9780521842716

Group Formation in Economics: Networks, Clubs, and Coalitions

by
  • ISBN13:

    9780521842716

  • ISBN10:

    0521842719

  • Format: Hardcover
  • Copyright: 2005-01-10
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press
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Summary

Diverse activities are conducted within and by organized groups of individuals, including political, economic, and social activities. How groups form and are organized to conduct these activities are subjects of intense game-theoretic research. Some of the topics investigated are trade networks, coauthorship networks, buyer-seller networks with differentiated products, and networks of information sharing. Other topics are social norms on punctuality, the adoption of new technologies, clubs and the provision of club goods and public goods, collusive alliances among corporations, international alliances, and trading agreements. This volume introduces the reader to recent literature on game-theoretic treatments of organized groups, with networks, clubs, and coalitions. Book jacket.

Table of Contents

List of Contributors
ix
Introduction 1(10)
PART ONE NETWORK FORMATION, COMMUNICATION, AND LEARNING
A Survey of Network Formation Models: Stability and Efficiency
11(47)
Matthew O. Jackson
Introduction
11(2)
Defining Network Games
13(6)
Some Examples
19(6)
Modeling Network Formation
25(11)
The Relationship between Stability and Efficiency
36(9)
The Myerson Value and Alternative Allocation Rules
45(4)
Concluding Discussion
49(9)
Models of Network Formation in Cooperative Games
58(31)
Anne van den Nouweland
Introduction
58(2)
Definitions
60(3)
Network-Formation Game in Extensive Form
63(5)
Network-Formation Game in Strategic Form
68(5)
Comparison of the Network-Formation Models in Extensive and Strategic Forms
73(1)
Network Formation with Costs for Establishing Links
73(6)
Simultaneous Bargaining over Network Formation and Payoff Division
79(6)
Related Literature
85(4)
Farsighted Stability in Network Formation
89(33)
Frank H. Page, Jr.
Samir Kamat
Introduction
89(4)
Directed Networks
93(2)
Supernetworks
95(6)
Notions of Farsighted Stability in Network Formation
101(8)
Computational Examples: Strategic Information Sharing
109(13)
Learning in Networks
122(49)
Sanjeev Goyal
Introduction
122(3)
Networks
125(2)
Nonstrategic Interaction
127(10)
Strategic Interaction
137(12)
Evolving Networks
149(7)
Optimal Links and Actions in Games
156(6)
Concluding Remarks
162(9)
PART TWO ON EQUILIBRIUM FORMATION OF GROUPS: A THEORETICAL ASSESSMENT
Group Formation: The Interaction of Increasing Returns and Preferences Diversity
171(38)
Gabrielle Demange
Introduction
171(2)
Competition under Increasing Returns
173(13)
On Competition across Groups
186(12)
Public Decision Rules and Mobility
198(7)
Conclusion
205(4)
Games and Economies with Near Exhaustion of Gains to Scale
209(37)
Alexander Kovalenkov
Myrna Wooders
Games with Many Players as Models of Large Economies
209(3)
Games with Side Payments
212(3)
Parameterized Collections of Games
215(1)
Pregames
216(4)
Nonemptiness of Approximate Cores of Games in Parameterized Collections
220(3)
Examples of Coalition Production Economies with Small or Large Optimal Firms
223(1)
Equal Treatment of Similar Individuals
224(2)
Games and Markets
226(4)
Examples of Local Public Goods Economies
230(3)
Attribute Games and Exchange Economies
233(2)
Some Relationships to the Literature
235(4)
Conclusions
239(7)
Coalitions and Clubs: Tiebout Equilibrium in Large Economies
246(20)
John Conley
Stefani Smith
Introduction
246(2)
Agents and Crowding
248(6)
A Local Public Goods Economy
254(2)
Optimality and Decentralization
256(2)
Existence
258(1)
Noncooperative Solutions
259(1)
Other Results and Future Research
260(6)
Secession-Proof Cost Allocations and Stable Group Structures in Models of Horizontal Differentiation
266(23)
Michel Le Breton
Shlomo Weber
Introduction
266(2)
The Model
268(1)
Cooperative Framework
269(2)
Unrestricted Cost-Allocation Correspondence
271(5)
Restricted Cost-Allocation Correspondence
276(13)
PART THREE GROUPS, CLUBS, ALLIANCES IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS
Political Parties and Coalition Formation
289(23)
Amrita Dhillon
Introduction
289(1)
Preelectoral Coalitions
290(8)
Postelection Coalitions
298(4)
Conclusions
302(10)
Power in the Design of Constitutional Rules
312(23)
Mika Widgren
Introduction
312(1)
Measuring Power
313(6)
Applying Power Indices to the EU
319(3)
Power in EU Procedures
322(9)
Concluding Remarks
331(4)
Group and Network Formation in Industrial Organization: A Survey
335(19)
Francis Bloch
Introduction
335(1)
Group and Network Stability
336(2)
Cartels and Collusive Networks
338(7)
Alliances and Networks of Collaboration
345(3)
Trade Networks
348(6)
Institution Design for Managing Global Commons: Lessons from Coalition Theory
354(27)
Carlo Carraro
Introduction
354(3)
Accession Rules and Equilibrium Environmental Coalitions
357(3)
Endogenous Minimum Participation Rules in International Environmental Agreements
360(6)
Endogenous Issue Linkage in International Negotiations
366(4)
Regional versus Global Environmental Treaties
370(7)
Conclusions
377(4)
Inequality and Growth Clubs
381(49)
Fernando Jaramillo
Hubert Kempf
Fabien Moizeau
Introduction
381(3)
Stratification and Growth: Evidence
384(4)
Stratification and Growth: Theoretical Approaches
388(10)
Inequality, Stratification, and Growth
398(14)
Club Formation Dynamics and Growth
412(6)
Conclusion
418(12)
Informal Insurance, Enforcement Constraints, and Group Formation
430(17)
Garance Genicot
Debraj Ray
Introduction
430(3)
Group Formation under Equal Sharing
433(2)
Stationary Transfers
435(5)
General Results: Asymmetric Treatment and History Dependence
440(3)
Some Final Remarks
443(4)
Spontaneous Market Emergence and Social Networks
447(24)
Marcel Fafchamps
Introduction
447(2)
A Model of Relational Contracting
449(11)
Stigmatization and Collective Punishment
460(3)
Networks and Markets
463(3)
Conclusion
466(5)
Index 471

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