Thinking About America's Defense: An Analytical Memoir 2008

by Kent, Glenn A.; Ochmanek, David; Spirtas, Michael; Pirnie, Bruce R.

• ISBN13: 9780833044525
• ISBN10: 0833044524
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2009-07-13
• Publisher: RAND Corporation

Summary

"Lieutenant General Glenn A. Kent was a uniquely acute analyst and developer of American defense policy in the second half of the twentieth century. His 33-year career in the Air Force was followed by more than 20 years as one of the leading analysts at RAND. This volume is not a memoir in the normal sense but rather a summary of the dozens of national security issues in which General Kent was personally engaged over the course of his career. These issues included creating the single integrated operational plan (SIOP), leading DoD's official assessment of strategic defenses in the 1960s, developing and analyzing strategic nuclear arms control agreements, helping to bring new weapon systems to life, and many others. Each vignette describes the analytical frameworks and, where appropriate, the mathematical formulas and charts that General Kent developed and applied to gain insights into the issue at hand. In addition, he relates his roles in much of the bureaucratic pulling and hauling that occurred as issues were addressed within the government."--BOOK JACKET.

Table of Contents

Preface	p. iii
Figures	p. ix
Tables	p. xi
Boxes	p. xiii
Acknowledgments	p. xv
Abbreviations	p. xxi
Foreword: Creating Strategic Analysis	p. 1
Foreword: Putting Analysis to Work	p. 3
Introduction
The Single Integrated Operational Plan	p. 21
The Advent of the SIOP	p. 22
Defending the Planners of the SIOP	p. 30
Calculating the "SIOP Degrade"	p. 37
Nuclear Weapons: Strategy and Arms Control	p. 43
Limiting Damage to the United States	p. 43
Limiting Damages: Allocation of Resources	p. 50
Helping with DPMs	p. 54
Changing the Paradigm of Arms Control	p. 56
From SALT to START	p. 62
"Stability" Between U.S. and Soviet Strategic Forces	p. 72
The Concept of First-Strike Stability	p. 73
Insights on Strategic Offensive Forces	p. 80
The Debate over Strategic Defenses	p. 82
The Transition from Assured Destruction to Assured Survival	p. 83
Calculating First-Strike Stability in the Presence of Strategic Defenses	p. 87
Final Thoughts	p. 89
Analysis, Force Planning, and the Paradigm for Modernizing	p. 93
On Analysis	p. 93
Running Air Force Studies and Analysis	p. 101
My General Approach and the "Learn to Think" Mandate	p. 101
On Recruiting	p. 104
The Paradigm for Promoting Innovation and Modernizing the Operational Capabilities of the Force	p. 105
A Framework for Modernizing	p. 106
Strategies to Tasks: A Construct for Advocating New Concepts	p. 115
Strategies to Tasks Debuts	p. 116
The Advocacy of Systems	p. 119
Strategies to Tasks Employed to This Day	p. 120
Modernizing Nuclear Forces	p. 123
Killing the Concept for an Area-Denial Weapon	p. 123
The B-36 Delivering Megaton Bombs	p. 126
Developing the MB-1 Rocket	p. 128
Other Observations	p. 136
The Short-Range Attack Missile Affair	p. 137
The Minuteman Missile	p. 139
Responding to a Possible Soviet Nationwide Antiballistic Missile Deployment	p. 141
The Minuteman III	p. 144
Defining the Deployment of the Minuteman III	p. 146
Penetrating Soviet Air Defenses: The Argument for Decoys	p. 149
Keeping Bombers in the Triad: The Mix Is the Thing	p. 153
Gaining Insight as to the Vulnerability of Submarines on Patrol	p. 158
Defining and Promoting the Defense Support Program	p. 160
Modernizing Conventional Forces	p. 165
The C-5A Fiasco	p. 165
Defining the F-X and Saving the F-15	p. 168
The Rationale for the Lightweight Fighter	p. 172
Demonstrating the AWACS	p. 179
Starting the JSTARS Program	p. 184
Keeping the Global Positioning System Alive	p. 188
JDAM and the CAG for Bomber Weapons	p. 191
Analytical Tools	p. 199
Assessing the Effectiveness of Bomber Attacks	p. 199
Assessing the Effectiveness of ABM Deployments	p. 202
Providing Insights with the SABER GRAND Model	p. 212
Another Episode with SABER GRAND	p. 217
Fostering Campaign Models	p. 223
The Trade-Offs Between Numbers, Yield, and CEP in Hard-Target Kill	p. 226
The Trade-Off with "Soft" Area Targets	p. 229
Calculus of the Attrition of Agents in a Battle	p. 230
Basic Principles	p. 232
Scaling Up	p. 234
Heterogeneous Engagements	p. 235
Future Applications	p. 239
Summing Up: Kent's Maxims	p. 243
Creating Effective Analyses	p. 243
Think Before You Calculate	p. 243
Minimize Reliance on Computers	p. 243
Seek Help from Outside Experts	p. 244
Do Not Treat the Adversary as Static	p. 244
Eschew "Recommendations"	p. 244
Recruit People Who Can Think	p. 244
Invest in People	p. 244
Use No-Holds-Barred "Murder Boards" to Improve Your Products	p. 245
Making (Good) Things Happen	p. 245
Convene Conceivers Action Groups to Promote Innovation in Operational Capabilities	p. 245
Beware of the "Hobby Shop" Mentality	p. 245
Draw a Bright Line Between Demonstrating a Technology and Developing a System	p. 245
Be an Advocate	p. 246
Doing the Right Thing	p. 246
To Thine Own Self Be True	p. 246
Beware of Statements of "Operational Requirements"	p. 247
Accept Risks	p. 247
Winning Bureaucratic Battles	p. 247
Understand the Dynamics of the Real Decisionmaking Process	p. 247
Go to the Top	p. 247
Seize the Conceptual High Ground	p. 247
Anticipate the Need for Analysis	p. 248
Recognize that a Good Offense Is Usually Better Than a Good Defense	p. 248
Encourage Errors by Your Adversary	p. 248
And Finally: Do Your Homework	p. 248
Chronology	p. 249
Awards	p. 253
Bibliography	p. 255
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