Classics in Game Theory

by Kuhn, Harold William

• ISBN13: 9780691011936
• ISBN10: 0691011931
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 1997-02-01
• Publisher: Princeton Univ Pr

Summary

Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late 1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; it is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honored are all included in this volume.Harold Kuhn, himself a major contributor to game theory for his reformulation of extensive games, has chosen eighteen essays that constitute the core of game theory as it exists today. Drawn from a variety of sources, they will be an invaluable tool for researchers in game theory and for a broad group of students of economics, political science, and biology.

Table of Contents

Permissions	vii	(2)
H. W. KUHN
Foreword	ix	(2)
DAVID KREPS
ARIEL RUBINSTEIN
An Appreciation	xi
JOHN F. NASH, Jr.
1. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. PNAS 36 (1950) 48-49	3	(2)
JOHN F. NASH, Jr.
2. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18 (1950) 155-162	5	(9)
JOHN NASH
3. Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286-295	14	(13)
JULIA ROBINSON
4. An Iterative Method of Solving a Game. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 296-301	27	(9)
F. B. THOMPSON
5. Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form. RAND Memo RM-759 (1952)	36	(10)
H. W. KUHN
6. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 193-216	46	(23)
L. S. SHAPLEY
7. A Value for n-Person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 307-317	69	(11)
L. S. SHAPLEY
8. Stochastic Games. PNAS 39 (1953) 1095-1100	80	(7)
H. EVERETT
9. Recursive Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games III (1957) 47-78	87	(32)
R. J. AUMANN
B. PELEG
10. Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments. Bulletin AMS 66 (1960) 173-179	119	(8)
GERARD DEBREU
HERBERT SCARF
11. A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. International Economic Review 4 (1963) 235-246	127	(13)
ROBERT J. AUMANN
MICHAEL MASCHLER
12. The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. Advances in Game Theory (1964) 443-477	140	(30)
ROBERT J. AUMANN
13. Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica 34 (1966) 1-17	170	(22)
HERBERT E. SCARF
14. The Core of an n-Person Game. Econometrica 35 (1967) 50-69	192	(24)
JOHN C. HARSANYI
15. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players
Part I: The Basic Model. Man. Sci. 14 (1967) 159-182	216	(73)
Part II: Bayesian Equilibrium Points. Man. Sci. 14 (1968) 320-334	247	(21)
Part III: The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game. Man. Sci. 14 (1968) 486-502	268	(21)
DAVID BLACKWELL
T. S. FERGUSON
16. The Big Match. Ann. Math. Stat. 39 (1968) 159-163	289	(7)
LLOYD S. SHAPLEY
MARTIN SHUBIK
17. On Market Games. J.E.T. 1 (1969) 9-25	296	(21)
R. SELTEN
18. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Th. 4 (1975) 25-55	317	(38)
List of Contributors	355	(2)
Index	357