Preface | xiii | ||
The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions | 1 | (32) | |
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Partisan and Electoral Motivations and the Choice of Monetary Institutions Under Fully Mobile Capital | 33 | (26) | |
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Checks and Balances, Private Information, and the Credibility of Monetary Commitments | 59 | (24) | |
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Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions | 83 | (28) | |
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Political Parties and Monetary Commitments | 111 | (28) | |
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Real Sources of European Currency Policy: Sectoral Interests and European Monetary Integration | 139 | (30) | |
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Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes | 169 | (28) | |
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Competing Commitments: Technocracy and Democracy in the Design of Monetary Institutions | 197 | ||
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