9781410202529

A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive

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  • ISBN13:

    9781410202529

  • ISBN10:

    1410202526

  • Format: Paperback
  • Copyright: 2002-09-01
  • Publisher: Lightning Source Inc

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Table of Contents

Introduction
A definition at the commencement of a subject must be provisional
1(1)
Is Logic the art and science of reasoning?
1(1)
Or the art and science of the pursuit of truth?
2(1)
Logic is concerned with inferences, not with intuitive truths
3(2)
Relation of Logic to the other sciences
5(1)
Its utility, how shown
6(1)
Definition of Logic stated and illustrated
6(5)
BOOK I. OF NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS
Of the Necessity of commencing with an Analysis of Language
Theory of names, why a necessary part of Logic
11(1)
First step in the analysis of Propositions
12(1)
Names must be studied before things
13(1)
Of Names
Names are names of things, not of our ideas
14(1)
Words which are not names, but parts of names
15(1)
General and Singular names
16(1)
Concrete and Abstract
17(2)
Connotative and Non-connotative
19(7)
Positive and Negative
26(1)
Relative and Absolute
27(1)
Univocal and Æquivocal
28(1)
Of the Things denoted by Names
Necessity of an enumeration of Nameable Things. The Categories of Aristotle
29(1)
Ambiguity of the most general names
30(2)
Feelings, or states of consciousness
32(1)
Feelings must be distinguished from their physical antecedents. Perceptions, what
33(2)
Volitions and Actions, what
35(1)
Substance and Attribute
35(1)
Body
36(3)
Mind
39(2)
Qualities
41(1)
Relations
42(2)
Resemblance
44(2)
Quantity
46(1)
All attributes of bodies are grounded on states of consciousness
46(1)
So also all attributes of mind
47(1)
Recapitulation
48(1)
Of Propositions
Nature and office of the copula
49(2)
Affirmative and Negative propositions
51(1)
Simple and Complex
52(2)
Universal, Particular, and Singular
54(1)
Of the Import of Propositions
Doctrine that a Proposition is the expression of a relation between two ideas
55(2)
Doctrine that it is the expression of a relation between the meanings of two names
57(3)
Doctrine that it consists in referring something to, or excluding something from, a class
60(2)
What it really is
62(2)
It asserts (or denies) a sequence, a co-existence, a simple existence, a causation
64(1)
--- or a resemblance
65(3)
Propositions of which the terms are abstract
68(2)
Of Propositions merely Verbal
Essential and Accidental Propositions
70(1)
All essential Propositions are identical Propositions
71(2)
Individuals have no essences
73(1)
Real Propositions, how distinguished from verbal
74(1)
Two modes of representing the import of a real Proposition
75(1)
Of the Nature of Classification, and the Fire Predicables
Classification, how connected with naming
76(1)
The Predicables, what
77(1)
Genus and Species
77(2)
Kinds have a real existence in nature
79(2)
Differentia
81(2)
Differentiæ for general purposes, and differentiæ for special or technical purposes
83(1)
Proprium
84(1)
Accideus
85(1)
Of Definition
A definition, what
86(1)
Every name can be defined whose meaning is susceptible of analysis
87(1)
Complete, how distinguished from incomplete definitions
88(1)
--- and from descriptions
89(3)
What are called definitions of Things, are definitions of Names with an implied assumption of the existence of Things corresponding to them
92(5)
--- even when such things do not in reality exist
97(1)
Definitions, though of names only, must be grounded on knowledge of the corresponding things
98(5)
BOOK II. OF REASONING
Of Inference, or Reasoning, in general
Retrospect of the preceding Book
103(1)
Inferences improperly so called
104(3)
Inferences proper, distinguished into inductions and ratiocinations
107(1)
Of Ratiocination, or Syllogism
Analysis of the Syllogism
108(5)
The dictum de omni not the foundation of reasoning, but a mere identical proposition
113(3)
What is the really fundamental axion of Ratiocination
116(1)
The other form of the axiom
117(2)
Of the Functions and Logical Value of the Syllogism
Is the Syllogism a petitio principii?
