Saul Kripke

by Edited by Alan Berger

• ISBN13: 9780521674980
• ISBN10: 0521674980
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2011-06-13
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

This collection of essays on Saul Kripke and his philosophy is the first and only collection of essays to examine both published and unpublished writings by Kripke. Its essays, written by distinguished philosophers in the field, present a broader picture of Kripke's life and work than has previously been available to scholars of his thought. New topics covered in these essays include vacuous names and names in fiction, Kripke on logicism and de re attitude toward numbers, Kripke on the incoherency of adopting a logic, Kripke on colour words and his criticism of the primary versus secondary quality distinction, and Kripke's critique of functionalism. These essays not only present Kripke's basic arguments but also engage with the arguments and controversies engendered by his work, providing the most comprehensive analysis of his philosophy and writings available. This collection will become a classic in contemporary analytic philosophy.

Author Biography

Alan Berger is professor of philosophy at Brandeis University and a visiting professor at Harvard University. He formerly served as director of the Saul Kripke Center and is the author of Terms and Truth: Reference Direct and Anaphoric (2002), Quine: From a Critical Point of View (forthcoming), and numerous articles in scholarly journals including the Journal of Philosophy and Nous.

Table of Contents

List of Contributors	p. vii
Introduction to Kripke	p. 1
Naming, Necessity, And Apriority
Kripke on Proper and General Names	p. 17
Fiction, Myth, and Reality	p. 49
Kripke on Epistemic and Metaphysical Possibility: Two Routes to the Necessary A Posteriority	p. 78
Possible Worlds Semantics: Philosophical Foundations	p. 100
Formal Semantics, Truth, Philosophy Of Mathematics, And Philosophy Of Logic
Kripke Models	p. 119
Kripke on Truth	p. 141
Kripke on Logicism, Wittgenstein, and De Re Beliefs about Numbers	p. 160
Kripke on the Incoherency of Adopting a Logic	p. 177
Language And Mind
Kripke's Puzzle about Belief	p. 211
A Note on Kripke's Puzzle about Belief	p. 235
On the Skepticism about Rule-Following in Kripke's Version of Wittgenstein	p. 253
Kripke on Color Words and the Primary/Secondary Quality Distinction	p. 290
Philosophy Of Mind And Philosophical Psychology
Kripke and Cartesianism	p. 327
Not Even Computing Machines Can Follow Rules: Kripke's Critique of Functionalism	p. 343
Index	p. 369
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