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Lynne Rudder Baker is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts Amherst. Baker has written four books on metaphysics and the philosophy of mind, and has published many articles in philosophy journals such as The Journal of Philosophy, The Philosophical Review, PhilosophicalStudies, Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research and many more.
Table of Contents
Introduction: What is the Problem? The Claim of Naturalism A Challenge to Naturalism What is at Stake An Overview
Part I: The Core Argument
Chapter 1. Varieties of Naturalism What Counts As 'Science'? Reductive Naturalism Nonreductive Naturalism Disenchantment and Optimism
Chapter 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective What is Naturalization? The Robust First-Person Perspective The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective
Chapter 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective John Perry on an Epistemic Account of the Self David Lewis on De Se Belief A Comment on John Searle Can Cognitive Science Save the Day?
Chapter 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective Daniel Dennett on Consciousness Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory My Recommendation
Chapter 5. Arguments Against First-Person Naturalization From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person Properties A Metaphysical Argument Against Ontological Naturalism
Part II: An Account of the First-Person Perspective
Chapter 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness Language and the Acquisition of Concepts How to Acquire a Self-Concept Human Persons: Wrap Up
Chapter 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent? Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach Objections and Replies Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory Johnston's Critique Side-Stepped
Chapter 8. A Metaphysical Framework for The First-Person Perspective First-Person Properties Dispositional Properties Haecceitistic Implications
Chapter 9. Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-person Perspective Personhood Agency Artifacts Moral Responsibility
Chapter 10. Natural Reality Near-Naturalism Property-Constitution and Causation Emergentism and Downward Causation How Naturalistic is Near-Naturalism?