119(1)
Insufficiency of the common theory
120(1)
All inference is from particulars to particulars
121(5)
General Propositions are a record of such inferences, and the rules of the Syllogism are rules for the interpretation of the record
126(2)
The Syllogism not the type of reasoning, but a test of it
128(3)
The true type, what
131(2)
Relation between Induction and Deduction
133(1)
Objections answered
134(2)
Of Formal Logic, and its relation to the Logic of Truth
136(1)
Of Trains of Reasoning, and Deductive Sciences
For what purpose trains of reasoning exist
137(1)
A train of reasoning is a series of inductive inferences
138(1)
--- from particulars to particulars through marks of marks
139(2)
Why there are deductive sciences
141(2)
Why other sciences still remain experimental
143(2)
Experimental sciences may become deductive by the progress of experiment
145(1)
In what manner this usually takes place
145(2)
Of Demonstration, and Necessary Truths
The Theorems of Geometry are necessary truths only in the sense of necessarily following from hypotheses
147(2)
Those hypotheses are real facts with some of their circumstances exaggerated or omitted
149(1)
Some of the first principles of Geometry are axioms, and these are not hypothetical
150(1)
--- but are experimental truths
151(2)
An objection answered
153(3)
Dr. Whewell's opinions on axioms examined
156(8)
The same Subject continued
All deductive sciences are inductive
164(2)
The propositions of the Science of Number are not verbal, but generalisations from experience
166(3)
In what sense hypothetical
169(1)
The characteristic property of demonstrative science is to be hypothetical
170(1)
Definition of demonstrative evidence
171(1)
Examination of some Opinions opposed to the preceding doctrines
Doctrine of the Universal Postulate
172(1)
The test of inconceivability does not represent the aggregate of past experience
173(2)
--- nor is implied in every process of thought
175(4)
Objections answered
179(3)
Sir W. Hamilton's opinion on the Principles of Contradiction and Excluded Middle
182(3)
BOOK III. OF INDUCTION
Preliminary Observations on Induction in General
Importance of an Inductive Logic
185(1)
The Logic of Science is also that of business and life
185(3)
Of Inductions improperly so called
Inductions distinguished from verbal transformations
188(2)
--- from inductions, falsely so called, in mathematics
190(1)
--- and from descriptions
191(1)
Examination of Dr. Whewell's theory of Induction
192(6)
Further illustration of the preceding remarks
198(2)
On the Ground of Induction
Axiom of the uniformity of the course of Nature
200(3)
Not true in every sense. Induction per enumerationem simplicem
203(2)
The question of Inductive Logic stated
205(1)
Of Laws of Nature
The general regularity in nature is a tissue of partial regularities, called laws
205(3)
Scientific induction must be grounded on previous spontaneous inductions
208(1)
Are there any inductions fitted to be a test of all others?
209(2)
Of the Law of Universal Causation
The universal law of successive phenomena is the Law of Causation
211(2)
--- i.e. the law that every consequent has an invariable antecedent
213(1)
The cause of a phenomenon is the assemblage of its conditions
214(4)
The distinction of agent and patient illusory
218(2)
Case in which the effect consists in giving a property to an object
220(1)
The cause is not the invariable antecedent, but the unconditional invariable antecedent
221(3)
Can a cause be simultaneous with its effect?
224(1)
Idea of a permanent Cause, or original natural agent
225(2)
Uniformities of co-existence between effects of different permanent causes are not laws
227(1)
Theory of the Conservation of Force
228(4)
Doctrine that volition is an efficient cause, examined
232(10)
Of the Composition of Causes
Two modes of the conjunet action of causes, the mechanical and the chemical
242(2)
The composition of causes the general rule, the other case exceptional
244(2)
Are effects proportional to their causes?
