The Road To Maastricht Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union

by Dyson, Kenneth; Featherstone, Kevin

• ISBN13: 9780198296386
• ISBN10: 019829638X
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2000-01-20
• Publisher: Oxford University Press

Summary

The negotiations for economic and monetary union in the European Union represented a massive change for Europe and for the world. This book identifies why the historical agreement at Maastricht in December 1991 was possible and how the agreement was made. It examines the motives that inspired EC political leaders, the strategies that they pursued, and the institutions of the EC which were used to achieve monetary union.

Author Biography

Kenneth Dyson is Professor of European Studies, University of Bradford
Kevin Featherstone is Professor of European Politics and Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration Studies, University of Bradford

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations	xxi
Introduction: An Historical Overview	1	(11)
Making Sense of the EMU Negotiations	12	(50)
EMU Negotiations as a `Core Executive' Activity	13	(2)
Conceptualizing the Negotiations: Structural, Strategic, and Cognitive Dimensions	15	(4)
EMU as a Prestructured Negotiating Process	19	(14)
EMU Negotiations as a Strategic Process: Power and Interests	33	(14)
EMU Negotiations as a Cognitive Process: Ideas and Knowledge	47	(15)
EMU, the Mitterrand Presidency, and French Political Tradition	62	(37)
The Role of Inherited Beliefs and Historical Memories	64	(3)
The Tradition of the Republican State and EMU	67	(4)
French Leadership of Europe: The Primacy to Construction Europeenne	71	(4)
The Franc Stable: The Tresor and the Finance Inspectorate	75	(8)
Rebalancing Power in the International Monetary System: The Search for Economic Independence from the USA and the Problem of Asymmetry	83	(2)
Domestic Economic-Policy Traditions and EMU	85	(14)
The Political Problem of Reconciling Domestic and International Interests in EMU: The Legacy of Barre, Giscard d'Estaing, and Pompidou	99	(25)
EMU and Gold in the 1960s	100	(2)
Pompidou, the Hague Summit, and the Werner Report: The Turning-Point of 1968	102	(10)
The Fourcade Plan and the Reform of the `Snake': The Giscard Presidency	112	(2)
`A New Bretton Woods for Europe': Giscard, the EMS, and EMU	114	(10)
Challenging the `D-Mark Zone': Agenda-Setting on EMU and the Strategy of Indirection under Mitterrand, 1981--1989	124	(78)
Mitterrand's Beliefs about Europe and Strategy for EMU	125	(6)
Mitterrand's Governing Style and EMU	131	(3)
The EMS, EMU, and Construction Europeenne: The Domestic and International Context, 1981-1983	134	(3)
Finance Ministry Power under Delors: The `Tournant' of 1982, Stage 2 of the EMS, and Defining French Objectives for EMS Reform	137	(5)
Mitterrand and the Political Management of the March 1983 ERM Crisis	142	(5)
Reconciling Socialism to Life in the ERM: Delors, Beregovoy, and the Franc Stable, 1983-1986	147	(4)
EMU and the Relance Europeenne: Mitterrand, the Dumas Memorandum, and the IGC of 1985	151	(5)
The ERM and EMU under the Cohabitation, 1986-1988: The Balladur Memorandum, and the Dumas-Genscher Relationship	156	(16)
Mitterrand, Beregovoy, and the Delors Committee	172	(15)
Activating Elysee Leadership of EMU after Madrid: The French Presidency, the Guigou Group, and the Conversion of Beregovoy	187	(15)
French Strategy for the IGC: Making EMU Irreversible	202	(54)
Presidential Leadership after Strasbourg: EMU, Political Union, and the Domestic Political Context	204	(5)
The Bureaucratic Politics of EMU in Paris: Mitterrand, Beregovoy, and the Banque de France	209	(7)
