Moore and Wittgenstein Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense

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  • Format: Hardcover
  • Copyright: 2010-10-15
  • Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan
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Does scepticism threaten our common sense picture of the world? Does it really undermine our deep-rooted certainties? Answers to these questions are offered through a comparative study of the epistemological work of two key figures in the history of analytic philosophy, G. E. Moore and Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Author Biography

Annalisa Coliva is lecturer in philosophy at the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia, Italy, and Associate Director of the Research Centre in Philosophy COGITO, Italy. Fulbright and Alexander von Humboldt Fellow, her publications include several monographs and papers in Italian and English. Her forthcoming books are Mind, Meaning and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright and The Self and Self-Knowledge.

Table of Contents

Preface to the English Editionp. vii
Series Editor's Forewordp. viii
Acknowledgementsp. xi
Abbreviations of cited worksp. xiii
Introductionp. 1
G. E. Moore: Scepticism, Certainty and Common sensep. 13
'A defence of common sense'p. 14
'Proof of an external world'p. 25
Malcolm: 'common sense' and 'ordinary language'p. 28
Clarke and Stroud: At the origins of contextualismp. 37
Moore and Humean scepticism: Wright's interpretation of the proofp. 42
Moore's comeback: Pryor's dogmatist interpretationp. 44
Having knowledge and being able to prove that one doesp. 47
Wittgenstein: Belief, Knowledge and Certaintyp. 55
The philosophical use of 'to know'. On the misleading assimilation of 'to know' and 'to believe'p. 57
The language game with 'to know' and 'I know'. A perspicuous descriptionp. 60
The grammatical use of 'I know'p. 74
Wittgenstein and the 'assertion fallacy'p. 90
Coda. Wittgenstem and semantic contextualismp. 100
Wittgenstein: Doubts and the Nonsense of Scepticismp. 103
The language game with 'to doubt': A perspicuous descriptionp. 104
Some philosophical consequences: Why idealism and scepticism in general are nonsensicalp. 111
Two classical sceptical arguments and Wittgenstein's repliesp. 118
Wittgenstein: Hinges, Certainty, World-Picture and Mythologyp. 149
Only apparently empirical propositions: Examples and preliminary considerationsp. 152
Propositions that characterize a method. The hinges around which all other propositions rotatep. 161
On the groundlessness of the foundationsp. 166
World-picturep. 179
Different world-pictures and epistemic relativism?p. 188
Propositions that might be part of a kind of mythologyp. 203
Conclusion: Moore and Wittgenstein on Epistemology and Language. A Synopsisp. 208
Truisms, hinges, common sense, world-picture and knowledgep. 208
Meaning, use and philosophical contextsp. 209
Scepticismp. 209
Certaintyp. 210
Epistemic foundationalism and epistemic relativismp. 210
Notesp. 211
Bibliographyp. 234
Indexp. 241
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