Preface | p. iii |
Figures | p. ix |
Tables | p. xi |
Summary | p. xiii |
Acknowledgments | p. xxiii |
Abbreviations | p. xxv |
Overview of the Conflict in Iraq | p. 1 |
The Ba'athist Regime | p. 2 |
The Invasion of Iraq | p. 5 |
The Occupation of Iraq | p. 9 |
The First Priority: Setting Up a Constitutional Government | p. 10 |
The Spiral Downward Begins (Spring 2004) | p. 11 |
Benchmark One: Holding Iraqi Elections | p. 13 |
Islamic Extremist and Sectarian Violence Begin | p. 15 |
A U.S. Approach Hesitantly Unfolds | p. 17 |
Armed Groups in Iraq | p. 21 |
Overview | p. 22 |
Kurdish Separatists | p. 24 |
Sunni Arab Insurgents | p. 25 |
Violent Extremists | p. 28 |
Shi'ite Arab Militias | p. 31 |
Criminal Gangs | p. 32 |
Insurgent Use of Terrorism | p. 32 |
Counterinsurgency in Iraq | p. 35 |
Organization and Recognition of the U.S. COIN Effort Is Slow to Unfold | p. 35 |
Traditional U.S. Military Forces May Need to Be Adjusted | p. 36 |
Fallujah | p. 38 |
Tal Afar | p. 39 |
Baghdad | p. 41 |
Air Support | p. 43 |
Combating Improvised Explosive Devices | p. 44 |
Detainee Operations | p. 46 |
U.S. Development and Support of Iraqi Forces | p. 49 |
The Iraqi Police | p. 49 |
The Iraqi Armed Forces | p. 51 |
Assessing Progress in Counterinsurgency | p. 52 |
Iraqi Casualties and Displacement | p. 52 |
The Iraqi Economy | p. 53 |
Iraqi Opinion | p. 58 |
Accounting for Success and Failure | p. 61 |
Understanding Iraqi Society | p. 61 |
Little Planning for the Occupation of Iraq | p. 62 |
The Impact of a Lack of International Support for the War | p. 63 |
The Disastrous Effects of Prematurely Dismantling the Ba'athist Regime | p. 64 |
The Challenge of Building a New Iraqi State from Scratch | p. 65 |
Instituting a New System of Justice | p. 66 |
Undertaking the Reconstruction of Iraq | p. 67 |
The Consequences of Failing to Maintain Security Early On | p. 69 |
Military Missions | p. 69 |
Lack of Infiltration and Tips Hinders Intelligence on the Insurgency | p. 71 |
Building Effective Capabilities for Counterinsurgency | p. 73 |
Use of Force | p. 75 |
Public Safety and Security | p. 78 |
Partnering with and Enabling Indigenous Forces | p. 80 |
Reporting on the Enemy and Infiltration | p. 83 |
Provision of Essential Services | p. 86 |
Informing and Influencing Operations | p. 88 |
Rigorous and Coordinated Detainee Operations | p. 89 |
Recommendations | p. 91 |
Development of Strategy | p. 91 |
Coalition-Building | p. 92 |
Planning Process | p. 92 |
Unity of Effort | p. 93 |
Interagency Process | p. 93 |
Host-Nation Governance | p. 94 |
Funding Mechanisms | p. 94 |
Counterinsurgency as a Mission | p. 94 |
Protection of the Indigenous Population | p. 95 |
Personnel Policy | p. 95 |
U.S. Army Special Forces | p. 95 |
Partnership with Indigenous Forces | p. 96 |
Policing Functions | p. 96 |
Brigade Organization | p. 97 |
Gunship-Like Capability | p. 97 |
Intelligence Collection and Sharing | p. 97 |
Bibliography | p. 99 |
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