246(1)
Of Observation and Experiment
The first step of inductive inquiry is a mental analysis of complex phenomena into their elements
247(2)
The next is an actual separation of those elements
249(1)
Advantages of experiment over observation
249(2)
Advantages of observation over experiment
251(2)
Of the Four Methods of Experimental Inquiry
Method of Agreement
253(2)
Method of Difference
255(1)
Mutual relation of these two methods
256(2)
Joint Method of Agreement and Difference
258(1)
Method of Residues
259(1)
Method of Concomitant Variations
260(4)
Limitations of this last method
264(3)
Miscellaneous Examples of the Four Methods
Liebig's theory of metallic poisons
267(2)
Theory of induced electricity
269(2)
Dr. Wells' theory of dew
271(5)
Dr. Brown-Sequard's theory of cadaveric rigidity
276(3)
Examples of the Method of Residues
279(3)
Dr. Whewell's objections to the Four Methods
282(3)
Of Plurality of Causes: and of the Intermixture of Effects
One effect may have several causes
285(1)
--- which is the source of a characteristic imperfection of the Method of Agreement
286(2)
Plurality of Causes, how ascertained
288(1)
Concurrence of Causes which do not compound their effects
289(2)
Difficulties of the investigation when causes compound their effects
291(3)
Three modes of investigating the laws of complex effects
294(1)
The method of simple observation inapplicable
295(1)
The purely experimental method inapplicable
296(3)
Of the Deductive Method
First stage; ascertainment of the laws of the separate causes by direct induction
299(3)
Second stage; ratiocination from the simple laws of the complex cases
302(1)
Third stage; verification by specific experience
303(2)
Of the Explanation of Laws of Nature
Explanation defined
305(1)
First mode of explanation; by resolving the law of a complex effect into the laws of the concurrent causes and the fact of their co-existence
305(1)
Second mode; by the detection of an intermediate link in the sequence
306(1)
Laws are always resolved into laws more general than themselves
307(1)
Third mode; the subsumption of less general laws under a more general one
308(2)
What the explanation of a law of nature amounts to
310(1)
Miscellaneous Examples of the Explanation of Laws of Nature
The general theories of the sciences
311(1)
Examples from chemical speculations
312(1)
Example from Dr. Brown-Sequard's researches on the nervous system
313(1)
Examples of following newly-discovered laws into their complex manifestations
314(1)
Examples of empirical generalisations, afterwards confirmed and explained deductively
315(1)
Example from mental science
316(1)
Tendency of all the sciences to become deductive
317(1)
Of the Limits to the Explanation of Laws of Nature; and of Hypotheses
Can all the sequences in nature be resolvable into one law?
318(1)
Ultimate laws cannot be less numerous than the distinguishable feelings of our nature
318(3)
In what sense ultimate facts can be explained
321(1)
The proper use of scientific hypotheses
322(4)
Their indispensableness
326(1)
The two degrees of legitimacy in hypotheses
327(5)
Some inquiries apparently hypothetical are really inductive
332(1)
Of Progressive Effects; and of the Continued Action of Causes
How a progressive effect results from the simple continuance of the cause
333(3)
--- and from the progressiveness of the cause
336(1)
Derivative laws generated from a single ultimate law
337(1)
Of Empirical Laws
Definition of an empirical law
338(1)
Derivative laws commonly depend on collocations
339(1)
The collocations of the permanent causes are not reducible to any law
340(1)
Hence empirical laws cannot be relied on beyond the limits of actual experience
