Legitimacy and the Use of Armed Force: Stability Missions in the Post-Cold War Era

by Aoi; Chiyuki

• ISBN13: 9780415559546
• ISBN10: 0415559545
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2010-11-12
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

This book examines the notion of the legitimacy of the use of force in stability operations, specifying conditions under which intervention is most likely to occur and may be justified.In the success of stability operations, legitimacy is key. In order to achieve success, the intervening force must create a sense of legitimacy of the mission among the various constituencies concerned with and involved in the venture. These parties include the people of the host nation, the host government (whose relations with the local people must be legitimate), political elites and the general public worldwide'”including the intervening parties' own domestic constituencies, who will sustain (or not sustain) the intervention by offering (or withdrawing) support.ã This book seeks to bring into close scrutiny the legitimacy of stability interventions in the post-cold war era, by proposing a concept that captures both the multi-faceted nature of legitimacy and the process of legitimation that takes place in each case. Case studies on Liberia, Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Afghanistan and Iraq explain how legitimacy related to the outcome of these operations.This book will be of much interest to students of humanitarian intervention, peace operations, international law, and IR/Security Studies in general.Chiyuki Aoi is Associate Professor of International Politics at Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo. She has a PhD in Political Science from Columbia University.

Table of Contents

Preface	p. xii
Legitimacy in stability operations	p. 1
Liberia: creating peace in Africa	p. 22
Bosnia-Herzegovina: from peace support to coercive diplomacy	p. 42
Somalia: from peace enforcement to disengagement	p. 63
Rwanda: failure to stop genocide	p. 85
Iraq: from pre-emption to counterinsurgency	p. 104
Iraq: transformation failure and intervention performance	p. 122
Iraq: non-support of pre-emptive war	p. 142
Afghanistan: from self-defense to state-building	p. 159
Afghanistan: stabilization and counterinsurgency performance	p. 180
Afghanistan: from adequate to dwindling support	p. 200
Legitimacy and the conditions of success	p. 216
Notes	p. 223
Bibliography	p. 271
Index	p. 280
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