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Purchase Benefits
What is included with this book?
Preface | p. xiv |
Introduction | p. xix |
What Is World Politics and Why Do We Study It? | p. xxi |
Twelve Puzzles in Search of Explanations | p. xxiii |
The Framework: Interests, Interactions, and Institutions | p. xxv |
Levels of Analysis | p. xxvii |
Integrating Insights from Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism | p. xxviii |
The Plan of the Book | p. xxxiii |
Foundations | |
What Shaped Our World? A Historical Introduction | p. 2 |
The Emergence of International Relations: The Mercantilist Era | p. 5 |
How Do We Know? Mercantilism and the Thirteen Colonies | p. 7 |
The Pax Britannica | p. 8 |
What Shaped Our World? Colonists and the Colonized | p. 9 |
The Hundred Years' Peace | p. 10 |
Free Trade | p. 11 |
The Gold Standard | p. 13 |
Colonial Imperialism | p. 13 |
The Thirty Years' Crisis | p. 14 |
Tension in Europe | p. 15 |
World War I and Its Effects | p. 15 |
Interwar Instability | p. 20 |
World War II | p. 21 |
The Cold War | p. 22 |
The Superpowers Emerge | p. 23 |
The Blocs Consolidate | p. 23 |
Decolonization | p. 27 |
The Rise of the Third World | p. 28 |
The Cold War Thaws | p. 29 |
After the Cold War | p. 29 |
The Cold War fends | p. 29 |
Worldwide Economic Developments | p. 30 |
New Diplomatic Challenges | p. 32 |
What Will Shape Our World in the Future? | p. 33 |
American Predominance and Challenges to It | p. 34 |
Globalization | p. 35 |
Looking Ahead | p. 36 |
Understanding Interests, Interactions, and Institutions | p. 38 |
Interests: What Do Actors Want from Politics? | p. 42 |
Actors and Interests | p. 44 |
What Shaped Our World? The Rise of the State | p. 45 |
Interactions: Why Can't Actors Always Get What They Want? | p. 47 |
Cooperation and Bargaining | p. 49 |
When Can Actors Cooperate? | p. 52 |
Who Wins and Who Loses in Bargaining? | p. 58 |
Institutions: Do Rules Matter in World Politics? | p. 62 |
How Do Institutions Affect Cooperation? | p. 62 |
How Do We Know? The International Diffusion of Election Monitoring | p. 65 |
Whom Do Institutions Benefit? | p. 68 |
Why Follow the Rules? | p. 69 |
Conclusion: Thinking Analytically about World Politics | p. 71 |
Special Topic: A Primer on Game Theory | p. 74 |
War and Peace | |
Why Are There Wars? | p. 80 |
What Is the Purpose of War? | p. 84 |
What Do States Fight Over? | p. 86 |
Bargaining and War | p. 88 |
Compellence and Deterrence: Varieties of Coercive Bargaining | p. 92 |
Do Wars Happen by Mistake? War from Incomplete Information | p. 93 |
Incentives to Misrepresent and the Problem of Credibility | p. 96 |
Communicating Resolve: The Language of Coercion | p. 99 |
Can an Adversary Be Trusted to Honor a Deal? War from Commitment Problems | p. 105 |
Bargaining over Goods That Are a Source of Future Bargaining Power | p. 106 |
How Do We Know?. Bargaining and Conflict over Territory | p. 107 |
Controversy: Should We Negotiate with Rogue Regimes? | p. 108 |
Prevention: War in Response to Changing Power | p. 110 |
Preemption: War in Response to First-Strike Advantages | p. 112 |
What Shaped Our World'? Prevention and Preemption in World War I | p. 114 |
Is Compromise Always Possible? War from Indivisibility | p. 115 |
How Can We Make War Less Likely? | p. 118 |
Raising the Costs of War | p. 118 |
Increasing Transparency | p. 118 |
Providing Outside Enforcement of Commitments | p. 119 |
Dividing Apparently Indivisible Goods | p. 120 |
Conclusion: Why War? | p. 121 |
Domestic Politics and War | p. 124 |
Whose Interests Count in Matters of War and Peace? | p. 128 |
National versus Particularistic Interests | p. 128 |
Interactions, Institutions, and Influence | p. 130 |
Do Politicians Spark Wars Abroad in Order to Hold On to Power at Home? | p. 132 |
What Do Leaders Want? | p. 133 |
