A Cooperative Species

by Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert

• ISBN13: 9780691151250
• ISBN10: 0691151253
• Format: Hardcover
• Copyright: 2011-05-31
• Publisher: Princeton Univ Pr

Summary

Why do humans, uniquely among animals, cooperate in large numbers to advance projects for the common good? Contrary to the conventional wisdom in biology and economics, this generous and civic-minded behavior is widespread and cannot be explained simply by far-sighted self-interest or a desire to help close genealogical kin. InA Cooperative Species, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis--pioneers in the new experimental and evolutionary science of human behavior--show that the central issue is not why selfish people act generously, but instead how genetic and cultural evolution has produced a species in which substantial numbers make sacrifices to uphold ethical norms and to help even total strangers. The authors describe how, for thousands of generations, cooperation with fellow group members has been essential to survival. Groups that created institutions to protect the civic-minded from exploitation by the selfish flourished and prevailed in conflicts with less cooperative groups. Key to this process was the evolution of social emotions such as shame and guilt, and our capacity to internalize social norms so that acting ethically became a personal goal rather than simply a prudent way to avoid punishment. Using experimental, archaeological, genetic, and ethnographic data to calibrate models of the coevolution of genes and culture as well as prehistoric warfare and other forms of group competition,A Cooperative Speciesprovides a compelling and novel account of how humans came to be moral and cooperative.

Table of Contents

Preface	p. xi
A Cooperative Species	p. 1
The Evolution of Altruism in Humans	p. 8
Preferences, Beliefs, and Constraints	p. 9
Social Preferences and Social Dilemmas	p. 10
Genes, Culture, Groups, and Institutions	p. 13
Preview	p. 18
Social Preferences	p. 19
Strong Reciprocity Is Common	p. 20
Free-Riders Undermine Cooperation	p. 22
Altruistic Punishment Sustains Cooperation	p. 24
Effective Punishment Depends on Legitimacy	p. 26
Purely Symbolic Punishment Is Effective	p. 29
People Punish Those Who Hurt Others	p. 31
Social Preferences Are Not Irrational	p. 32
Culture and Institutions Matter	p. 33
Behavior Is Conditioned on Group Membership	p. 35
People Enjoy Cooperating and Punishing Free-Riders	p. 38
Social Preferences in Laboratory and Natural Settings	p. 39
Competing Explanations	p. 42
The Sociobiology of Human Cooperation	p. 46
Inclusive Fitness and Human Cooperation	p. 48
Modeling Multi-level Selection	p. 52
Equilibrium Selection	p. 57
Reciprocal Altruism	p. 59
Reciprocal Altruism in Large Groups	p. 63
Reputation: Indirect Reciprocity	p. 68
Altruism as a Signal of Quality	p. 71
Positive Assortment	p. 72
Mechanisms and Motives	p. 75
Cooperative Homo economicus	p. 79
Folk Theorems and Evolutionary Dynamics	p. 80
The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information	p. 83
The Folk Theorem with Private Information	p. 86
Evolutionarily Irrelevant Equilibria	p. 87
Social Norms and Correlated Equilibria	p. 89
The Missing Choreographer	p. 90
Ancestral Human Society	p. 93
Cosmopolitan Ancestors	p. 95
Genetic Evidence	p. 99
Prehistoric Warfare	p. 102
The Foundations of Social Order	p. 106
The Crucible of Cooperation	p. 110
The Coevolution of Institutions and Behaviors	p. 111
Selective Extinction	p. 115
Reproductive Leveling	p. 117
Genetic Differentiation between Groups	p. 120
Deme Extinction and the Evolution of Altruism	p. 121
The Australian Laboratory	p. 123
The Coevolution of Institutions and Altruism	p. 124
Simulating Gene-Culture Coevolution	p. 126
Levelers and Warriors	p. 130
Parochialism, Altruism, and War	p. 133
Parochial Altruism and War	p. 135
The Emergence of Parochial Altruism and War	p. 138
Simulated and Experimental Parochial Altruism	p. 142
The Legacy of a Past ôRed in Tooth and Clawö	p. 146
The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity	p. 148
Coordinated Punishment	p. 150
Altruistic Punishment in a Realistic Demography	p. 156
The Emergence of Strong Reciprocity	p. 159
Why Coordinated Punishment Succeeds	p. 163
A Decentralized Social Order	p. 164
Socialization	p. 167
Cultural Transmission	p. 168
Socialization and the Survival of Fitness-Reducing Norms	p. 171
Genes, Culture, and the Internalization of Norms	p. 173
The Internalized Norm as Hitchhiker	p. 176
The Gene-Culture Coevolution of a Fitness-Reducing Norm	p. 179
How Can Internalized Norms Be Altruistic?	p. 180
The Programmable Brain	p. 183
Social Emotions	p. 186
Reciprocity, Shame, and Punishment	p. 188
The Evolution of Social Emotions	p. 191
The ôGreat Captains of Our Livesö	p. 192
Conclusion: Human Cooperation and Its Evolution	p. 195
The Origins of Human Cooperation	p. 196
The Future of Cooperation	p. 199
Appendix	p. 201
Altruism Defined	p. 201
Agent-Based Models	p. 202
Game Theory	p. 207
Dynamical Systems	p. 209
The Replicator Dynamic	p. 212
Continuation Probability and Time Discount Factor	p. 213
Alternatives to the Standing Model	p. 214
The Prisoner's Dilemma with Public and Private Signals	p. 215
Student and Nonstudent Experimental Subjects	p. 217
The Price Equation	p. 218
Weak Multi-level Selection	p. 222
Cooperation and Punishment with Quorum Sensing	p. 223
References	p. 225
Subject Index	p. 251
Author Index	p. 255
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