9780521405997

Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

by
  • ISBN13:

    9780521405997

  • ISBN10:

    0521405998

  • Format: Paperback
  • Copyright: 11/30/1990
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press
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Summary

The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.

Table of Contents

Series editors' preface xi
Preface xiii
Reflections on the Commons
1(28)
Three influential models
2(5)
The tragedy of the commons
2(1)
The prisoner's dilemma game
3(2)
The logic of collective action
5(2)
The metaphorical use of models
7(1)
Current policy prescriptions
8(15)
Leviathan as the ``only'' way
8(4)
Privatization as the ``only'' way
12(1)
The ``only'' way?
13(2)
An alternative solution
15(3)
An empirical alternative
18(3)
Policy prescriptions as metaphors
21(2)
Policies based on metaphors can be harmful
23(1)
A challenge
23(6)
An Institutional Approach to the Study of Self-Organization and Self-Governance in CPR Situations
29(29)
The CPR situation
30(8)
CPRs and resource units
30(3)
Rational appropriators in complex and uncertain situations
33(5)
Interdependence, independent action, and collective action
38(4)
The theory of the firm
40(1)
The theory of the state
41(1)
Three puzzles: supply, commitment, and monitoring
42(3)
The problem of supply
42(1)
The problem of credible commitment
43(2)
The problem of mutual monitoring
45(1)
Framing inquiry
45(10)
Appropriation and provision problems
46(4)
Multiple levels of analysis
50(5)
Studying institutions in field settings
55(3)
Analyzing Long-Enduring, Self-Organized, and Self-Governed CPRs
58(45)
Communal tenure in high mountain meadows and forests
61(8)
Torbel, Switzerland
61(4)
Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka villages in Japan
65(4)
Huerta irrigation institutions
69(13)
Valencia
71(5)
Murcia and Orihuela
76(2)
Alicante
78(4)
Zanjera irrigation communities in the Philippines
82(6)
Similarities among enduring, self-governing CPR institutions
88(15)
Clearly defined boundaries
91(1)
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions
92(1)
Collective-choice arrangements
93(1)
Monitoring
94(1)
Graduated sanctions
94(6)
Conflict-resolution mechanisms
100(1)
Minimal recognition of rights to organize
101(1)
Nested enterprises
101(2)
Analyzing Institutional Change
103(40)
The competitive pumping race
104(7)
The setting
104(2)
The logic of the water-rights game
106(5)
The litigation game
111(16)
The Raymond Basin negotiations
111(3)
The West Basin negotiations
114(9)
The Central Basin negotiations
123(2)
Conformance of parties to negotiated settlements
125(2)
The entrepreneurship game
127(6)
Reasons for forming a district to include both basins
130(1)
Reasons against forming a district to include both basins
131(2)
The polycentric public-enterprise game
133(3)
The analysis of institutional supply
136(7)
Incremental, sequential, and self-transforming institutional change in a facilitative political regime
137(2)
Reformulating the analysis of institutional change
139(4)
Analyzing Institutional Failures and Fragilities
143(39)
Two Turkish inshore fisheries with continuing CPR problems
144(2)
California groundwater basins with continuing CPR problems
146(3)
A Sri Lankan fishery
149(8)
Irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka
157(16)
The fragility of Nova Scotian inshore fisheries
173(5)
Lessons to be learned from comparing the cases in this study
178(4)
A Framework for Analysis of Self-Organizing and Self-Governing CPRs
182(35)
The problems of supply, credible commitment, and mutual monitoring
185(7)
A framework for analyzing institutional choice
192(22)
Evaluting benefits
195(3)
Evaluating costs
198(7)
Evaluating shared norms and other opportunities
205(2)
The process of institutional change
207(3)
Predicting institutional change
210(4)
A challenge to scholarship in the social sciences
214(3)
Notes 217(28)
References 245(26)
Index 271

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