The Case for Contextualism Knowledge, Skepticism, and Context, Vol. 1

by DeRose, Keith

• ISBN13: 9780199564460
• ISBN10: 0199564469
• eBook ISBN(s): 9780191619748
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2009-06-22
• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• More Book Details

Summary

It's an obvious enough observation that the standards that govern whether ordinary speakers will say that someone knows something vary with context: What we are happy to call "knowledge" in some ("low-standards") contexts we'll deny is "knowledge" in other ("high-standards") contexts. But dothese varying standards for when ordinary speakers will attribute knowledge, and for when they are in some important sense warranted in attributing knowledge, reflect varying standards for when it is or would be true for them to attribute knowledge? Or are the standards that govern whether suchclaims are true always the same? And what are the implications for epistemology if these truth-conditions for knowledge claims shift with context? Contextualism, the view that the epistemic standards a subject must meet in order for a claim attributing "knowledge" to her to be true do vary withcontext, has been hotly debated in epistemology and philosophy of language during the last few decades. In The Case for Contextualism Keith DeRose offers a sustained state-of-the-art exposition and defense of the contextualist position, presenting and advancing the most powerful arguments in favorof the view and against its "invariantist" rivals, and responding to the most pressing objections facing contextualism.

Author Biography

Keith DeRose is Allison Foundation Professor of Philosophy at Yale University.

Table of Contents

Introduction: Contextualism, Invariantism, Skepticism, and What Goes On in Ordinary Conversion	p. 1
The Ordinary Language Basis for Contextualism	p. 47
Assertion, Knowledge, and Context	p. 80
Single Scoreboard Semantics	p. 128
'Bamboozled by our words': Semantic Blindness and some Objections to Contextualism	p. 153
Now you Know It, Now You Don't: Intellectualism, Contextuaism, and Subject-Sensitive Invariantism	p. 185
Knowledge, Assertion, and Action: Contextualism vs. Subject-Sensitive Invariantism	p. 226
References	p. 227
Index	p. 285
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