Just Exchange: A Theory of Contract

by Buckley; Francis H

• ISBN13: 9780415700269
• ISBN10: 0415700264
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2004-12-23
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

F. H. Buckley'snew book fills a prominent hole in the literature, explaining economic terms and jargon with welcome clarity and examining the moral basis of free contracting, as well as those cases where bargaining rights might reasonably be restricted. Along the way the book examines several philosophical puzzles, such as allegiance requirements, paternalism and fairness constraints. Buckley approaches fundamental issues of contract law from an economic perspective, though the book is far from being overly technical and will appeal equally to economists, philosophers and law students. This is a welcome addition to the literature on law and economics.

Author Biography

F. H. Buckley is Associate Dean and Foundation Professor at George Mason School of Law in Arlington, Virginia and Executive Director of the George Mason Law and Economics Center in Arlington, Virginia.

Table of Contents

List of illustrations	ix
Preface	xi
PART I The enforcement of contracts	1	(60)
1 The promising game	3	(19)
How to create a game	7	(6)
Hume on promising	13	(4)
The principle of fidelity	17	(5)
2 Rival theories of contract law	22	(13)
Reliance theories	22	(4)
Benefits theories	26	(1)
Will theories	27	(8)
3 The economic theory of contract law	35	(16)
The need for trust	36	(2)
Beneficial reliance	38	(3)
Credible commitments	41	(2)
Substitutes for contract law	43	(8)
4 Fidelity to promising	51	(10)
Respect, gratitude and consent	51	(4)
Natural duties of support	55	(6)
PART II The limits of bargaining freedom	61	(113)
5 Soft paternalism	63	(39)
Minors and incompetents	64	(3)
Judgment heuristics	67	(17)
Weakness of the will	84	(15)
Screening	99	(3)
6 Private perfectionism	102	(14)
Perfectionism and neutralism	103	(5)
Endogenous preferences	108	(2)
Internalities	110	(1)
Liberal perfectionism and conservative neutralism	111	(5)
7 Social perfectionism	116	(20)
Moral externalities	116	(3)
Common law illegality	119	(2)
The harm-to-others principle	121	(3)
The disintegration thesis	124	(7)
The case for neutralism	131	(5)
8 Substantive fairness	136	(21)
Game theoretic bargaining solutions	137	(7)
Cooperation theories	144	(4)
Incentive theories	148	(3)
Screening theories	151	(1)
Standard form contracts	152	(5)
9 Contractarian virtue	157	(17)
The cultural contradictions of contract law	158	(7)
The Romantic objection	165	(9)
Notes	174	(24)
Index	198