Controversy: Should We Assassinate Leaders Rather Than Fight Their Armies? | p. 134 |
The Rally Effect and the Diversionary Incentive | p. 136 |
Do Leaders "Wag the Dog"? | p. 138 |
The Political Costs of War | p. 140 |
How Do We Know? War and the Fate of Political Leaders | p. 142 |
Do Countries Fight Wars to Satisfy the Military or Special Interest Groups? | p. 143 |
Bureaucratic Politics and the Military | p. 143 |
What Shaped Our World? The Kargil War and Military Influence in War | p. 146 |
Interest Groups: Economic and Ethnic Lobbies | p. 147 |
How Can Small Groups Have a Big Influence on Policy? | p. 149 |
How Do Domestic Interests Affect International Bargaining? | p. 152 |
Why Don't Democracies Fight One Another? | p. 154 |
What Is Democracy? | p. 155 |
Representation, Accountability, and Interests in War and Peace | p. 156 |
Democracy and the Bargaining Interaction | p. 161 |
Domestic Institutions or Strategic Interests? | p. 163 |
Conclusion: What If All the World Were Democratic? | p. 164 |
International Institutions and War | p. 168 |
Alliances: Why Promise to Fight Someone Else's War? | p. 172 |
Alliances and Alignments | p. 173 |
Alliances and the Likelihood of War | p. 176 |
How Alliances Establish Credibility | p. 179 |
Why Aren't Alliance Commitments Ironclad? | p. 180 |
The Success and Failure of Alliances in Europe, 1879-1990 | p. 181 |
What Shaped Our World? NATO after the Cold War | p. 186 |
Collective Security: Why Can't the United Nations Keep the Peace? | p. 188 |
How Does Collective Security Work? | p. 189 |
The Dilemmas of Collective Security | p. 192 |
Institutional Responses to the Challenges of Collective Security | p. 193 |
The Experience of Collective Security: The United Nations | p. 195 |
Controversy: Should the International Community Intervene Militarily in Civil Conflicts? | p. 206 |
How Do We Know? Does Peacekeeping Keep the Peace? | p. 209 |
Conclusion: Are Poor Police Better Than None? | p. 211 |
Violence by Nonstate Actors: Civil War and Terrorism | p. 214 |
Why Does War Occur within States? | p. 219 |
Why Rebel? | p. 220 |
Controversy: Should Every Group Have a State of Its Own? | p. 222 |
When Does Dissatisfaction Lead to Armed Opposition? | p. 224 |
How Do We Know? Why Civil Wars Cluster Together | p. 230 |
Civil War As a Bargaining Failure | p. 233 |
The Strategies of Civil War | p. 237 |
What Can Be Done about Civil War? | p. 240 |
Terrorism: Why Kill Civilians? | p. 242 |
Are Terrorists Rational? | p. 243 |
Why Terrorism? | p. 245 |
What Shaped Our World? The Rise of Al Qaeda | p. 247 |
Terrorism As a Bargaining Failure | p. 248 |
How Can Terrorists Hope to Win? Strategies of Violence | p. 252 |
Can Terrorism Be Prevented? | p. 256 |
Conclusion: A Challenge to States? | p. 261 |
International Political Economy | |
International Trade | p. 264 |
What's So Good about Trade? | p. 268 |
Why Do Countries Trade What They Do? | p. 270 |
Trade Restrictions Are the Rule, Not the Exception | p. 273 |
Why Do Governments Restrict Trade? The Domestic Political Economy of Protection | p. 276 |
Winners and Losers in International Trade | p. 278 |
Economic Interests and Trade Policy | p. 278 |
Domestic Institutions and Trade Policy | p. 281 |
How Do We Know? The Political Economy of American Sugar Protection | p. 283 |
Costs, Benefits, and Compensation in National Trade Policies | p. 285 |
How Do Countries Get What They Want? The International Political Economy of Trade | p. 287 |
Strategic Interaction in International Trade Relations | p. 288 |
What Shaped Our World? The Creation of a Single European Market | p. 289 |
International Institutions in International Trade | p. 293 |
Explaining Trends and Patterns in International Trade | p. 298 |
Why, within a Country, Are Some Industries Protected and Some Not? | p. 298 |
