Social Foraging Theory

by Giraldeau, Luc-Alain; Caraco, Thomas

• ISBN13: 9780691048765
• ISBN10: 0691048762
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2000-05-01
• Publisher: Princeton Univ Pr

Summary

Although there is extensive literature in the field of behavioral ecology that attempts to explain foraging of individuals, social foraging--the ways in which animals search and compete for food in groups--has been relatively neglected. This book redresses that situation by providing both a synthesis of the existing literature and a new theory of social foraging. Giraldeau and Caraco develop models informed by game theory that offer a new framework for analysis. Social Foraging Theory contains the most comprehensive theoretical approach to its subject, coupled with quantitative methods that will underpin future work in the field. The new models and approaches that are outlined here will encourage new research directions and applications.To date, the analysis of social foraging has lacked unifying themes, clear recognition of the problems inherent in the study of social foraging, and consistent interaction between theory and experiments. This book identifies social foraging as an economic interaction between the actions of individuals and those of other foragers. This interdependence raises complex questions about the size of foraging groups, the diversity of resources used, and the propensity of group members to exploit each other or forage cooperatively. The models developed in the book will allow researchers to test their own approaches and predictions. Many years in development, Social Foraging Theory will interest researchers and graduate students in such areas as behavioral ecology, population ecology, evolutionary biology, and wildlife management.

Table of Contents

Preface	xi
Acknowledgments	xv
Social Foraging Theory: Definitions, Concepts, and Methods	3	(32)
What Is Social Foraging?	3	(3)
Concepts and Methods of Social Foraging Theory	6	(9)
Interactions Among Social Foragers	15	(2)
Concluding Remarks	17	(18)
Math Boxes 1.1-1.3	19	(16)
PART One: Group Membership Games
Two-Person Games: Competitive Solutions	35	(19)
Introduction	35	(1)
Achieving an Aggregation Economy	36	(4)
A Symmetric Group Membership Game	40	(3)
An Asymmetric Group Membership Game	43	(5)
Concluding Remarks	48	(6)
Math Box 2.1	50	(4)
Two-Person Games: Conditional Cooperation	54	(31)
Introduction	54	(2)
Food-Sharing with a Communal Cost	56	(10)
Food-Calling and Cooperation	66	(7)
Concluding Remarks	73	(12)
Math Boxes 3.1-3.3	78	(7)
Group Size in Aggregation Economies	85	(34)
Introduction	85	(2)
Which Group Size to Expect?	87	(3)
The Effect of Genetic Relatedness on Equilibrium Group Size	90	(6)
Integrating Entry Rules, Relatedness, and Aggressive Dominance	96	(4)
Risk-Sensitive Group Membership Games	100	(9)
Concluding Remarks	109	(10)
Math Boxes 4.1-4.4	113	(6)
Predicting Group Size in Dispersion Economies	119	(32)
Introduction	119	(2)
Introduction to Continuous Input Models	121	(2)
Changing the Assumptions of Continuous Input Models	123	(14)
Introduction to Interference Models	137	(3)
Changing the Assumptions of Interference Models	140	(6)
Concluding Remarks	146	(5)
PART Two: Producer-Scrounger Decisions
An Introduction to Producer-Scrounger Games	151	(23)
Introduction	151	(1)
The Diversity of Kleptoparasitism	152	(1)
Kleptoparasitism: A Game-Theoretic Approach	153	(2)
A Symmetric Rate-Maximizing Producer-Scrounger Model	155	(9)
Empirical Tests of the Rate-Maximizing Producer-Scrounger Model	164	(4)
Concluding Remarks	168	(6)
Math Box 6.1	170	(4)
Producer-Scrounger Games in Stochastic Environments	174	(31)
Introduction	174	(1)
A Stochastic Producer-Scrounger Game	174	(6)
Analysis of the Stochastic Game	180	(4)
Numerical Evaluation	184	(10)
Experimental Evidence of Risk-Sensitive Producer-Scrounger Decisions	194	(2)
Concluding Remarks	196	(9)
Math Boxes 7.1-7.2	199	(6)
PART Three: Decisions within Patches
Social Patch and Prey Models	205	(24)
Introduction	205	(1)
Models of Social Patch Exploitation	206	(14)
Tests of Social Patch Models	220	(2)
Social Prey Models	222	(3)
Concluding Remarks	225	(4)
PART Four: Models of Phenotypic Diversity
Quantifying Phenotypic Diversity	229	(24)
Composition of Foraging Groups	229	(3)
Quantifying Variability in Foraging Behavior	232	(2)
Phenotypic Diversity	234	(12)
Concluding Remarks	246	(7)
Math Box 9.1	248	(5)
Learning in Foraging Groups	253	(34)
Introduction	253	(1)
Some Functional Definitions of Learning	253	(2)
Learning How: Individual Learning Only	255	(2)
Models of Individual Learning Only	257	(12)
Learning How: Social Learning	269	(2)
Models with Both Individual and Social Learning How	271	(6)
Learning About: Individual Learning	277	(1)
Learning About: Social Learning	277	(3)
Concluding Remarks	280	(7)
Math Boxes 10.1-10.3	282	(5)
Efficiency of Diversity: The Skill Pool	287	(38)
Background	288	(1)
A Skill Pool: Static Model	289	(13)
A Skill Pool: Stochastic Dynamic Model	302	(13)
Conclusions	315	(10)
Math Box 11.1	322	(3)
PART Five: Final Thoughts
Synthesis and Conclusions	325	(10)
Introduction	325	(1)
Group Membership Models	325	(5)
Searching Decisions within Groups	330	(1)
Models for Decisions within Patches	331	(1)
Models of Phenotypic Diversity	332	(2)
Conclusions	334	(1)
References	335	(24)
Subject Index	359	(2)
Species Index	361