The New copy of this book will include any supplemental materials advertised. Please check the title of the book to determine if it should include any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.
The Used, Rental and eBook copies of this book are not guaranteed to include any supplemental materials. Typically, only the book itself is included. This is true even if the title states it includes any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.
Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility is a series of volumes presenting outstanding new work on a set of connected themes, investigating such questions as: --What does it mean to be an agent? --What is the nature of moral responsibility? Of criminal responsibility? What is the relation between moral and criminal responsibility (if any)? --What is the relation between responsibility and the metaphysical issues of determinism and free will? --What do various psychological disorders tell us about agency and responsibility? --How do moral agents develop? How does this developmental story bear on questions about the nature of moral judgment and responsibility? --What do the results from neuroscience imply (if anything) for our questions about agency and responsibility? OSAR thus straddles the areas of moral philosophy and philosophy of action, but also draws from a diverse range of cross-disciplinary sources, including moral psychology, psychology proper (including experimental and developmental), philosophy of psychology, philosophy of law, legal theory, metaphysics, neuroscience, neuroethics, political philosophy, and more. It is unified by its focus on who we are as deliberators and (inter)actors, embodied practical agents negotiating (sometimes unsuccessfully) a world of moral and legal norms.
David Shoemaker is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Murphy Institute at Tulane University. He is the author or co-author of two books and thirty-five articles, many of them having to do with the issues of agency, responsibility, and personal identity.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2. The Possibility of Action as the Impossibility of Certain Forms of Self-Alienation, David Shoemaker 3. The Possibility of Action as the Impossibility of Certain Forms of Self-Alienation, Sarah Buss 4. The Fecundity of Planning Agency, Michael E. Bratman 5. Can I Only Intend My Own Actions? Intentions and the Own Action Condition, Luca Ferrero 6. Regret, Agency, and Error, Daniel Jacobson 7. Phenomenal Abilities: Incompatibilism and the Experience of Agency, Oisin Deery, Matt Bedke, and Shaun Nichols 8. Reasons-Responsiveness, Agents and Mechanisms, Michael McKenna 9. Responsibility, Naturalism and 'the Morality System', Paul Russell 10. The Three-Fold Significance of the Blaming Emotions, Zac Cogley 11. Unwitting Wrongdoers and the Role of Moral Disagreement in Blame, Matthew Talbert 12. Partial Desert, Tamler Sommers 13. Values, Sanity, and Responsibility, Heidi L. Maibom 14. Fairness and the Architecture of Responsibility, David O. Brink and Dana K. Nelkin Index