Controversy: Does the WTO Hurt the Global Poor? | p. 300 |
Why Have National Trade Policies Varied over Time? | p. 302 |
Why Do Some Countries Have Higher Trade Barriers Than Others? | p. 302 |
Why Has the World Trading Order Been More or Less Open at Different Times? | p. 303 |
Conclusion: Trade and Politics | p. 303 |
Special Topic: Comparative Advantage and the Political Economy of Trade | p. 306 |
International Financial Relations | p. 312 |
How and Why Do People Invest Overseas? | p. 316 |
Why Invest Abroad? Why Borrow Abroad? | p. 317 |
What's the Problem with Foreign Investment? | p. 319 |
Concessional Finance | p. 320 |
Why Is International Finance Controversial? | p. 322 |
Who Wants to Borrow? Who Wants to Lend? | p. 322 |
Debtor-Creditor Interactions | p. 325 |
Institutions of International Finance | p. 327 |
Controversy: Is the IMF Unfair? | p. 330 |
Recent Borrowing and Debt Crises | p. 332 |
What Shaped Our World? The Latin American Debt Crisis | p. 333 |
A New Crisis Hits the United States-and the World | p. 334 |
Foreign Direct Investment: What Role Do Multinational Corporations Play? | p. 337 |
Why Do Corporations Go Multinational? | p. 337 |
Why Do Countries Let Foreign Multinationals In? | p. 339 |
How Do We Know? Who's Afraid of MNCs, and Who Likes Them? | p. 340 |
Host-Country Interactions with MNCs | p. 341 |
Why Aren't There International Institutions Related to FDI? | p. 343 |
International Migration: What Happens When People-Rather Than Capital-Move across Borders? | p. 344 |
Conclusion: The Politics of International Investment | p. 347 |
International Monetary Relations | p. 350 |
What Are Exchange Rates, and Why Do They Matter? | p. 354 |
How Are Currency Values Determined? | p. 355 |
Allowing the Exchange Rate to Change | p. 356 |
Who Cares about Exchange Rates, and Why? | p. 357 |
Governments | p. 357 |
Consumers and Businesses | p. 361 |
Can There Be World Money without World Government? | p. 363 |
When and Why Do Governments Agree on the Monetary Order? | p. 364 |
International Monetary Cooperation and Conflict | p. 365 |
International Monetary Regimes | p. 366 |
A Short History of International Monetary Systems | p. 367 |
What Shaped Our World? The Wizard of Oz and the Gold Standard | p. 369 |
Regional Monetary Arrangements: The Euro | p. 371 |
How Do We Know? Who Wanted the Euro? | p. 372 |
What Happens When Currencies Collapse? | p. 375 |
Effects on Government | p. 376 |
International Repercussions | p. 377 |
Containing Currency Crises | p. 381 |
Conclusion: Currencies, Conflict, and Cooperation | p. 381 |
Controversy: Should Currency Traders Be Permitted to "Attack" Weak Currencies? | p. 382 |
Development: Causes of the Wealth and Poverty of Nations | p. 386 |
If Everyone Wants Development, Why Is It So Hard to Achieve? | p. 390 |
Geographic Location | p. 390 |
What Shaped Our World? Paths to Development | p. 391 |
Domestic Factors | p. 392 |
Domestic Institutions | p. 397 |
How Do We Know? Explaining Developmental Differences: North and South America | p. 398 |
Are Rich Countries Responsible for the Problems of the Developing World? | p. 400 |
Did Colonialism Hamper Development? | p. 401 |
Is the International Economy Biased against LDCs? | p. 403 |
Are International Institutions Biased against LDCs? | p. 404 |
Development Policies and Development Politics | p. 406 |
Import Substituting Industrialization | p. 407 |
Export-Oriented Industrialization | p. 409 |
The Turn toward Globalization | p. 410 |
Attempts to Remedy the Bias of International Institutions | p. 411 |
Is Foreign Aid an Answer? | p. 413 |
Controversy: What Responsibilities Do Rich Countries Have to the Global Poor? | p. 414 |
Globalization and Its Discontents | p. 416 |
Conclusion: Toward Global Development | p. 417 |
Addressing International Factors | p. 417 |
