9780198296386

The Road To Maastricht Negotiating Economic and Monetary Union

by ;
  • ISBN13:

    9780198296386

  • ISBN10:

    019829638X

  • Format: Paperback
  • Copyright: 2000-01-20
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press

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Summary

The negotiations for economic and monetary union in the European Union represented a massive change for Europe and for the world. This book identifies why the historical agreement at Maastricht in December 1991 was possible and how the agreement was made. It examines the motives that inspired EC political leaders, the strategies that they pursued, and the institutions of the EC which were used to achieve monetary union.

Author Biography


Kenneth Dyson is Professor of European Studies, University of Bradford
Kevin Featherstone is Professor of European Politics and Jean Monnet Professor of European Integration Studies, University of Bradford

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations
xxi
Introduction: An Historical Overview 1(11)
Making Sense of the EMU Negotiations
12(50)
EMU Negotiations as a `Core Executive' Activity
13(2)
Conceptualizing the Negotiations: Structural, Strategic, and Cognitive Dimensions
15(4)
EMU as a Prestructured Negotiating Process
19(14)
EMU Negotiations as a Strategic Process: Power and Interests
33(14)
EMU Negotiations as a Cognitive Process: Ideas and Knowledge
47(15)
EMU, the Mitterrand Presidency, and French Political Tradition
62(37)
The Role of Inherited Beliefs and Historical Memories
64(3)
The Tradition of the Republican State and EMU
67(4)
French Leadership of Europe: The Primacy to Construction Europeenne
71(4)
The Franc Stable: The Tresor and the Finance Inspectorate
75(8)
Rebalancing Power in the International Monetary System: The Search for Economic Independence from the USA and the Problem of Asymmetry
83(2)
Domestic Economic-Policy Traditions and EMU
85(14)
The Political Problem of Reconciling Domestic and International Interests in EMU: The Legacy of Barre, Giscard d'Estaing, and Pompidou
99(25)
EMU and Gold in the 1960s
100(2)
Pompidou, the Hague Summit, and the Werner Report: The Turning-Point of 1968
102(10)
The Fourcade Plan and the Reform of the `Snake': The Giscard Presidency
112(2)
`A New Bretton Woods for Europe': Giscard, the EMS, and EMU
114(10)
Challenging the `D-Mark Zone': Agenda-Setting on EMU and the Strategy of Indirection under Mitterrand, 1981--1989
124(78)
Mitterrand's Beliefs about Europe and Strategy for EMU
125(6)
Mitterrand's Governing Style and EMU
131(3)
The EMS, EMU, and Construction Europeenne: The Domestic and International Context, 1981-1983
134(3)
Finance Ministry Power under Delors: The `Tournant' of 1982, Stage 2 of the EMS, and Defining French Objectives for EMS Reform
137(5)
Mitterrand and the Political Management of the March 1983 ERM Crisis
142(5)
Reconciling Socialism to Life in the ERM: Delors, Beregovoy, and the Franc Stable, 1983-1986
147(4)
EMU and the Relance Europeenne: Mitterrand, the Dumas Memorandum, and the IGC of 1985
151(5)
The ERM and EMU under the Cohabitation, 1986-1988: The Balladur Memorandum, and the Dumas-Genscher Relationship
156(16)
Mitterrand, Beregovoy, and the Delors Committee
172(15)
Activating Elysee Leadership of EMU after Madrid: The French Presidency, the Guigou Group, and the Conversion of Beregovoy
187(15)
French Strategy for the IGC: Making EMU Irreversible
202(54)
Presidential Leadership after Strasbourg: EMU, Political Union, and the Domestic Political Context
204(5)
The Bureaucratic Politics of EMU in Paris: Mitterrand, Beregovoy, and the Banque de France
209(7)
