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9780521533584

The Rational Design of International Institutions

by
  • ISBN13:

    9780521533584

  • ISBN10:

    0521533589

  • Format: Paperback
  • Copyright: 2003-12-08
  • Publisher: Cambridge University Press

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Summary

International institutions vary widely in terms of key institutional features such as membership, scope, and flexibility. Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal argue that this is so because international actors are goal-seeking agents who make specific institutional design choices to solve the particular cooperation problems they face in different issue-areas. Using a Rational Design approach, they explore five important features of institutions--membership, scope, centralization, control, and flexibility--and explain their variation in terms of four independent variables that characterize different cooperation problems: distribution, number of actors, enforcement, and uncertainty. The contributors to the volume then evaluate a set of conjectures in specific issue areas. (This book is Volume 55, part 4 of International Organization.)

Table of Contents

Contributors xi
Abstracts xiii
The Rational Design of International Institutions 1(40)
Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal
Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement 41(28)
Andrew Kydd
The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape 69(30)
B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner
Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiations 99(32)
Robert Pahre
Situation Structure and Institutional Design: Reciprocity, Coercion, and Exchange 131(28)
Ronald B. Mitchell and Patricia M. Keilbach
Private Justice in a Global Economy: From Litigation to Arbitration 159(30)
Walter Mattli
Multilateralizing Trade and Payments in Postwar Europe 189(22)
Thomas M. Oatley
The Institutional Features of the Prisoners of War Treaties 211(22)
James D. Morrow
Institutions for Flying: How States Built a Market in International Aviation Services 233(26)
John E. Richards
Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design 259(32)
Alexander Wendt
Rational Design: Looking Back to Move Forward 291(32)
Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal
References 323

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