Addressing Domestic Factors | p. 418 |
Transnational Politics | |
International Law and Norms | p. 420 |
What Is International Law? | p. 425 |
How Does International Law Get Made? | p. 426 |
What Shaped Our World? Crimes against Humanity | p. 427 |
Is All International Law the Same? | p. 428 |
How Do We Know? The European Court of Justice and the Integration of Europe | p. 430 |
Does International Law Matter? | p. 431 |
What Are International Norms? | p. 434 |
How Are International Norms Created? | p. 437 |
Controversy: Toys Made for Children, by Children | p. 440 |
Do Norms Matter? | p. 443 |
Beyond Norms: TANs and International Cooperation | p. 446 |
Conclusion: Is the State Obsolete? | p. 448 |
Human Rights | p. 452 |
What Are International Human Rights? | p. 456 |
What Shaped Our World? The Universal Declaration of Human Rights | p. 457 |
Why Are Human Rights Controversial? | p. 459 |
Are Some Rights More Important Than Others? | p. 462 |
Why Do Individuals and States Care about the Human Rights of Others? | p. 463 |
Controversy: Should Economic Sanctions Be Imposed on Governments That Violate Human Rights? | p. 464 |
Why Do States Violate Human Rights? | p. 466 |
Why Do States Sign Human Rights Agreements? | p. 468 |
Why Don't States Observe International Human Rights Law? | p. 473 |
Does International Human Rights Law Make a Difference? | p. 476 |
How Do We Know? Human Rights Abuses around the Globe | p. 477 |
What Can Lead to Better Protection of International Human Rights? | p. 480 |
When Do States Take Action on Human Rights? | p. 482 |
Will Protection of Human Rights Improve in the Future? | p. 483 |
Conclusion: Why Protect Human Rights? | p. 489 |
The Global Environment | p. 492 |
Why Are Good Intentions Not Good Enough? | p. 496 |
Collective Action and the Environment | p. 497 |
Solving Collective Action Problems | p. 500 |
What Shaped Our World? The Campaign to Save the Whales | p. 501 |
Why Do Polluters Usually Win? | p. 505 |
Domestic Winners and Losers | p. 505 |
International Winners and Losers | p. 507 |
Controversy: Who Should Bear the Costs of Addressing Global Climate Change? | p. 508 |
How Do We Know? Patterns of Environmental Performance | p. 514 |
Bargaining over the Future Environment | p. 515 |
How Can Institutions Promote International Environmental Cooperation? | p. 517 |
Setting Standards and Verifying Compliance | p. 518 |
Facilitating Decision Making | p. 520 |
Resolving Disputes | p. 521 |
Conclusion: Can Global Environmental Cooperation Succeed? | p. 522 |
Special Topic: The Science of Ozone Depletion and Global Climate Change | p. 526 |
Looking Ahead | |
The Future of International Politics | p. 534 |
Can the Spread of WMD Be Stopped? | p. 538 |
What Do Theory and History Tell Us? | p. 539 |
What Shaped Our World? The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons | p. 540 |
Preventing the Spread of WMD | p. 543 |
Will China and the United States Fight for Global Leadership? | p. 548 |
What Do Theory and History Tell Us? | p. 551 |
A Coming Showdown or Peaceful Engagement? | p. 554 |
What Will the United States Do? | p. 556 |
Will Economic Globalization Continue? | p. 557 |
What Do Theory and History Tell Us? | p. 559 |
Resistance to Globalization in the Developed World | p. 562 |
How Do We Know? Is Globalization Increasing Inequality? | p. 564 |
Resistance to Globalization in the Developing World | p. 565 |
Backlash and the International Trading System | p. 566 |
Will Globalization Lead to Global Government? | p. 568 |
What Do Theory and History Tell Us? | p. 569 |
Coming Conflicts over Global Governance | p. 571 |
Who Will Set the Rules? | p. 573 |
Conclusion: Can Our Common Interests Prevail? | p. 577 |
Glossary | p. A-1 |
Credits | p. A-8 |
Index | p. A-9 |
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