Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining

by Edited by Alvin E. Roth

• ISBN13: 9780521022743
• ISBN10: 0521022746
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2005-11-03
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press

Summary

Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.

Table of Contents

List of contributors	vii
Preface	ix
Chapter 1. Editor's introduction and overview	1	(8)
Alvin E. Roth
Chapter 2. Disagreement in bargaining: Models with incomplete information	9	(18)
Kalyan Chatterjee
Chapter 3. Reputations in games and markets	27	(36)
Robert Wilson
Chapter 4. An approach to some noncooperative game situations with special attention to bargaining	63	(10)
Robert W. Rosenthal
Chapter 5. Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information	73	(26)
Drew Fudenberg
David Levine
Jean Tirole
Chapter 6. Choice of conjectures in a bargaining game with incomplete information	99	(16)
Ariel Rubinstein
Chapter 7. Analysis of two bargaining problems with incomplete information	115	(34)
Roger B. Myerson
Chapter 8. Sequential bargaining mechanisms	149	(32)
Peter C. Cramton
Chapter 9. The role of risk aversion in a simple bargaining model	181	(34)
Martin J. Osborne
Chapter 10. Risk sensitivity and related properties for bargaining solutions	215	(18)
Stef Tijs
Hans Peters
Chapter 11. Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable population: A survey of recent results	233	(26)
William Thomson
Chapter 12. Toward a focal-point theory of bargaining	259	(10)
Alvin E. Roth
Chapter 13. Bargaining and coalitions	269	(36)
K.G. Binmore
Chapter 14. Axiomatic approaches to coalitional bargaining	305	(16)
Sergiu Hart
Chapter 15. A comment on the Coase theorem	321	(20)
William Samuelson
Chapter 16. Disclosure of evidence and resolution of disputes: Who should bear the burden of proof?	341	(22)
Joel Sobel
Chapter 17. The role of arbitration and the theory of incentives	363
Vincent P. Crawford