Moral Reasoning Vol 2

by Beardsmore, R.

• ISBN13: 9780415318426
• ISBN10: 0415318424
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2003-09-29
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

Accounts of moral reasoning have tended either to ignore the differences in what men count as good reasons for their moral judgments, or, in emphasizing these differences, to imply that anything whatsoever can count as a moral reason. This book shows that both of these positions rest on a mistaken assumption, and by rejecting this assumption brings out important features of moral discourse. Although moral disagreement is seen to be far more radical than empirical disagreement, a framework of agreement is shown to be a precondition of moral discourse, and even of the possibility of individual moral decision.

Table of Contents

Preface	vii
Introduction	ix
PART I: MORAL REASONS
R. M. Hare: Deductive Arguments and Rationality	3	(8)
Mrs. Foot: Moral and Empirical Criteria	11	(13)
The Common Assumption	24	(13)
The Diversity of Moral Standards	37	(17)
The Rebel and Moral Traditions	54	(13)
PART II: MORAL ARGUMENTS
`Is' and `Ought'	67	(11)
Moral Viewpoints and Our Ideas of Reality	78	(14)
Facts and `Pure' Facts	92	(12)
The Possibility of Conflicting Values	104	(16)
Agreement and Moral Communication	120	(15)
Conclusion	135	(3)
Bibliography	138	(3)
Index	141