The French Negotiating Team and the Structure of Core Executive Co-ordination: The Elysee, Dumas, and Guigou	216	(3)
Bureaucratic Politics and the Core Executive in the EMU Negotiations: The Finance Ministry and Interministerial Co-ordination	219	(2)
Squaring the Council of Ministers: Preparing the Paper `Progress towards EMU'	221	(3)
Negotiating the French Draft Treaty on EMU: A `Third Route' to EMU?	224	(7)
Managing Bilateral Relations during the IGC	231	(5)
Pursuing French Objectives in the IGC	236	(9)
The `End-Game': Achieving `Irreversibility'	245	(11)
EMU, the Kohl Chancellorship, and German Political Tradition: The Legacy of Adenauer and Erhard	256	(30)
Kohl as `Grandson of Adenauer'	257	(3)
EMU: Between European Unification and the Social Market Economy	260	(6)
Adenauer's Legacy and EMU: The Foreign Ministry and Chancellor Leadership	266	(8)
Erhard's Legacy and EMU: The Ordo-liberal Economics Establishment and Stability Culture	274	(8)
German Negotiating Style: The `Rule-Based' Approach	282	(4)
The Political Problem of Reconciling Domestic and International Interests in EMU: The Legacy of Schiller and Schmidt	286	(20)
The Legacy of Schiller: The Werner Group, `Coronation Theory', and Belief in Parallelism	289	(4)
The Consolidation of Power of the Ordo-liberal Coalition on EMU	293	(1)
Schmidt as Finance Minister: The Changing Domestic Context of EMU	294	(2)
Otmar Emminger, the Bundesbank, and EMU	296	(2)
Schmidt and the Birth of the EMS: Challenging the Ordo-liberals	298	(3)
Schmidt's Legacy	301	(1)
The Second Stage of the EMS in 1982	302	(4)
Negotiating EMU around the German Model: Agenda-Setting under the Kohl Chancellorship, 1982--1989	306	(64)
Kohl's Beliefs about EMU and Governing Style	307	(6)
Stoltenberg and Finance Ministry Power over the EMS and EMU	313	(2)
Saving the EMS: Stoltenberg, Kohl, and the March ERM Crisis	315	(1)
Fighting off Delors's Trojan Horse: EMU and the Single European Act	316	(4)
Challenges to Develop the EMS: New Strains and Tensions	320	(6)
Genscher as `Policy Enterpreneur' and Kohl's Political Strategy for the Hanover European Council	326	(16)
Seizing the Initiative: Pohl, the Bundesbank, and Strategy for the Delors Committee	342	(8)
The Struggle for Control of German Strategy after the Delors Report: The Timetable Issue and Madrid	350	(4)
Policy Reflection in the Shadows of the Delors Report, Madrid, and the `German Question'	354	(9)
Genscher, German Unification, and the Date of the IGC	363	(1)
Kohl's Strategy for the Strasbourg European Council	364	(2)
After Strasbourg: Kohl's Ownership of the EMU Project	366	(4)
German Strategy for the IGC	370	(82)
The German Approach to the IGC Negotiations: Key Themes	371	(4)
Kohl's Use of Metaphor and Historical Narrative to Reframe EMU	375	(3)
Finance Ministry Strategy for the IGC	378	(8)
Bundesbank Strategy for the IGC	386	(8)
Germany and the Italian EC Presidency: Stage 2, the Organization of the IGC, and Political Union	394	(8)
Putting the German Negotiating Team Together and Preparing German Bargaining Positions: From Rome 2 to the German Draft Treaty on EMU	402	(10)
Franco-German Relations after the German Draft Treaty: The Top-Secret Bilaterals	412	(5)
Kohl, the Chancellor's Office, and the IGC on EMU	417	(6)
Kohler and the IGC	423	(11)
The Bundesbank and the IGC	434	(3)
The EMU `End-Game': Saving the Treaty	437	(11)
Conclusion: `D-Mark Patriotism', `Coronation Theory', and Trusting the French	448	(4)
Italian Policy Beliefs about EMU: External Discipline versus Internal Protection	452	(33)
The Need for a Vincolo Esterno: Institutional Weakness at Home	455	(4)
The Tesoro and Sarcinelli	459	(2)
The Banca d'Italia	461	(1)
External Discipline versus Internal Protection: The Two Souls of Faust	462	(7)
