
13.3 Trench Warfare: Finite Horizon
13.4 Trench Warfare: Infinite Horizon
13.5 Some Experimental Evidence for the Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
13.6 Appendix: Present Value of a Payoff Stream
13.7 Appendix: Dynamic Programming
 
CHAPTER 14: COOPERATION AND REPUTATION: APPLICATIONS OF REPEATED INTERACTION WITH INFINITELY-LIVED PLAYERS
14.1 Introduction
14.2 A Menu of Punishments
14.2.1 Price-Fixing
14.2.2 Temporary Reversion to Moderate Rates
14.2.3 Price Wars: Temporary Reversion to Low Rates
14.2.4 A More Equitable Punishment
14.3 Quid Pro Quo
U.S. Congress and Pork Barrel Spending
Vampire Bats and Reciprocal Altruism
14.4 Reputation
Lending to Kings
Henry Ford and the $5 Workday
14.5 Imperfect Monitoring and Anti-Ballistic Missiles
 
CHAPTER 15: INTERACTION IN INFINITELY-LIVED INSTITUTIONS
15.1 Introduction
15.2 Cooperation with Overlapping Generations
Tribal Defense
Taking Care of Your Elderly Parents
Political Parties and Lame Duck Presidents
15.3 Cooperation in a Large Population
eBay
Medieval Law Merchant
 
PART VI: EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY
CHAPTER 16: EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY: EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE STRATEGIES
16.1 Introducing Evolutionary Game Theory
16.2 Hawk-Dove Conflict
16.3 Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
Stayin’ Alive” on a Cowpat
16.4 Properties of an ESS
Side-blotched Lizards
16.5 Multi-population Games
Parental Care
16.6 Evolution of Spite
 
CHAPTER 17: EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AND BIOLOGY: REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
17.1 Introduction
17.2 Replicator Dynamics and Hawk-Dove
17.3 General Definition of the Replicator Dynamic
17.4 ESS and Attractors of the Replicator Dynamic
17.5 Examples of Strategic Situations
Stag Hunt
Handedness in Baseball
Evolution of Cooperation



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