Philosophy of Mind

by Kim,Jaegwon

• ISBN13: 9780813344584
• ISBN10: 0813344581
• Edition: 3rd
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2010-12-28
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

The philosophy of mind has long been part of the core philosophy curriculum, and this book is the classic, comprehensive survey of the subject. Designed as an introduction to the field for upper-level undergraduates and graduate students,Philosophy of Mindfocuses on the mindbody problem and related issues, some touching on the status of psychology and cognitive science. The third edition has been thoroughly updated throughout to reflect developments of the past decade, and it is the only text of its kind that provides a serious and respectful treatment of substance dualism. This edition also includes two new chapters on the nature of consciousness and the status of consciousness. Improved readability and clarity has been one important aim of the new edition. Throughout the text, author Jaegwon Kim allows readers to come to their own terms with the central problems of the mind. At the same time, Kimrs"s own emerging views are on display and serve to move the discussion forward. Comprehensive, clear, and fair,Philosophy of Mindis a model of philosophical exposition and a significant contribution to the field.

Author Biography

Jaegwon Kim is William Perry Faunce Professor of Philosophy at Brown University. He is the author of Supervenience and Mind; Mind in a Physical World; Physicalism, or Something Near Enough; Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind; and many important papers on the philosophy of mind, metaphysics, epistemology, and the philosophy of science.

Table of Contents

Preface	p. ix
Introduction	p. 1
What Is Philosophy of Mind?	p. 2
Metaphysical Preliminaries	p. 5
Mind-Body Supervenience	p. 8
Materialism and Physicalism	p. 11
Varieties of Mental Phenomena	p. 14
Is There a "Mark of the Mental"?	p. 17
For Further Reading	p. 28
Notes	p. 28
Mind as Immaterial Substance: Descartes's Dualism	p. 31
Descartes's Interactionist Substance Dualism	p. 32
Why Minds and Bodies Are Distinct: Some Arguments	p. 35
Princess Elisabeth Against Descartes	p. 46
The "Pairing Problem": Another Causal Argument	p. 50
Immaterial Minds in Space?	p. 54
Substance Dualism and Property Dualism	p. 56
For Further Reading	p. 58
Notes	p. 58
Mind and Behavior: Behaviorism	p. 61
The Cartesian Theater and the "Beetle in the Box"	p. 63
What Is Behavior?	p. 66
Logical Behaviorism: A Positivist Argument	p. 68
A Behavioral Translation of "Paul Has a Toothache"	p. 70
Difficulties with Behavioral Definitions	p. 71
Do Pains Entail Pain Behavior?	p. 76
Ontological Behaviorism	p. 78
The Real Relationship Between Pain and Pain Behavior	p. 80
Behaviorism in Psychology	p. 82
Why Behavior Matters to Mind	p. 86
For Further Reading	p. 87
Notes	p. 88
Mind as the Brain: The Psychoneural Identity Theory	p. 91
Mind-Brain Correlations	p. 91
Making Sense of Mind-Brain Correlations	p. 93
The Argument from Simplicity	p. 98
Explanatory Arguments for Psychoneural Identity	p. 102
An Argument from Mental Causation	p. 110
Against Psychoneural Identity Theory	p. 114
Reductive and Nonreductive Physicalism	p. 122
For Further Reading	p. 125
Notes	p. 126
Mind as a Computing Machine: Machine Functionalism	p. 129
Multiple Realizability and the Functional Conception of Mind	p. 130
Functional Properties and Their Realizers: Definitions	p. 134
Functionalism and Behaviorism	p. 136
Turing Machines	p. 139
Physical Realizers of Turing Machines	p. 144
Machine Functionalism: Motivations and Claims	p. 147
Machine Functionalism: Further Issues	p. 151
Can Machines Think? The Turing Test	p. 156
Computationalism and the "Chinese Room"	p. 160
For Further Reading	p. 165
Notes	p. 65
Mind as a Causal System: Causal-Theoretical Functionalism	p. 169
The Ramsey-Lewis Method	p. 170
Choosing an Underlying Psychology	p. 172
Functionalism as Physicalism: Psychological Reality	p. 177
Objections and Difficulties	p. 179
Roles Versus Realizers: The Status of Cognitive Science	p. 186
For Further Reading	p. 189
Notes	p. 190
Mental Causation	p. 193
Agency and Mental Causation	p. 195
Mental Causation, Mental Realism, and Epiphenomenalism	p. 197
Psychophysical Laws and "Anomalous Monism"	p. 202
Is Anomalous Monism a Form of Epiphenomenalism?	p. 207
Counterfactuals to the Rescue?	p. 209
Physical Causal Closure and the "Exclusion Argument"	p. 214
The "Supervenience Argument" and Epiphenomenalism	p. 217
Further Issues: The Extrinsicness of Mental States	p. 220
For Further Reading	p. 223
Notes	p. 224
Mental Content	p. 227
Interpretation Theory	p. 228
The Causal-Correlational Approach: Informational Semantics	p. 235
Misrepresentation and the Teleological Approach	p. 239
Narrow Content and Wide Content: Content Externalism	p. 241
The Metaphysics of Wide Content States	p. 248
Is Narrow Content Possible?	p. 251
Two Problems for Content Externalism	p. 254
For Further Reading	p. 258
Notes	p. 259
What Is Consciousness?	p. 263
Some Views on Consciousness	p. 264
Nagel and His Inscrutable Bats	p. 267
Phenomenal Consciousness and Access Consciousness	p. 271
Consciousness and Subjectivity	p. 280
Does Consciousness Involve Higher-Order Perception or Thought?	p. 283
Transparency of Experience and Qualia Representationalism	p. 289
For Further Reading	p. 295
Notes	p. 296
Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem	p. 301
The "Explanatory Gap" and the "Hard Problem"	p. 302
Does Consciousness Supervene on Physical Properties?	p. 306
Closing the Explanatory Gap: Reduction and Reductive Explanation	p. 311
Functional Analysis and Reductive Explanation	p. 315
Consciousness and Brain Science	p. 317
What Mary, the Supervision Scientist, Didn't Know	p. 323
The Limits of Physicalism	p. 326
For Further Reading	p. 333
Notes	p. 334
References	p. 339
Index	p. 355
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