The French Negotiating Team and the Structure of Core Executive Co-ordination: The Elysee, Dumas, and Guigou
216(3)
Bureaucratic Politics and the Core Executive in the EMU Negotiations: The Finance Ministry and Interministerial Co-ordination
219(2)
Squaring the Council of Ministers: Preparing the Paper `Progress towards EMU'
221(3)
Negotiating the French Draft Treaty on EMU: A `Third Route' to EMU?
224(7)
Managing Bilateral Relations during the IGC
231(5)
Pursuing French Objectives in the IGC
236(9)
The `End-Game': Achieving `Irreversibility'
245(11)
EMU, the Kohl Chancellorship, and German Political Tradition: The Legacy of Adenauer and Erhard
256(30)
Kohl as `Grandson of Adenauer'
257(3)
EMU: Between European Unification and the Social Market Economy
260(6)
Adenauer's Legacy and EMU: The Foreign Ministry and Chancellor Leadership
266(8)
Erhard's Legacy and EMU: The Ordo-liberal Economics Establishment and Stability Culture
274(8)
German Negotiating Style: The `Rule-Based' Approach
282(4)
The Political Problem of Reconciling Domestic and International Interests in EMU: The Legacy of Schiller and Schmidt
286(20)
The Legacy of Schiller: The Werner Group, `Coronation Theory', and Belief in Parallelism
289(4)
The Consolidation of Power of the Ordo-liberal Coalition on EMU
293(1)
Schmidt as Finance Minister: The Changing Domestic Context of EMU
294(2)
Otmar Emminger, the Bundesbank, and EMU
296(2)
Schmidt and the Birth of the EMS: Challenging the Ordo-liberals
298(3)
Schmidt's Legacy
301(1)
The Second Stage of the EMS in 1982
302(4)
Negotiating EMU around the German Model: Agenda-Setting under the Kohl Chancellorship, 1982--1989
306(64)
Kohl's Beliefs about EMU and Governing Style
307(6)
Stoltenberg and Finance Ministry Power over the EMS and EMU
313(2)
Saving the EMS: Stoltenberg, Kohl, and the March ERM Crisis
315(1)
Fighting off Delors's Trojan Horse: EMU and the Single European Act
316(4)
Challenges to Develop the EMS: New Strains and Tensions
320(6)
Genscher as `Policy Enterpreneur' and Kohl's Political Strategy for the Hanover European Council
326(16)
Seizing the Initiative: Pohl, the Bundesbank, and Strategy for the Delors Committee
342(8)
The Struggle for Control of German Strategy after the Delors Report: The Timetable Issue and Madrid
350(4)
Policy Reflection in the Shadows of the Delors Report, Madrid, and the `German Question'
354(9)
Genscher, German Unification, and the Date of the IGC
363(1)
Kohl's Strategy for the Strasbourg European Council
364(2)
After Strasbourg: Kohl's Ownership of the EMU Project
366(4)
German Strategy for the IGC
370(82)
The German Approach to the IGC Negotiations: Key Themes
371(4)
Kohl's Use of Metaphor and Historical Narrative to Reframe EMU
375(3)
Finance Ministry Strategy for the IGC
378(8)
Bundesbank Strategy for the IGC
386(8)
Germany and the Italian EC Presidency: Stage 2, the Organization of the IGC, and Political Union
394(8)
Putting the German Negotiating Team Together and Preparing German Bargaining Positions: From Rome 2 to the German Draft Treaty on EMU
402(10)
Franco-German Relations after the German Draft Treaty: The Top-Secret Bilaterals
412(5)
Kohl, the Chancellor's Office, and the IGC on EMU
417(6)
Kohler and the IGC
423(11)
The Bundesbank and the IGC
434(3)
The EMU `End-Game': Saving the Treaty
437(11)
Conclusion: `D-Mark Patriotism', `Coronation Theory', and Trusting the French
448(4)
Italian Policy Beliefs about EMU: External Discipline versus Internal Protection
452(33)
The Need for a Vincolo Esterno: Institutional Weakness at Home
455(4)
The Tesoro and Sarcinelli
459(2)
The Banca d'Italia
461(1)
External Discipline versus Internal Protection: The Two Souls of Faust
462(7)
Policy Learning: Defer to the Market, Stay in Serie A
