Questions About This Book?
Why should I rent this book?
Renting is easy, fast, and cheap! Renting from eCampus.com can save you hundreds of dollars compared to the cost of new or used books each semester. At the end of the semester, simply ship the book back to us with a free UPS shipping label! No need to worry about selling it back.
How do rental returns work?
Returning books is as easy as possible. As your rental due date approaches, we will email you several courtesy reminders. When you are ready to return, you can print a free UPS shipping label from our website at any time. Then, just return the book to your UPS driver or any staffed UPS location. You can even use the same box we shipped it in!
What version or edition is this?
This is the edition with a publication date of 5/5/2013.
What is included with this book?
- The New copy of this book will include any supplemental materials advertised. Please check the title of the book to determine if it should include any CDs, lab manuals, study guides, etc.
- The Rental copy of this book is not guaranteed to include any supplemental materials. You may receive a brand new copy, but typically, only the book itself.
This is the second of six volumes in a series of selected scientific papers by one of the world's most distinguished economists. Volume I presented the basic concepts in the Economics of Information, showing that markets in which information was imperfect or asymmetric (where some individuals know things that others don't) behave markedly different from how they would if information were perfect. Volume II, with papers written between 1969 and 2009, explores the implications ofthe New Information Paradigm for labor, capital, and product markets. This New Paradigm, for which Stiglitz was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2001, has fundamentally changed the way we think about every aspect of economics, raising new questions on corporate governance, and leadingus to reconsider old questions on corporate finance, the relationship between finance and the economy, and the theory of economic incentives. While this volume focuses on the application of basic principles, it also extends the theory in important ways, showing the fruitfulness of Stiglitz's research strategy. In doing so, the papers set the ground for questioning some prevailing doctrines: key market phenomena cannot be explained by markets with rational expectations, even when information is imperfect. It demonstrates that how societies organize the obtainment, processing, and transmitting of information is as important as howthey organize the production and distribution of goods. Indeed, the two issues are inseparable. The papers thus lay the foundations of a New Institutional Economics, not only describing how institutions (like sharecropping or banks) work and affect resource allocations, but why they arise and take onparticular forms.
Table of Contents
Preface to Volume II
I: SURVEYS AND PERSPECTIVES
1. Information and Economic Analysis: A Perspective
2. Information and Competition
II: CAPITAL MARKETS
IIA: Information and Capital Markets
3. Information and Capital Markets
4. Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term Trading
5. Ownership, Control and Efficient Markets: Some Paradoxes in the Theory of Capital Markets
6. The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings, with I. Gale
7. A Simple Proof that Futures Markets are Almost Always Informationally Imperfect, with I. Gale
IIB: Credit and Equity Rationing
8. Incentive Effects of Termination: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets, with A. Weiss
9. Credit Rationing and Collateral, with A. Weiss
10. Credit and Equity Rationing in Markets with Adverse Selection, with T. Hellmann
IIC: Structure and Functioning of Capital Markets
11. Information, Finance and Markets: The Architecture of Allocative Mechanisms, with B. Greenwald
12. Banks as Social Accountants and Screening Devices for the Allocation of Credit, with A. Weiss
13. Banks versus Markets as Mechanisms for Allocating and Coordinating Investment
14. Short-term Contracts as a Monitoring Device, with P. Rey
15. Pure Theory of Country Risk, with J. Eaton and M. Gersovitz
16. Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies, with A. Edlin
III: INFORMATION AND LABOR MARKETS AND THE GENERAL THEORY OF INCENTIVES
17. A Survey of the Economics of Incentives
18. Incentives, Risk and Information: Notes Toward a Theory of Hierarchy
19. Prizes and Incentives: Toward a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, with B. Nalebuff
20. Design of Labor Contracts: Economics of Incentives and Risk-Sharing
IIIB: Efficiency Wages
21. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment in L.D.C.'s: The Labor Turnover Model
22. Alternative Theories of Wage Determination and Unemployment: The Efficiency Wage Model
23. Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Screening Device, with B. Nalebuff and A. Rodriguez
IIIC: Wage Distributions, Search, and the Efficiency of Market Equilibrium
24. Equilibrium Wage Distribution
25. Labor Turnover, Wage Structure & Moral Hazard: The Inefficiency of Competitive Markets, with R. Arnott
IV. THE PURE THEORY OF MORAL HAZARD AND INSURANCE
26. Risk, Incentives and Insurance: The Pure Theory of Moral Hazard
27. Price Equilibrium, Efficiency, and Decentralizability in Insurance Markets, with R. Arnott
28. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets, with Moral Hazard with R. Arnott
V. INFORMATION AND PRODUCT MARKETS
29. Imperfect Information in Product Markets
30. The Theory of Sales: A Simple Model of Equilibrium Price Dispersion with Identical Agents, with S. Salop
31. Equilibrium in Product Markets with Imperfect Information
32. Competition and the Number of Firms in a Market: Are Duopolies More Competitive Than Atomistic Markets?