9781107405554

Military Threats

by
  • ISBN13:

    9781107405554

  • ISBN10:

    1107405556

  • Format: Paperback
  • Copyright: 2012-07-19
  • Publisher: Cambridge Univ Pr
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Summary

Is military power central in determining which states get their voice heard? Must states run a high risk of war to communicate credible intent? Slantchev shows that states can often obtain concessions without incurring higher risks when they use military threats. Unlike diplomatic forms of communication, physical military moves improve a state's expected performance in war. If the opponent believes the threat, it will be more likely to back down. Military moves are also inherently costly, so only resolved states are willing to pay these costs. Slantchev argues that powerful states can secure better peaceful outcomes and lower the risk of war, but the likelihood of war depends on the extent to which a state is prepared to use military threats to deter challenges to peace and compel concessions without fighting. The price of peace may therefore be large: states invest in military forces that are both costly and unused.

Table of Contents

Coercion and Credibility
Introduction
Commitment and signalling in coercive bargaining
A Theory of Military Threats
A model of military threats
Comparing the instruments of coercion
Elements of Militarized Deterrence
Militarization and the distribution of power and interests
The expansion of the Korean War, 1950
The price of peace and military threat effectiveness
Conclusions
Implications
Formalities for Chapter 2
Formalities for Chapter 3
Formalities for Chapter 4
Formalities for Chapter 5
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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