469(2)
From Werner to the EMS
471(3)
Italy and the Birth of the EMS
474(5)
Divorce, Italian Style
479(2)
Financial Market Liberlization
481(4)
Framing EMU as a New Vincolo Esterno: Policy Enterpreneurs, Co-ordination, and Reflection in Italy, 1988--1990
485(23)
Policy Entrepreneurs and the Core Executive: The Technocratic Opportunity
486(5)
Andreotti and EMU: Guile Displaced by Technical Realities
491(2)
De Michelis and EMU: No Time for Accountancy
493(2)
Carli and EMU: Breaking Free of Andreotti?
495(1)
EMU Co-ordination and the `Gang of Three'
495(2)
Italy and the Emerging EMU Agenda
497(1)
Public Opinion and Europe
498(1)
Italian Economists and EMU: A Rationale for Reform
499(1)
From Basle--Nyborg to Hanover: Policy in the Shadow of the D-Mark
500(2)
The Devout Courtier: Padoa-Schioppa and the Delors Committee
502(1)
The Genial Architect: Ciampi, Institutionalism, and the Delors Committee
502(3)
From the Delors Report to Rome 1: Sustaining EMU
505(3)
Italy and the IGC: Negotiating External Discipline, Avoiding Exclusion, 1990--1991
508(26)
Avoiding Relegation from Europe's First Division
510(2)
Maximalist Ambitions: Italian Negotiating Positions
512(2)
Negotiating Successes: Andreotti, Vattani, and Rome 1: Padoa-Schioppa's Formula for `Automaticity'
514(4)
Negotiating Failures: Maximalist Dreams Scuppered
518(6)
Of their Own Free Will?
524(1)
Let the British Take It or Leave It
525(1)
Framing the Wider Package
526(2)
Strategy and Coalitions
528(2)
Any Deal is Better than No Deal?
530(4)
The British Political Tradition and EMU: Policy Legacies, Beliefs, and Co-ordination
534(67)
The Trouble with Europe
534(2)
Lessons from History? Policy Beliefs and Strategy on European Monetary Co-operation, 1970--1990
536(21)
Policy Beliefs and the Structure of the Debate on Europe
557(25)
The Domestic Policy Process on EMU
582(19)
Resisting EMU: Political Strategy, Policy Entrepreneurship, and Policy Reflection before the IGC
601(43)
Caught of Guard: Hanover and the Delors Committee
602(10)
Britain's Belated Alternatives: The Competing Currency and the Hard ECU Plans
612(20)
The Rome 1 Debacle
632(2)
As a Window at Home Opens, That in Europe Closes
634(4)
The Hard ECU and the IGC
638(6)
John Major: Between the Party and the IGC
644(47)
Major, the Party Leader
645(2)
Major and the Negotiating Strategy in the IGC
647(2)
This Far and No Further: The Negotiating Mandate
649(28)
British Strategy and Coalition-Building in the IGC
677(5)
On the Margins, but Tied to the Core: Britain's Exit from the ERM
682(4)
Conclusion: Inevitable Heartache or Avoidable Failure?
686(5)
Jacques Delors as Policy Entrepreneur and Ingenieur of the EMU Negotiations: Agenda-Setting and Oiling the Wheels
691(55)
The Informal Presidentilization of EMU: Delors's Beliefs and Strategy
695(11)
Delors as Animateur, Ingenieur, and Entrepreneur: Securing the Chair of the Delors Committee
706(7)
Achieving a Unanimous Report: Delors as Ingenieur of Agreement in the Delors Committee
713(7)
Preparing for the IGC on EMU: Delors in Retreat
720(6)
The Role and Impact of Delors and the Commission in the IGC
726(14)
Delors's Historical Contribution
740(6)
Conclusions and Reflections
746(56)
What have we Learnt about the EMU Negotiations?
747(4)
Why was an EMU Agreement Possible?
751(7)
The Nature and Patterns of Coalition Building
758(12)
Theorizing about Maastricht
770(4)
Theoretical Implications of the Study
774(9)
How Successful Was the EMU Agreement?
783(16)
Some Final Comments: `Locked' into a Politics of Deflation
799(3)
Appendix: List of Interviewees 802(7)
References 809(18)
Name Index 827(12)
Index 839

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