340(1)
Generalisations which rest only on the Method of Agreement can only be received as empirical laws
341(1)
Signs from which an observed uniformity of sequence may be presumed to be resolvable
342(1)
Two kinds of empirical laws
343(1)
Of Chance and its Elimination
The proof of empirical laws depends on the theory of chance
344(1)
Chance defined and characterised
345(3)
The elimination of chance
348(1)
Discovery of residual phenomena by eliminating chance
349(1)
The doctrine of chances
350(1)
Of the Calculation of Chances
Foundation of the doctrine of chances, as taught by mathematics
350(2)
The doctrine tenable
352(1)
On what foundation it really rests
352(3)
Its ultimate dependence on causation
355(2)
Theorem of the doctrine of chances which relates to the cause of a given event
357(1)
How applicable to the elimination of chance
358(2)
Of the Extension of Derivative Laws to Adjacent Cases
Derivative laws, when not causal, are almost always contingent on collocations
360(1)
On what grounds they can be extended to cases beyond the bounds of actual experience
361(1)
Those cases must be adjacent cases
362(2)
Of Analogy
Various senses of the word analogy
364(1)
Nature of analogical evidence
365(2)
On what circumstances its value depends
367(1)
Of the Evidence of the Law of Universal Causation
The law of causality does not rest on an instinct
368(3)
But on an induction by simple enumeration
371(2)
In what cases such induction is allowable
373(1)
The universal prevalence of the law of causality, on what grounds admissible
374(3)
Of Uniformities of Co-existence not dependent on Causation
Uniformities of co-existence which result from laws of sequence
377(2)
The properties of Kinds are uniformities of co-existence
379(1)
Some are derivative, others ultimate
380(1)
No universal axiom of co-existence
381(1)
The evidence of uniformities of co-existence, how measured
382(1)
When derivative, their evidence is that of empirical laws
382(1)
So also when ultimate
383(1)
The evidence stronger in proportion as the law is more general
384(1)
Every distinct Kind must be examined
385(1)
Of Approximate Generalisations, and Probable Evidence
The inferences called probable rest on approximate generalisations
386(1)
Approximate generalisations less useful in science than in life
387(1)
In what cases they may be resorted to
388(1)
In what manner proved
389(1)
With what precautions employed
390(1)
The two modes of combining probabilities
391(3)
How approximate generalisations may be converted into accurate generalisations equivalent to them
394(1)
Of the Remaining Laws of Nature
Propositions which assert mere existence
395(1)
Resemblance considered as a subject of science
396(1)
The axioms and theorems of mathematics comprise the principal laws of resemblance
397(1)
--- and those of order in place, and rest on induction by simple enumeration
398(1)
The propositions of arithmetic affirm the modes of formation of some given number
399(3)
Those of algebra affirm the equivalence of different modes of formation of numbers generally
402(1)
The propositions of Geometry are laws of outward nature
403(2)
Why Geometry is almost entirely deductive
405(1)
Function of mathematical truths in the other sciences, and limits of that function
406(1)
Of the Grounds of Disbelief
Improbability and impossibility
407(1)
Examination of Hume's doctrine of miracles
408(2)
The degrees of improbability correspond to differences in the nature of the generalisation with which an assertion conflicts
410(2)
A fact is not incredible because the chances are against it
412(1)
Are coincidences less credible than other facts?
