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Brian Skyrms is Distinguished Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science and Economics at the University of California, Irvine. His interests cover a range of topics, including the evolution of conventions, the social contract, inductive logic, decision theory, rational deliberation, the metaphysics of logical atomism, causality, and truth. He is the author of Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information (OUP, 2010) and From Zeno to Arbitrage: Essays on Quantity. Coherence, and Induction (OUP, 2012).
Table of Contents
Introduction Part I: Correlation and the Social Contract Introduction to part I 1. Evolution and the Social Contract Part II: Importance of Dynamics Introduction to part II 2. Trust, Risk, and the Social Contract 3. Bargaining with Neighbors: Is Justice Contagious?, with Jason Alexander 4. Stability and Explanatory Significance of Some Simple Evolutionary Models 5. Dynamics of Conformist Bias 6. Chaos and the Explanatory Significance of Equilibrium: Strange Attractors in Evolutionary Game Dynamics 7. Evolutionary Dynamics of Collective Action in N-person Stag Hunt Dilemmas, with Jorge Pacheco, Francisco Santos and Max Souza 8. Learning to Take Turns, with Peter Vanderschraaf 9. Evolutionary Considerations in the Framing of Social Norms, with Kevin Zollman Part III: Dynamic Networks Introduction to part III 10. Learning to Network, with Robin Pemantle 11. A Dynamic Model of Social Network Formation, with Robin Pemantle 12. Network Formation by Reinforcement Learning: The Long and the Medium Run, with Robin Pemantle 13. Time to Absorption in Discounted Reinforcement Models, with Robin Pemantle Part IV: Dynamics of Signals Introduction to part IV 14. Learning to Signal: Analysis of a Micro-Level Reinforcement Model, with Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle and Stanislav Volkov 15. Inventing New Signals, with Jason McKenzie Alexander and Sandy L. Zabell 16. Signals, Evolution and the Explanatory Power of Transient Information 17. Co-Evolution of Pre-Play Signaling and Cooperation, with Francesco Santos and Jorge Pacheco 18. Evolution of Signaling Systems with Multiple Senders and Receivers Index