Mind and Cognition An Anthology

by Lycan, William G.; Prinz, Jesse J.

• ISBN13: 9781405157858
• ISBN10: 1405157852
• Edition: 3rd
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2008-02-11
• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

Summary

First published in 1990, Mind and Cognition: An Anthology is now firmly established as a popular teaching apparatus for upper level undergraduate and graduate courses in the philosophy of mind. This collection of classic and contemporary articles in philosophy of mind and cognition provides the reader with an overview of the complex, sophisticated and sometimes conflicting developments in theories of mind that have taken place over the last 40 years, making available to students, teachers and researchers the very best and most influential contributions to the discipline. For this new edition, 20 new readings are included and substantial revisions restore the balance (from the first edition) between the traditional areas of philosophy of mind and cutting edge areas of philosophy of cognitive science, such as situated cognition, animal minds and emotion. The emphasis in selection throughout has been on quality and teachability, making this volume a vital resource.

Author Biography

William G. Lycan is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has published widely in the field of philosophy of mind and language. His publications include Consciousness (1987), Judgement and Justification (1988), and Consciousness and Experience (1996).

Jesse J. Prinz is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He works primarily in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. His books include Furnishing the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis (2002), Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (2004), and The Emotional Construction of Morals (2007).

Table of Contents

Preface to the Third Edition	p. xi
Preface to the First Edition	p. xii
Acknowledgments	p. xiii
Ontology: The Identity Theory and Functionalism	p. 1
Introduction	p. 3
Behaviorism	p. 15
Excerpt from About Behaviorism	p. 17
The Identity Theory and Machine Functionalism	p. 23
Is Consciousness a Brain Process?	p. 25
The Causal Theory of the Mind	p. 31
The Nature of Mental States	p. 40
Troubles with Functionalism (excerpt)	p. 48
Anomalous Monism	p. 53
Mental Events	p. 55
Homuncular and Teleological Functionalism	p. 67
The Continuity of Levels of Nature	p. 69
Intentionality	p. 85
Introduction	p. 87
Psychosemantics	p. 93
Information and Representation	p. 95
Biosemantics	p. 105
A Guide to Naturalizing Semantics (excerpt)	p. 116
Other Approaches to Intentionality	p. 125
Modality, Normativity, and Intentionality	p. 127
The Computational Theory of Mind and Artificial Intelligence	p. 143
Introduction	p. 145
The Language of Thought and Computationalism	p. 151
Why There Has to Be and How There Could Be a Private Language	p. 153
Which Language Do We Think With?	p. 171
Artificial Intelligence	p. 193
Semantic Engines: An Introduction to Mind Design	p. 195
Can Computers Think?	p. 213
Eliminativism, Neurophilosophy, and Anti-Representationalism	p. 221
Introduction	p. 223
Eliminativism	p. 229
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes	p. 231
Connectionism	p. 245
Neural Representation and Neural Computation	p. 247
Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture (excerpt)	p. 269
Dynamical Systems Theory and Robotics	p. 273
What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation?	p. 275
Intelligence Without Representation	p. 298
Instrumentalism and Folk Psychology	p. 313
Introduction	p. 315
Instrumentalism	p. 321
True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works	p. 323
Dennett on Intentional Systems	p. 337
Real Patterns	p. 351
Simulationism and the Theory Theory	p. 367
Folk Psychology as Simulation	p. 369
Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory? (excerpt)	p. 379
Mental Causation, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge	p. 393
Introduction	p. 395
For and Against Folk Psychology	p. 403
Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis	p. 405
Folk Psychology is Here to Stay	p. 419
Supervenient Causation	p. 437
Mental Causation	p. 439
Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical	p. 459
For and Against Externalism	p. 475
Individualism and Supervenience	p. 477
The Argument from Causal Powers	p. 497
Reference, Causal Powers, Externalist Intuitions and Unicorns	p. 515
Self-Knowledge	p. 527
Knowing One's Own Mind	p. 529
Externalism and Inference	p. 543
Radical Externalism	p. 553
The Extended Mind	p. 555
Consciousness, Qualia, and Subjectivity	p. 565
Introduction	p. 567
What Is Consciousness?	p. 573
How Not to Find the Neural Correlate of Consciousness	p. 575
What Should We Expect from a Theory of Consciousness?	p. 583
Consciousness and its Place in Nature (excerpt)	p. 595
Conscious Awareness	p. 603
A Theory of Consciousness (excerpt)	p. 605
The Superiority of HOP to HOT	p. 617
Perception without Awareness	p. 630
What It's Like	p. 655
Epiphenomenal Qualia	p. 657
Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos?	p. 664
Qualia	p. 679
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience	p. 681
Sensation and the Content of Experience	p. 693
Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism?	p. 707
Perceptual Content	p. 725
Introduction	p. 727
Simple Seeing	p. 731
Excerpts from The Varieties of Reference	p. 741
Non-conceptual Content	p. 748
Experience Without the Head	p. 760
Animal Minds	p. 777
Introduction	p. 779
Rational Animals	p. 781
The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything it is Like to be a Honey Bee?	p. 788
Why the Question of Animal Consciousness Might Not Matter Very Much	p. 805
Emotion	p. 821
Introduction	p. 823
Emotions and Choice	p. 827
Embodied Emotions	p. 839
Is Emotion a Natural Kind?	p. 850
Author Index	p. 863
Subject Index	p. 871
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