413(2)
An opinion of Laplace examined
415(4)
BOOK IV. OF OPERATIONS SUBSIDIARY TO INDUCTION
Of Observation and Description
Observation, how far a subject of Logic
419(1)
A great part of what seems observation is really inference
420(2)
The description of an observation affirms more than is contained in the observation
422(1)
--- namely, an agreement among phenomena; and the comparison of phenomena to ascertain such agreements is a preliminary to induction
423(1)
Of Abstraction, or the Formation of Conceptions
The comparison which is a preliminary to induction implies general conceptions
424(1)
--- but these need not be pre-existent
425(2)
A general conception, originally the result of a comparison, becomes itself the type of comparison
427(2)
What is meant by appropriate conceptions
429(1)
--- and by clear conceptions
430(2)
Further illustration of the subject
432(1)
Of Naming, as subsidiary to Induction
The fundamental property of names as an instrument of thought
433(1)
Names are not indispensable to induction
434(1)
In what manner subservient to it
435(1)
General names not a mere contrivance to economise the use of language
436(1)
Of the Requisites of a Philosophical Language, and the Principles of Definition
First requisite of philosophical language, a steady and determinate meaning for every general name
436(1)
Names in common use have often a loose connotation
436(2)
--- which the logician should fix, with as little alteration as possible
438(1)
Why definition is often a question not of words but of things
439(2)
How the logician should deal with the transitive applications of words
441(3)
Evil consequences of casting off any portion of the customary connotation of words
444(4)
On the Natural History of the Variations in the Meaning of Terms
How circumstances originally accidental become incorporated into the meaning of words
448(2)
--- and sometimes become the whole meaning
450(1)
Tendency of words to become generalised
451(2)
--- and to become specialised
453(2)
The Principles of Philosophical Language further considered
Second requisite of philosophical language, a name for every important meaning
455(1)
--- viz. first, an accurate descriptive terminology
456(2)
--- secondly, a name for each of the more important results of scientific abstraction
458(1)
--- thirdly, a nomenclature, or system of the names of Kinds
459(2)
Peculiar nature of the connotation of names which belong to a nomenclature
461(1)
In what cases language may, and may not, be used mechanically
462(3)
Of Classification as Subsidiary to Induction
Classification as here treated of wherein different from the classification implied in naming
465(1)
Theory of natural groups
466(2)
Are natural groups given by type or by definition?
468(2)
Kinds are natural groups
470(3)
How the names of Kinds should be constructed
473(2)
Of Classification by Series
Natural groups should be arranged in a natural series
475(1)
The arrangement should follow the degrees of the main phenomenon
475(1)
--- which implies the assumption of a type-species
476(1)
How the divisions of the series should be determined
477(1)
Zoology affords the completest type of scientific classification
478(3)
BOOK V. ON FALLACIES
Of Fallacies in General
Theory of fallacios a necessary part of Logic
481(1)
Casual mistakes are not fallacies
482(1)
The moral sources of erroneous opinion, how related to the intellectual
482(2)
Classification of Fallacies
On what criteria a classification of fallacies should be grounded
484(1)
The five classes of fallacies
485(2)
The reference of a fallacy to one or another class is sometimes arbitrary
487(1)
Fallacies of Simple Inspection, or a priori Fallacies
Character of this class of Fallacies
488(1)
Natural prejudice of mistaking subjective laws for objective, exemplified in popular superstitions
489(2)
Natural prejudices that things which we think of together must exist together, and that what is inconceivable must be false
491(4)
Natural prejudice of ascribing objective existence to abstractions
495(1)
Fallacy of the Sufficient Reason
496(1)
Natural prejudice that the differences in nature correspond to the distinctions in language
497(3)
Prejudice that a phenomenon cannot have more than one cause
500(1)
Prejudice that the conditions of a phenomenon must resemble the phenomenon
501(5)
Fallacies of Observation
Non-observation and Mal-observation
506(1)
Non-observation of instances, and non-observation of circumstances
506(1)
Examples of the former
507(2)
--- and of the latter
509(3)
Mal-observation characterised and exemplified
512(2)
Fallacies of Generalisation
Character of the class
514(1)
Certain kinds of generalisation must always be groundless
514(1)
Attempts to resolve phenomena radically different into the same
515(1)
Fallacy of mistaking empirical for causal laws
516(3)
Post hoc, ergo propter hoc; and the deductive fallacy corresponding to it
519(1)
Fallacy of False Analogies
520(4)
Function of metaphors in reasoning
524(1)
How fallacies of generalisation grow out of bad classification
525(1)
Fallacies of Ratiocination
Introductory Remarks
526(1)
Fallacies in the conversion and æquipollency of propositions
526(1)
Fallacies in the syllogistic process
527(1)
Fallacy of changing the premises
527(3)
Fallacies of Confusion
Fallacy of Ambiguous Terms
530(7)
Fallacy of Petitio Principii
537(5)
Fallacy of Ignoratio Elenchi
542(3)
BOOK VI. ON THE LOGIC OF THE MORAL SCIENCES
Introductory Remarks
The backward state of the Moral Sciences can only be remedied by applying to them the methods of Physical Science, duly extended and generalised
545(1)
How far this can be attempted in the present work
546(1)
Of Liberty and Necessity
Are human actions subject to the law of causality?
