9780199252541

Philosophy of Mind A Beginner's Guide

by
  • ISBN13:

    9780199252541

  • ISBN10:

    0199252548

  • Format: Paperback
  • Copyright: 2005-04-28
  • Publisher: Oxford University Press

Note: Supplemental materials are not guaranteed with Rental or Used book purchases.

Purchase Benefits

  • Free Shipping On Orders Over $35!
    Your order must be $35 or more to qualify for free economy shipping. Bulk sales, PO's, Marketplace items, eBooks and apparel do not qualify for this offer.
  • Get Rewarded for Ordering Your Textbooks! Enroll Now
  • We Buy This Book Back!
    In-Store Credit: $5.25
    Check/Direct Deposit: $5.00
    PayPal: $5.00
List Price: $53.28 Save up to $38.04
  • Rent Book $15.24
    Add to Cart Free Shipping

    TERM
    PRICE
    DUE
    IN STOCK USUALLY SHIPS IN 24 HOURS.
    HURRY! ONLY 1 COPY IN STOCK AT THIS PRICE

Supplemental Materials

What is included with this book?

  • The New copy of this book will include any supplemental materials advertised. Please check the title of the book to determine if it should include any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.
  • The Used and Rental copies of this book are not guaranteed to include any supplemental materials. Typically, only the book itself is included. This is true even if the title states it includes any access cards, study guides, lab manuals, CDs, etc.

Summary

Designed specifically for students with no background knowledge in the subject, this accessible introduction covers all of the basic concepts and major theories in the philosophy of mind. Topics discussed include dualism, behaviorism, the identity theory, functionalism, the computational theory of mind, connectionism, physicalism, mental causation, and consciousness. The text is enhanced by chapter summaries, a glossary, suggestions for further reading, and self-assessment questions.

Author Biography


Ian Ravenscroft completed his PhD at the Research School of Social Science, Australian National University. After spending a year teaching in the Philosophy Department at the University of Auckland, he became an ARC Research Associate at Flinders University. In 1998, Ian moved to the Philosophy Department at King's College London, where he directed the graduate program in the philosophy of mental disorder. He is now back at Flinders University.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements x
Introduction 1(8)
Part 1 What are mental states?
1 Dualism
9(16)
1.1 Substance dualism
10(1)
1.2 Arguments in favor of substance dualism
11(5)
1.3 Arguments against substance dualism
16(2)
1.4 Property dualism
18(2)
1.5 Assessing epiphenomenalism
20(2)
1.6 Conclusion
22(3)
2 Behaviorism
25(14)
2.1 Philosophical behaviorism
25(1)
2.2 Arguments in favor of philosophical behaviorism
26(4)
2.3 Arguments against philosophical behaviorism
30(3)
2.4 What is methodological behaviorism?
33(1)
2.5 Arguments for methodological behaviorism
34(1)
2.6 Arguments against methodological behaviorism
35(4)
3 The identity theory
39(11)
3.1 More about the identity theory
39(2)
3.2 Arguments in favor of the identity theory
41(2)
3.3 Evidence from deficit studies
43(1)
3.4 Arguments against the identity theory
44(3)
3.5 Reductive and nonreductive physicalism
47(1)
3.6 Conclusion
48(2)
4 Functionalism
50(14)
4.1 Introducing functionalism
50(3)
4.2 Functionalism and brain states
53(2)
4.3 Functionalism and the six features of mental states
55(2)
4.4 Two famous arguments against functionalism
57(5)
4.5 Conclusion
62(2)
5 Eliminativism and fictionalism
64(17)
5.1 From theory to reality
64(1)
5.2 Introducing eliminativism
65(2)
5.3 Eliminativism about mental states
67(4)
5.4 Anti-eliminativist arguments
71(1)
5.5 Fictionalism
72(3)
5.6 Conclusion
75(6)
Part 2 Mind as machine
6 The computational theory of mind
81(16)
6.1 Syntax and semantics
81(2)
6.2 What's a computer?
83(1)
6.3 Turing machines
84(3)
6.4 The computational theory of mind
87(2)
6.5 The language of thought
89(2)
6.6 The Chinese room
91(3)
6.7 Conclusion
94(3)
7 Connectionism
97(20)
7.1 What connectionist networks are like
97(4)
7.2 Some important properties of connectionist networks
101(3)
7.3 Connectionism and the mind
104(3)
7.4 Rationality, language, systematicity
107(5)
7.5 Conclusion
112(5)
Part 3 Mind in a physical world
8 Physicalism and supervenience
117(8)
8.1 Physical properties
118(1)
8.2 Introducing the supervenience approach to physicalism
118(2)
8.3 Refining the supervenience approach to physicalism
120(2)
8.4 A problem for the supervenience approach to physicalism?
122(3)
9 Content
125(19)
9.1 The resemblance theory
126(1)
9.2 The causal theory
127(3)
9.3 The teleological theory
130(2)
9.4 Fodor's theory
132(3)
9.5 Functional role theory
135(4)
9.6 Wide or narrow?
139(5)
10 Mental causation
144(15)
10.1 The problem of causal exclusion
145(2)
10.2 Responding to the problem of causal exclusion
147(3)
10.3 The causal efficacy of content
150(2)
10.4 Responding to the problem of the causal efficacy of content
152(7)
Part 4 Consciousness
11 Varieties of consciousness
159(12)
11.1 Phenomenal consciousness
159(3)
11.2 Access consciousness
162(2)
11.3 Is access a function of phenomenal consciousness?
164(2)
11.4 Avoiding confusion
166(2)
11.5 Other kinds of consciousness
168(3)
12 Phenomenal consciousness
171(19)
12.1 The knowledge argument
171(3)
12.2 Responding to the knowledge argument
174(6)
12.3 The explanatory gap
180(3)
12.4 Can the explanatory gap be filled?
183(2)
12.5 Functionalism and phenomenal consciousness
185(2)
12.6 Concluding remarks
187(3)
Appendix: Paper writing tips 190(2)
Glossary 192(4)
Some useful resources 196(3)
References 199(5)
Index 204

Rewards Program

Write a Review