Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind

by ;
  • ISBN13:


  • ISBN10:


  • Format: Hardcover
  • Copyright: 2007-10-01
  • Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
  • Purchase Benefits
  • Free Shipping On Orders Over $35!
    Your order must be $35 or more to qualify for free economy shipping. Bulk sales, PO's, Marketplace items, eBooks and apparel do not qualify for this offer.
  • Get Rewarded for Ordering Your Textbooks! Enroll Now
List Price: $127.95 Save up to $3.84
  • Buy New
    Add to Cart Free Shipping


Supplemental Materials

What is included with this book?

  • The New copy of this book will include any supplemental materials advertised. Please check the title of the book to determine if it should include any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.


Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind showcases the leading contributors to the field, debating the major questions in philosophy of mind today. Comprises 20 newly commissioned essays on hotly debated issues in the philosophy of mind Written by a cast of leading experts in their fields, essays take opposing views on 10 central contemporary debates A thorough introduction provides a comprehensive background to the issues explored Organized into three sections which explore the ontology of the mental, nature of the mental content, and the nature of consciousness

Author Biography

Brian P. McLaughlin is Professor and Chair in the philosophy department at Rutgers University. He has published widely in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, and is the co-editor of the classic collection on the philosophy of Donald Davidson, Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Blackwell, 1988), editor of Dretske and His Critics (Blackwell, 1991) and the forthcoming Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind.

Jonathan Cohen is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He is the the author of numerous papers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and perception. Much of his recent work has focused on the metaphysics of color properties.

Table of Contents

Notes on Contributorsp. ix
Introductionp. xii
Mental Contentp. 1
Is There a Viable Notion of Narrow Mental Content?p. 3
Cognitive Content and Propositional Attitude Attributionsp. 5
There Is No Viable Notion of Narrow Contentp. 20
Is Externalism about Mental Content Compatible with Privileged Access?p. 35
Externalism and Privileged Access Are Consistentp. 37
Externalism and Privileged Access Are Inconsistentp. 53
Is the Intentional Essentially Normative?p. 67
Resisting Normativism in Psychologyp. 69
Normativism Defendedp. 85
Is There Non-Conceptual Content?p. 103
The Revenge of the Givenp. 105
Are There Different Kinds of Content?p. 117
Physicalismp. 139
Is Non-Reductive Materialism Viable?p. 141
Everybody Has Got It: A Defense of Non-Reductive Materialismp. 143
The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialismp. 160
Should Physicalists Be A Priori Physicalists?p. 183
A Priori Physicalismp. 185
On the Limits of A Priori Physicalismp. 200
Is There an Unresolved Problem of Mental Causation?p. 225
Causation and Mental Causationp. 227
Mental Causation, or Something Near Enoughp. 243
The Place of Consciousness in Naturep. 265
Is Consciousness Ontologically Emergent from the Physical?p. 267
Dualist Emergentismp. 269
Against Ontologically Emergent Consciousnessp. 287
Are Phenomenal Characters and Intentional Contents of Experiences Identical?p. 301
New Troubles for the Qualia Freakp. 303
A Case for Qualiap. 319
Is Awareness of Our Mental Acts a Kind of Perceptual Consciousness?p. 333
All Consciousness Is Perceptualp. 335
Mental Action and Self-Awareness (I)p. 358
Indexp. 377
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

Rewards Program

Write a Review