547(1)
The doctrine commonly called Philosophical Necessity, in what sense true
547(2)
Inappropriateness and pernicious effect of the term Necessity
549(2)
A motive not always the anticipation of a pleasure or a pain
551(1)
That there is, or may be, a Science of Human Nature
There may be sciences which are not exact sciences
552(1)
To what scientific type the Science of Human Nature corresponds
553(2)
Of the Laws of Mind
What is meant by Laws of Mind
555(1)
Is there a Science of Psychology?
555(2)
The principal investigations of Psychology characterised
557(2)
Relation of mental facts to physical conditions
559(3)
Of Ethology, or the Science of the Formation of Character
The Empirical Laws of Human Nature
562(1)
--- are merely approximate generalisations. The universal laws are those of the formation of character
563(1)
The laws of the formation of character cannot be ascertained by observation and experiment
564(3)
--- but must be studied deductively
567(1)
The principles of Ethology are the axiomata media of mental science
568(2)
Ethology characterised
570(1)
General Considerations on the Social Science
Are Social Phenomena a subject of Science?
571(1)
Of what nature the Social Science must be
572(1)
Of the Chemical, or Experimental Method in the Social Science
Characters of the mode of thinking which deduces political doctrines from specific experience
573(1)
In the Social Science experiments are impossible
574(1)
--- the Method of Difference in applicable
575(1)
--- and the Methods of Agreement and of Concomtant Variations inconclusive
576(1)
The Method of Residues also inconclusive, and presupposes Deduction
577(1)
Of the Geometrical, or Abstract Method
Characters of this mode of thinking
578(1)
Examples of the Geometrical Method
579(1)
The interest-philosophy of the Bentham School
580(3)
Of the Physical, or Concrete Deductive Method
The Direct and Inverse Deductive Methods
583(2)
Difficulties of the Direct Deductive Method in the Social Science
585(2)
To what extent the different branches of sociological speculation can be studied apart. Political Economy characterised
587(3)
Political Ethology, or the science of National Character
590(2)
The Empirical Laws of the Social Science
592(1)
The Verification of the Social Science
593(1)
Of the Inverse Deductive, or Historical Method
Distinction between the general Science of Society and special Sociological inquiries
594(1)
What is meant by a State of Society?
595(1)
The Progressiveness of Man and Society
595(2)
The laws of the succession of states of Society can only be ascertained by the Inverse Deductive Method
597(1)
Social Statics, or the science of the Co-existences of Social Phenomena
598(5)
Social Dynamics or the science of the Successions of Social Phenomena
603(1)
Outlines of the Historical Method
604(1)
Future prospects of Sociological Inquiry
605(2)
Additional Elucidations of the Science of History
The subjection of historical facts to uniform laws is verified by statistics
607(2)
--- does not imply the insignificance of moral causes
609(2)
--- nor the inefficacy of the characters of individuals and of the acts of governments
611(2)
The historical importance of eminent men and of the policy of governments illustrated
613(3)
Of the Logic of Practice, or Art; including Morality and Policy
Morality not a science, but an Art
616(1)
Relation between rules of Art and the theorems of the corresponding science
616(1)
What is the proper function of rules of Art?
617(1)
Art cannot be Deductive
618(1)
Every Art consists of truths of Science, arranged in the order suitable for some practical use
619(1)
Teleology, or the doctrine of Ends
619(1)
Necessity of an ultimate standard, or first principle of Teleology
620(2)
Conclusion
622

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