The Red and the Real An Essay on Color Ontology

by Cohen, Jonathan

• ISBN13: 9780199692231
• ISBN10: 0199692238
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2011-08-11
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

The Red and the Realoffers a new approach to longstanding philosophical puzzles about what colors are and how they fit into the natural world. Jonathan Cohen argues for a role-functionalist treatment of color--a view according to which colors are identical to certain functional roles involving perceptual effects on subjects. Cohen first argues (on broadly empirical grounds) for the more general relationalist view that colors are constituted in terms of relations between objects, perceivers, and viewing conditions. He responds to semantic, ontological, and phenomenological objections against this thesis, and argues that relationalism offers the best hope of respecting both empirical results and ordinary belief about color. He then defends the more specific role functionalist-account by contending that the latter is the most plausible form of color relationalism.

Author Biography

Jonathan Cohen is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego.

Table of Contents

Introduction: The Space of Options	p. 1
The Standard Taxonomy	p. 1
Problems With the Standard Taxonomy	p. 5
Relationalism Defined	p. 8
Towards A Refined Taxonomy	p. 12
Looking Forward	p. 14
The Case for Color Relationalism
The Argument From Perceptual Variation	p. 19
An Illustrative Instance	p. 19
The Master Argument Form	p. 24
The Argument Generalized	p. 26
Inter-species Differences	p. 26
Interpersonal (Between-Subject) Differences	p. 29
Intrapersonal (Within-Subject) Differences	p. 33
Applications	p. 37
Averill's Trilemma, Hilbert's Puzzle	p. 37
Homogeneity	p. 41
Conclusion	p. 44
Variation Revisited: Objections and Responses	p. 45
A Favored Variant?	p. 45
An Epistemic Diagnosis	p. 46
Color Constancy	p. 53
Alien Modalities	p. 57
Perfect Psychosemantics	p. 59
Determinables and Determinates	p. 62
Color Irrealism?	p. 64
Irrealism by Elimination	p. 65
Irrealism by Way of Primitivism	p. 65
Motivating Primitivism	p. 67
Overcoming The Irrealist Challenge	p. 74
Ecumenicism Without Relationalism?	p. 74
Non-Relationalist Relativism	p. 75
Selectionism	p. 78
Modes of Presentation	p. 89
Conclusion	p. 94
DefenseAnd Elaboration: A Relationalist's Guide To Representation, Ontology, And Phenomenology
	p. 99
Enriching Unrelativized Predicates	p. 101
A Menu of Options	p. 104
Mismatch and Color	p. 107
The Ontology of Coarse-Grained Colors	p. 108
Properties	p. 109
Color Properties	p. 109
Relationality	p. 110
Determinacy	p. 110
Normality	p. 111
Anthropocentricity	p. 113
Dual Properties, Dual Representations: Parsimony Lost (Twice Over)?	p. 114
Representational Interaction	p. 115
Semantics for Color Attribution	p. 117
Context-Dependence and Shifting Standards	p. 117
Vagueness	p. 121
Problems and Solutions	p. 122
Permissiveness	p. 122
Proliferation	p. 123
Heraclitean Flux	p. 125
Error	p. 128
Conclusion	p. 132
Relationalism Defended: Ontology	p. 133
The Many and The One	p. 133
The Many: Multiplicity	p. 133
The One: Unity	p. 136
The Many Faces of Property Realism	p. 138
Mind-Independence	p. 139
Convergence	p. 141
Objectivity	p. 144
Summing Up: Relationalism and Reality	p. 145
Is Relationalism An Error Theory?	p. 146
Folk Color Concepts	p. 148
What Phenomenology Reveals	p. 149
Skepticism About Conceptual Requirements	p. 149
Error Theory Defanged	p. 150
Conclusion	p. 151
Relationalism Defended: Phenomenology	p. 152
Do Colors Look Relational?	p. 153
Are Relational Properties Visible?	p. 160
Phenomenology about Phenomenology?	p. 163
Relationalism and Regress	p. 166
Mutual Dependence and Understanding	p. 171
Conclusion	p. 174
Role Functionalism
A Role Functionalist Theory of Color	p. 477
Role Functionalism	p. 177
Motivation	p. 178
Role Functionalism as a Functional Analysis	p. 179
Role Functionalism and Perceptual Variation	p. 182
Being Red and Looking Red	p. 182
Role and Realizer Functionalism	p. 184
Compare and Contrast	p. 185
The Argument from Commonality	p. 188
The Argument from Necessity	p. 193
The Argument from Rigidity	p. 197
Role Functionalism and Causation	p. 205
Can Role Properties Be Causes?	p. 206
Explanatory Exclusion and Determination	p. 208
Explanatory Exclusion and Partial Determination	p. 210
Causal Relevance and Causation	p. 212
Virtus Dormitiva	p. 214
Causal Relevance and Profligacy	p. 215
Conclusion	p. 217
Role Functionalism and Its Relationalist Rivals	p. 218
Dispositionalism	p. 218
Exegesis	p. 218
The Argument from Absorption	p. 221
Ecological Relationalism	p. 223
Exegesis	p. 223
The Argument from Multiple Realization	p. 224
The Argument from Non-Idealism and Location	p. 225
Sensory Classificationism	p. 226
Exegesis	p. 226
The Argument from Stimulus-Independence	p. 229
Conclusion	p. 233
Summary
Summary Conclusion	p. 237
References	p. 239
Index	p. 256
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.