Getting to Yes in Korea

by Clemens Jr,Walter C.

• ISBN13: 9781594514074
• ISBN10: 1594514070
• Format: Nonspecific Binding
• Copyright: 2010-06-30
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

President George W. Bush had pinned North Korea to an 'œaxis of evil' but then neglected Pyongyang until it tested a nuclear device. Would the new administration make similar mistakes? When the Clinton White House prepared to bomb North Korea's nuclear facilities, private citizen Jimmy Carter mediated to avert war and set the stage for a deal freezing North Korea's plutonium production. The 1994 Agreed Framework collapsed after eight years, but when Pyongyang went critical, the negotiations got serious. Each time the parties advanced one or two steps, however, their advance seemed to spawn one or two steps backward.Clemens distils lessons from U.S. negotiations with North Korea, Russia, China, and Libya and analyses how they do-and do not-apply to six-party and bilateral talks with North Korea in a new political era.

Author Biography

Walter C. Clemens, JR. is Professor of Political Science at Boston University and Associate, Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies. He is the author (with Pulitzer Prize-Winning Editorial Cartoonist Jim Morin) most recently of Ambushed! A Cartoon History of the George W. Bush Administration (Paradigm 2009), and sole author of America and the World, 1898-2025: Achievements, Failures, Alternative Futures (2000) and a dozen other books including the highly praised Dynamics of International Relations, 2nd Edition (2004). His op-eds have appeared in the Christian Science Monitor, Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments	p. vii
Foreword	p. ix
How Korea Became Critical	p. 1
A cockpit of war
A failing rogue state equipped with nuclear arms
North Korea as a possible player in a zone of peace and commerce
Axioms for foreign policy
How Korea Became Korea	p. 14
A proud nation
Emergence in the shadow of China
Unique forms of Confucianism
Literacy
Coping with complexity
How Korea Became Japan	p. 36
A weak government and insular culture subjugated by an expansionist Japan while America watched and did nothing
U.S. commitments to national self-determination excluding Korea and other smaller nations
How One Korea Became Two	p. 51
Rooseveltian Realpolitik
Sacrificing Korea and the Baltics to appease Stalin and defeat the Axis
Origins of the thirty-eighth parallel
How North Korea Got the Bomb	p. 70
North Korea's demands for nuclear science, power, and weaponry
Comradely differences and North Korea's commitment to self-reliance and the ômilitary firstö
How Kissinger and Zhou Enlai Got to Yes	p. 88
Lessons from cold war détentes
GRIT
Mutual gain and openness
How to Get to Yes across Cultures	p. 103
High-context versus low-context diplomacy
The significance of distinct cultures of diplomacy
How Carter and Clinton Got Closer to Yes with Pyongyang	p. 113
Washington using both carrots and sticks, Track 1 and Track 2 diplomacy
Americans discovering rational and sentient humans in Pyongyang
How Bush and Kim Jong Il Got to Deadlock	p. 132
Bush's essentialist outlook, using neither sticks nor carrots
Bush and Rice dragging their heels and then facing a nuclear-armed DPRK
How Ideas and Free Will Can Trump Hard Power and Fortuna	p. 161
Material forces that condition but do not determine what happens
The roles of timing and coincidence
Black swans
Individual leaders who prevail over forces and fortuna
How to Avoid the Worst and Foster Better Futures	p. 175
Alternative futures
The spectrum from global war to a security system for Northeast Asia
Lessons for diplomacy
How Should Obama Deal with Authoritarians?	p. 191
Dangers of summitry
Utility of looking for mutual gain even with dictators
Letting professionals do the work
Experiences with the USSR and Libya
Grand bargains versus limited accords
How to Get to Yes in Korea?	p. 209
Challenges and policy dilemmas
Human rights and/or arms control?
Trust and/or arms control?
How to fathom ôoutliersö?
What paradigms for coping with uncertainty?
What could it mean to ôget to yesö in Korea?
From negative to positive peace?
Notes	p. 220
Index	p. 248
About the Author	p. 262
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