Policy Learning: Defer to the Market, Stay in Serie A	469	(2)
From Werner to the EMS	471	(3)
Italy and the Birth of the EMS	474	(5)
Divorce, Italian Style	479	(2)
Financial Market Liberlization	481	(4)
Framing EMU as a New Vincolo Esterno: Policy Enterpreneurs, Co-ordination, and Reflection in Italy, 1988--1990	485	(23)
Policy Entrepreneurs and the Core Executive: The Technocratic Opportunity	486	(5)
Andreotti and EMU: Guile Displaced by Technical Realities	491	(2)
De Michelis and EMU: No Time for Accountancy	493	(2)
Carli and EMU: Breaking Free of Andreotti?	495	(1)
EMU Co-ordination and the `Gang of Three'	495	(2)
Italy and the Emerging EMU Agenda	497	(1)
Public Opinion and Europe	498	(1)
Italian Economists and EMU: A Rationale for Reform	499	(1)
From Basle--Nyborg to Hanover: Policy in the Shadow of the D-Mark	500	(2)
The Devout Courtier: Padoa-Schioppa and the Delors Committee	502	(1)
The Genial Architect: Ciampi, Institutionalism, and the Delors Committee	502	(3)
From the Delors Report to Rome 1: Sustaining EMU	505	(3)
Italy and the IGC: Negotiating External Discipline, Avoiding Exclusion, 1990--1991	508	(26)
Avoiding Relegation from Europe's First Division	510	(2)
Maximalist Ambitions: Italian Negotiating Positions	512	(2)
Negotiating Successes: Andreotti, Vattani, and Rome 1: Padoa-Schioppa's Formula for `Automaticity'	514	(4)
Negotiating Failures: Maximalist Dreams Scuppered	518	(6)
Of their Own Free Will?	524	(1)
Let the British Take It or Leave It	525	(1)
Framing the Wider Package	526	(2)
Strategy and Coalitions	528	(2)
Any Deal is Better than No Deal?	530	(4)
The British Political Tradition and EMU: Policy Legacies, Beliefs, and Co-ordination	534	(67)
The Trouble with Europe	534	(2)
Lessons from History? Policy Beliefs and Strategy on European Monetary Co-operation, 1970--1990	536	(21)
Policy Beliefs and the Structure of the Debate on Europe	557	(25)
The Domestic Policy Process on EMU	582	(19)
Resisting EMU: Political Strategy, Policy Entrepreneurship, and Policy Reflection before the IGC	601	(43)
Caught of Guard: Hanover and the Delors Committee	602	(10)
Britain's Belated Alternatives: The Competing Currency and the Hard ECU Plans	612	(20)
The Rome 1 Debacle	632	(2)
As a Window at Home Opens, That in Europe Closes	634	(4)
The Hard ECU and the IGC	638	(6)
John Major: Between the Party and the IGC	644	(47)
Major, the Party Leader	645	(2)
Major and the Negotiating Strategy in the IGC	647	(2)
This Far and No Further: The Negotiating Mandate	649	(28)
British Strategy and Coalition-Building in the IGC	677	(5)
On the Margins, but Tied to the Core: Britain's Exit from the ERM	682	(4)
Conclusion: Inevitable Heartache or Avoidable Failure?	686	(5)
Jacques Delors as Policy Entrepreneur and Ingenieur of the EMU Negotiations: Agenda-Setting and Oiling the Wheels	691	(55)
The Informal Presidentilization of EMU: Delors's Beliefs and Strategy	695	(11)
Delors as Animateur, Ingenieur, and Entrepreneur: Securing the Chair of the Delors Committee	706	(7)
Achieving a Unanimous Report: Delors as Ingenieur of Agreement in the Delors Committee	713	(7)
Preparing for the IGC on EMU: Delors in Retreat	720	(6)
The Role and Impact of Delors and the Commission in the IGC	726	(14)
Delors's Historical Contribution	740	(6)
Conclusions and Reflections	746	(56)
What have we Learnt about the EMU Negotiations?	747	(4)
Why was an EMU Agreement Possible?	751	(7)
The Nature and Patterns of Coalition Building	758	(12)
Theorizing about Maastricht	770	(4)
Theoretical Implications of the Study	774	(9)
How Successful Was the EMU Agreement?	783	(16)
Some Final Comments: `Locked' into a Politics of Deflation	799	(3)
Appendix: List of Interviewees	802	(7)
References	809	(18)
Name Index	827	(12)
Index	839