The Theory of Industrial Organization

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  • Format: Hardcover
  • Copyright: 1988-08-26
  • Publisher: Mit Pr

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The Theory of Industrial Organizationis the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level. Rigorously analytical and filled with exercises coded to indicate level of difficulty, it provides a unified and modern treatment of the field with accessible models that are simplified to highlight robust economic ideas while working at an intuitive level. To aid students at different levels, each chapter is divided into a main text and supplementary section containing more advanced material. Each chapter opens with elementary models and builds on this base to incorporate current research in a coherent synthesis. Tirole begins with a background discussion of the theory of the firm. In part I he develops the modern theory of monopoly, addressing single product and multi product pricing, static and intertemporal price discrimination, quality choice, reputation, and vertical restraints. In part II, Tirole takes up strategic interaction between firms, starting with a novel treatment of the Bertrand-Cournot interdependent pricing problem. He studies how capacity constraints, repeated interaction, product positioning, advertising, and asymmetric information affect competition or tacit collusion. He then develops topics having to do with long term competition, including barriers to entry, contestability, exit, and research and development. He concludes with a "game theory user's manual" and a section of review exercises. Jean Tirole is a Professor of Economics at MIT

Table of Contents

Prefacep. xi
Introductionp. 1
The Theory of the Firmp. 15
The Exercise of Monopoly Power
Monopolyp. 65
Product Selection, Quality, and Advertisingp. 95
Price Discriminationp. 133
Vertical Controlp. 169
Strategic Interaction
Short-Run Price Competitionp. 209
Dynamic Price Competition and Tacit Collusionp. 239
Product Differentiation: Price Competition and Non-Price Competitionp. 277
Entry, Accommodation, and Exitp. 305
Information and Strategic Behavior: Reputation, Limit Pricing, and Predationp. 361
Research and Development and the Adoption of New Technologiesp. 389
Noncooperative Game Theory: A User's Manualp. 423
Review Exercisesp. 460
Indexp. 473
Table of Contents provided by Publisher. All Rights Reserved.

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