Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science

by Hitchcock, Christopher

• ISBN13: 9781405101523
• ISBN10: 1405101520
• Edition: 1st
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2004-01-09
• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
• More Book Details

Summary

Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science features original essays on some of the most hotly debated issues in the field. Are there laws of social science? Are causes physically connected to their effects? Is the mind a system of modules shaped by natural selection? Eight central questions shape the volume, with each question treated by a pair of opposing essays. This distinctive format offers readers a unique opportunity to observe philosophers engaging in head-to-head debate. Together, the essays provide an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary philosophy of science, including empiricism, confirmation, realism, laws, causation, and explanation. Showcasing original arguments for well-defined positions, as well as clear and concise statements of sophisticated philosophical views, this volume is an excellent resource for professional philosophers and students alike.

Author Biography

Christopher Hitchcock is Professor of Philosophy at the California Institute of Technology. His articles have appeared in journals such as The Philosophical Review, The Journal of Philosophy, Noûs, Philosophy of Science, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, and Synthese.

Table of Contents

Notes on Contributors	vii
Preface	xi
Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Science?	1	(20)
DO THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS TRANSCEND EMPIRICISM?	21	(46)
1 Why Thought Experiments Transcend Empiricism
James Robert Brown	23	(21)
2 Why Thought Experiments do not Transcend Empiricism
John D. Norton	44	(23)
DOES PROBABILITY CAPTURE THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC CONFIRMATION OR JUSTIFICATION?	67	(48)
3 Probability Captures the Logic of Scientific Confirmation
Patrick Maher	69	(25)
4 Why Probability does not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification
Kevin T. Kelly and Clark Glymour	94	(21)
CAN A THEORY'S PREDICTIVE SUCCESS WARRANT BELIEF IN THE UNOBSERVABLE ENTITIES IT POSTULATES?	115	(34)
5 A Theory's Predictive Success can Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities it Postulates
Jarrett Leplin	117	(16)
6 A Theory's Predictive Success does not Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities in Postulates
André Kukla and Joel Walmsley	133	(16)
ARE THERE LAWS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES?	149	(38)
7 There are no Laws of the Social Sciences
John T. Roberts	151	(17)
8 There are Laws in the Social Sciences
Harold Kincaid	168	(19)
ARE CAUSES PHYSICALLY CONNECTED TO THEIR EFFECTS?	187	(30)
9 Causes are Physically Connected to their Effects: Why Preventers and Omissions are not Causes
Phil Dowe	189	(8)
10 Causes need not be Physically Connected to their Effects: The Case for Negative Causation
Jonathan Schaffer	197	(20)
IS THERE A PUZZLE ABOUT THE LOW-ENTROPY PAST?	217	(40)
11 On the Origins of the Arrow of Time: Why there is Still a Puzzle about the Low-Entropy Past
Huw Price	219	(21)
12 There is no Puzzle about the Low-Entropy Past
Craig Callender	240	(17)
DO GENES ENCODE INFORMATION ABOUT PHENOTYPIC TRAITS?	257	(34)
13 Genes Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits
Sahotra Sarkar	259	(16)
14 Genes do not Encode Information for Phenotypic Traits
Peter Godfrey-Smith	275	(16)
IS THE MIND A SYSTEM OF MODULES SHAPED BY NATURAL SELECTION?	291	(44)
15 The Mind is a System of Modules Shaped by Natural Selection
Peter Carruthers	293	(19)
16 The Mind is not (just) a System of Modules Shaped (just) by Natural Selection
James Woodward and Fiona Cowie	312	(23)
Index	335