The Politics and Economics of Power

by Bowles, Samuel; Franzini, Maurizio; Pagano, Ugo

• ISBN13: 9780203194737
• ISBN10: 020319473X
• eBook ISBN(s): 9781134666645
• Copyright: 2004-01-14
• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• More Book Details

Summary

This edited collection looks at the emerging relationship between politics and economics. The papers examine power relations in the firm and the market and offer an economic perspective of political relations.

Author Biography

Samuel Bowles, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA Albert Breton, Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Canada John Dunn, King's College, Cambridge, UK Maurizio Franzini, Department of Political Economy, University of Siena, Italy Gianluigi Galeotti, University of Rome 'La Sapienza', Italy Ernest Gellner (deceased), formerly of Cambridge University, UK Herbert Gintis, Department of Economics, University of Massachusetts at Amherst, USA Russell Hardin, Department of Politics, New York University, USA Paul Milgrom, Department of Economics, Stanford University, USA Ugo Pagano, Department of Political Economy, University of Siena, Italy John Roberts, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, USA Viktor Vanberg, University of Freiburg, Germany Ronald Wintrobe, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, Canada Ulrich Witt, Max-Planck-Institute for Research into Economic Systems, Evolutionary Economics Unit, Jena, Gemany Donald Wittman, Economics Department, University of California, Santa Cruz, USA

Table of Contents

List of contributors	p. vii
Introduction: trespassing the boundaries of politics and economics	p. 1
Politics and power in economic organizations	p. 11
Power in competitive exchange	p. 13
Adaptation and opportunism in political and economic markets	p. 31
The internal politics of the firm	p. 46
Is power an economic good? Notes on social scarcity and the economics of positional goods	p. 63
How politics limits markets: power, legitimacy, choice	p. 85
The economic analysis of political organizations	p. 101
Modeling politics as a competitive endeavor	p. 103
Political parties and representative democracy	p. 129
Constitutionally constrained and safeguarded competition in markets and politics: with reference to a European constitution	p. 141
Political parties, pressure groups, and democracy: a transaction cost theory of political institutions	p. 167
The 'contamination' between economic and political factors in institutional change	p. 177
The coming of nationalism, and its interpretation: the myths of nation and class	p. 179
Norms of exclusion	p. 225
From expressionism and futurism to kitsch: ethnic and intergenerational conflict, political inaction, and the rise of dictatorship	p. 260
Multiple equilibria, critical masses, and institutional change: the coup d'etat problem	p. 286
Index	p. 300
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