Hard Lessons

by Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction

• ISBN13: 9780160808173
• ISBN10: 0160808170
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2009-02-02
• Publisher: United States Govt Printing Office

Summary

Product Description: The billions of dollars expended in Iraq constitute the largest relief and reconstruction exercise in American history. SIGIRrs"s lessons learned capping report characterizes this effort in four phases (pre-war to ORHA, CPA, post-CPA/Negroponte era, and Khalilzad, Crocker, and the Surge). From this history, SIGIR forwards a series of conclusions and recommendations for Congress to consider when organizing for the next post-conflict reconstruction situation. Over the past five years, the United States has provided nearly fifty billion dollars for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. This unprecedented rebuilding program, implemented after the March 2003 invasion, was developed to restore Iraqrs"s essential services, build Iraqrs"s security forces, create a market-based economy, and establish a democratic government-all in pursuit of U.S. interests in a stable and free Iraq. Did the U.S. rebuilding program achieve its objectives? Was the money provided well-spent or wasted? What lessons have we learned from the experience? Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience, a report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), answers these and other important questions by presenting a comprehensive history of the U.S. program, chiefly derived from SIGIRrs"s body of extensive oversight work in Iraq, hundreds of interviews with key figures involved with the reconstruction program, and thousands of documents evidencing the reconstruction work that was or was not - done. The report examines the limited pre-war planning for reconstruction, the shift from a large infrastructure program to a more community-based one, and the success of the "Surge" in 2007 and beyond. Hard Lessons concludes that the U.S. government did not have the structure or resources in place to execute the mammoth relief and reconstruction plan it took on in 2003. The lessons learned from this experience create a basis for reviewing and reforming the U.S. approach to contingency relief and reconstruction operations.

Author Biography

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) was created in October 2004 by a congressional amendment to Public Law 108-106. The amendment gives SIGIR authority to oversee Iraq reconstruction programs and operations. Specifically, SIGIR is mandated with the oversight responsibility of the use, and potential misuse, of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and all obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Iraq. SIGIR reports administratively to the Secretaries of State and Defense. SIGIR provides quarterly and semi-annual reports directly to the U.S. Congress.

Table of Contents

Preface	p. vii
Key U.S. Figures in Iraq Reconstruction	p. xi
Acronyms	p. xvi
Map Of Iraq	p. xix
Planning For Postwar Iraq	p. 1
Planning Begins	p. 3
The Agencies Engage	p. 18
The Department of Defense Takes Charge	p. 32
Staging in Kuwait	p. 46
ORHA in Baghdad	p. 53
The Coalition Provisional Authority Leads Reconstruction	p. 67
Charting a New Course	p. 69
CPA's Shortfalls	p. 78
Treasury's Triage	p. 86
Bremer's Grand Vision	p. 94
Contracting Billions for Reconstruction	p. 105
Restoring Iraq's Capacity to Govern	p. 115
Reconstructing Iraqi Security Forces	p. 124
Restarting Oil Production	p. 136
Rebuilding the Electricity Sector	p. 144
Iraq Reconstruction in Transition	p. 153
The U.S. Embassy Takes Charge	p. 163
Negroponte's Revisions	p. 165
Contingency Contracting and Program Management	p. 172
Building in a War Zone	p. 179
Iraqi Security Forces and Counterinsurgency	p. 193
Elections, Rule of Law, and Fighting Corruption	p. 203
Investigating Fraud	p. 217
Overcoming Roadblocks To Reconstruction	p. 227
Khalizad's Adaptations	p. 229
Returning to the Provinces	p. 247
The Primacy of Capacity Development	p. 258
Reconstruction Amid Sectarian Violence	p. 274
The Civilian Surge	p. 295
Lessons Learned	p. 321
Hard Lessons	p. 323
Afterword: Reforming Contingency Relief and Reconstruction Operations	p. 338
Annexes	p. 343
The Genesis and Methodology of Hard Lessons	p. 345
Oversight of Reconstruction Programs and Expenditures	p. 348
Acknowledgements	p. 357
Notes	p. 359
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