Supreme Court Economic Review

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  • Format: Hardcover
  • Copyright: 2008-11-01
  • Publisher: Univ of Chicago Pr
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Supreme Court Economic Reviewis an interdisciplinary journal that seeks to provide a forum for scholarship in law and economics, public choice, and constitutional political economy. Its approach is broad ranging and contributions employ explicit or implicit economic reasoning for the analysis of legal issues, with special attention to Supreme Court decisions, judicial process, and institutional design. Volume 16 contributors are Guiseppe Dari-Mattiacci, Vincy Fon, Nuno Garoupa, Keith N. Hylton, Sheldon Kimmel, Tonja Jacobi, David M. Levy, John O. McGinnis, Sandra J. Peart, Michael Rappaport, Neil S. Siegel, and Todd J. Zywicki.

Author Biography

Francesco Parisi is professor of l aw at the University of Minnesota Law School and holds a joint appointment as Distinguished Professor of Law and Economics at the University of Milan Law School.  Daniel D. Polsby is dean and Foundation Professor of Law at the George Mason University School of Law.  Lloyd R. Cohen is professor of law at George Mason University School of Law, with a specialization in application of economics to law.

Table of Contents

The Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Shape Their Docketsp. 1
When Should a Case Be Dismissed?: The Economics of Pleading and Summary Judgment Standardsp. 39
The Condorcet Case for Supermajority Rulesp. 39
The Unsolvable Dilemma of a Paretian Policymakerp. 89
Integral Proportional System: Aligning Electoral Votes More Closely with State Popular Votesp. 99
Adam Smith, Collusion and "Right" at the Supreme Courtp. 131
Dole's Future: A Strategic Analysisp. 137
Preemption and Products Liability: A Positive Theoryp. 177
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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