The U.S. Coast Guard's Deepwater Force Modernization Plan Can it be Accelerated? Will it Meet Changing Security Needs?

by Alkire, Brien

• ISBN13: 9780833035158
• ISBN10: 0833035150
• Format: Paperback
• Copyright: 2004-11-12
• Publisher: RAND Corporation

Summary

Explores acceleration of the pace at which the U.S. Coast Guard can acquire surface and air assests that it will operate in teh deepwater environment and whether the original Integrated Deepwater System program to modernize its aging cutters and aircraft will provide the Coast Guard with a force structure to meet the demands of its traditional missions and emerging responsibilities.

Table of Contents

Preface	iii
Figures	xiii
Tables	xvii
Summary	xix
Acknowledgments	xxxi
Abbreviations and Acronyms	xxxiii
CHAPTER ONE Introduction	1	(6)
Background	3	(2)
Sources of Evidence We Drew on to Address the Study Question	5	(1)
Report Organization	6	(1)
CHAPTER TWO The Coast Guard and Deepwater Today	7	(16)
USCG Missions and Responsibilities	8	(3)
Maritime Safety	8	(1)
Maritime Mobility	8	(1)
Maritime Security	9	(1)
National Defense	9	(1)
Protection of Natural Resources	9	(1)
Homeland Security	10	(1)
Non-Homeland Security	10	(1)
Areas of Responsibility	11	(2)
USCG Current Assets	13	(2)
The Deepwater Program Today	15	(3)
Deepwater Timeline	18	(5)
CHAPTER THREE What Are the Implications of Accelerating Deepwater Acquisition?	23	(40)
RAND'S Questions	24	(1)
Data Sources and Methodology	25	(3)
Data We Relied On	25	(1)
Analytic Tools We Used	26	(1)
How We Employed the Data and Models	27	(1)
Assumptions and Caveats	28	(2)
Objectives and Constraints	30	(1)
RAND's Comparison of Three Acquisition Schedules	31	(1)
Can Acquisition of Deepwater Assets Be Accelerated?	32	(9)
Accelerating the Deepwater Acquisition Schedule from 20 Years to 15 Years	33	(4)
Accelerating the Deepwater Acquisition Schedule from 20 Years to 10 Years	37	(4)
'What Are the Performance Implications of Acceleration?	41	(7)
Implications of Acceleration on Annual Mission Hours	41	(2)
Implications of Acceleration on Annual Airborne Sensor-Detection-Area Coverage	43	(5)
What Are the Cost Implications of Acceleration?	48	(5)
Implications for Acquisition Costs	48	(1)
Implications for Operating and Support Costs	49	(4)
What Are the Industrial-Base Implications of Acceleration?	53	(7)
Implications of Acceleration for Shipyard Industrial Base	53	(6)
Implications of Acceleration on the Air Vehicle Industrial Base	59	(1)
Summary of the Implications of Accelerating the Deepwater Acquisition Schedule	60	(1)
Postscript Question: Can the USCG Integrate Assets Faster Than Planned?	61	(2)
CHAPTER FOUR Will the Deepwater Plan Provide USCG with a Force Structure to Meet the Demands of Traditional Missions and Emerging Responsibilities?	63	(32)
Methodology	64	(1)
Will Currently Planned Assets Enable USCG to Carry Out Anticipated Missions?	65	(2)
Will Currently Planned Assets Meet Traditional Mission Demand?	65	(1)
Will Currently Planned Assets Meet Demands from Emerging Responsibilities?	66	(1)
What Assets Would Be Required to Perform Traditional Missions Robustly?	67	(8)
Assets Required to Perform 100 Percent of Demands of USCG's Traditional Missions	67	(2)
Assets Required to Perform 100 Percent of Demands from USCG's Emerging Responsibilities	69	(3)
HAEUAVs Versus Maritime Patrol Aircraft	72	(3)
What Are the Performance Benefits of the 100-Percent Force Structure?	75	(10)
Mission-Hour Performance	76	(1)
Detection Coverage Area of Airborne Sensors	77	(1)
The Number of Assets Needed to Protect One Port Under MARSEC III	78	(7)
What Is the Cost of Acquiring the 100-Percent Force Structure?	85	(3)
Acquisition Costs	86	(1)
Operating and Support Costs	87	(1)
Is U.S. Industry Capable of Producing the 100-Percent Force Structure?	88	(3)
Labor-Hour Implications for Shipbuilders	88	(2)
Capacity Implications for Air-Vehicle Manufacturers	90	(1)
100-Percent Force Structure Bottom Line: Meets Demands of Traditional Missions and Emerging Responsibilities, but at Higher Costs	91	(1)
Postscript Question One: Can the USCG Integrate the 100-Percent Force Structure?	92	(1)
Postscript Question Two: Is Buying More of the Same Assets the Best Strategy?	93	(2)
CHAPTER FIVE Findings and Recommendations	95	(6)
Findings	96	(2)
I. The Deepwater Program Can Be Accelerated	96	(1)
II. The Deepwater Program Provides Inadequate Assets for USCG's Traditional Missions and Emerging Responsibilities	96	(1)
III. An Alternative Force Structure Can Provide Adequate Assets for USCG's Traditional Missions and Emerging Responsibilities	97	(1)
Recommendations	98	(3)
APPENDIX
A. Definitions of U.S. Coast Guard Mission Responsibilities and Cutters	101	(8)
B. Manufacturer Points of Contact	109	(2)
C. Shipbuilder Survey Instrument	111	(10)
D. Force Structure Levels for 60-Percent and 80-Percent Mission Coverage of Traditional and Emerging Asset-Presence Demands	121	(8)
Bibliography	129