What is included with this book?
Dimitrios Diamantaras is an associate professor at Temple University.
List of Figures | p. vii |
List of Tables | p. viii |
Preface | p. ix |
Acknowledgments | p. xi |
Introduction | p. 1 |
A Story from Ancient Athens | p. 1 |
Institutions and Economics | p. 2 |
Getting the Big Picture | p. 4 |
Example: An Auction | p. 7 |
A Taste of Social Choice Theory | p. 8 |
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem | p. 9 |
Social Choice Functions | p. 14 |
Economic Domain | p. 18 |
Exchange Economies | p. 18 |
Social Choice Correspondences on the Exchange Economy Domain | p. 20 |
The Pareto Social Choice Correspondence | p. 21 |
The Individually Rational Social Choice Correspondence | p. 23 |
The Core Social Choice Correspondence | p. 23 |
The No-Envy Social Choice Correspondence | p. 25 |
Combinations of the Previous Social Choice Correspondences | p. 25 |
The Walrasian Social Choice Correspondence | p. 26 |
Quasilinear Preferences and Their Uses | p. 27 |
Appendix: Proofs | p. 29 |
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem | p. 29 |
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem | p. 33 |
Exercises | p. 36 |
Dominant Strategy Implementation | p. 38 |
Definitions | p. 38 |
Revelation Principle | p. 41 |
Restricting Domains: Single-Peaked Preferences | p. 43 |
Restricted Domains: Quasilinear Domains and Groves Mechanisms | p. 45 |
Balance Problem | p. 52 |
Voluntary Participation Problem | p. 53 |
The Vickrey Auction | p. 53 |
Exercises | p. 55 |
Implementation in Nash Equilibria | p. 58 |
A Quick Lesson on Nash Equilibrium | p. 58 |
Nash Equilibrium in Mixed Strategies | p. 61 |
Nash Equilibrium in Implementation | p. 62 |
Strategy Space Reduction | p. 72 |
Two Person Cases | p. 75 |
Exercises | p. 78 |
Bayesian Equilibrium and Mechanisms | p. 81 |
Preliminary: How to Represent Information | p. 81 |
Bayesian Equilibrium | p. 83 |
The Bayesian Revelation Principle | p. 86 |
The Mechanism of d'Aspremont and Gerard-Varet and of Arrow | p. 88 |
Voluntary Participation | p. 91 |
Optimal Auctions | p. 94 |
Bilateral Trading | p. 100 |
Exercises | p. 105 |
Refined Nash Implementation | p. 107 |
Implementation in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium | p. 107 |
Subgame Perfect Implementation in Quasilinear Environments | p. 112 |
Implementation Using Undominated Strategies | p. 115 |
Double Implementation | p. 121 |
Definitions | p. 121 |
Ratio Correspondence | p. 123 |
Virtual Nash Implementation | p. 126 |
Applications | p. 132 |
Manipulation-Resistant Online Reputation Systems | p. 132 |
Walrasian Implementation via Market Games | p. 136 |
Implementing the Lindahl Social Choice Correspondence | p. 139 |
Implementing Fair Allocations | p. 142 |
Application to Negative Externality Problems: Pollution Abatement | p. 147 |
A Nearly Efficient Mutual Insurance Mechanism | p. 150 |
Financing the Athenian Fleet | p. 153 |
Bayesian Implementation | p. 158 |
Example of Multiple Bayesian Equilibria | p. 158 |
Bayesian Implementation and Bayesian Monotonicity | p. 160 |
Restrictiveness of Bayesian Monotonicity | p. 166 |
Virtual Bayesian Implementation | p. 169 |
Further Topics in Mechanism Design | p. 172 |
Endogenous Mechanisms | p. 172 |
Notation and Definitions | p. 174 |
An Application: Public Goods | p. 179 |
Positive Results for Endogenous Games with 3 or More Players | p. 181 |
Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions | p. 183 |
Notation and Definitions | p. 185 |
Results | p. 187 |
Robust Mechanism Design | p. 189 |
Notation and Definitions | p. 190 |
Results | p. 192 |
The Limits of Ex Post Implementation | p. 195 |
Notation and a Result | p. 195 |
An Illustration of the Geometric Condition | p. 197 |
Exercises | p. 199 |
Matching Models | p. 202 |
What Is Matching? | p. 202 |
Notation and Definitions | p. 203 |
Two-Sided Matching | p. 204 |
One-to-One Matching | p. 205 |
Many-to-One Matching | p. 212 |
One-Sided Matching | p. 221 |
The Shapley and Scarf House Market | p. 221 |
House Allocation Problems | p. 223 |
The Kidney Exchange Problem | p. 224 |
Exercises | p. 226 |
Empirical Evidence on Mechanisms | p. 228 |
Introduction | p. 228 |
Voluntary Contribution Mechanisms for Public Goods | p. 229 |
Tests of Incentive Compatibility | p. 237 |
Research on Mechanism Dynamics | p. 239 |
Tests of Implementation Concepts | p. 241 |
Applied Economic Design: Notes from the Field | p. 244 |
Conclusion | p. 250 |
Mathematics Review and More on Economic Domains | p. 254 |
Sets, Correspondences, Functions, Intervals | p. 254 |
Derivatives and Related Notation | p. 256 |
Elements of Mathematical Optimization | p. 258 |
Envelope Theorem | p. 259 |
The Edgeworth Box | p. 260 |
Public Good Economies | p. 261 |
The Simplest Public Project Model | p. 261 |
Public Goods Models | p. 261 |
Social Choice Correspondences | p. 262 |
Pareto Social Choice Correspondences | p. 263 |
Lindahl and Constrained Lindahl Social Choice Correspondences | p. 264 |
Ratio Social Choice Correspondence | p. 270 |
Exercises | p. 275 |
Notation | p. 276 |
Bibliography | p. 278 |
Index | p. 288 |
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