9780415681827

Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security

by ;
  • ISBN13:

    9780415681827

  • ISBN10:

    0415681820

  • Edition: 1st
  • Format: Nonspecific Binding
  • Copyright: 2011-04-13
  • Publisher: Routledge
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Summary

There is a broad sense in both Russia and the United States that deep nuclear reductions#xE2;#xAC;#x1D;a goal endorsed by both governments#xE2;#xAC;#x1D;would constitute a risky step into the unknown and could undermine international security. However, until now, the reasons behind these concerns#xE2;#xAC;#x1D;and whether they are justified#xE2;#xAC;#x1D;have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in both Russia and the United States, this Adelphi maps out these concerns as they relate to the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence), the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and nuclear multipolarity. Contrary to popular belief, there is evidence against which these fears can be assessed. The practical experience of deterrence at low numbers that was acquired by the Soviet Union and the United States early in the Cold War, as well as by other nuclear-armed states, is highly relevant. Based on this experience and insights from deterrence theory, this Adelphi concludes that most of the challenges associated with low numbers are not really a consequence of arsenal size and, accordingly, that there are good reasons to believe that deep reductions would not undermine international security.

Author Biography

James M. Acton is an associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Table of Contents

Introductionp. 7
Why is there renewed interest in nuclear arms reductions?p. 9
Assessing the effect of deep reductions: deterrence effectiveness and strategic stabilityp. 15
Parameters and assumptionsp. 21
Central deterrencep. 25
The case for the efficacy of small arsenalsp. 27
Mirror imagingp. 31
Countervalue targetingp. 35
Russia and tactical nuclear weaponsp. 36
Extended deterrencep. 39
Damage limitationp. 40
How effective is damage limitation?p. 44
Looking back: the Berlin Crisisp. 49
Extended deterrence and conventional powerp. 52
Would a larger US nuclear arsenal help offset conventional weaknesses?p. 53
Crisis stabilityp. 57
Russian concernsp. 59
How much of a problem is crisis instability?p. 61
Managing Russia's fearsp. 64
Basing modes and crisis stabilityp. 65
Rearmament stabilityp. 71
Armament drivers during the Cold Warp. 72
What might prompt a state to be the first to rearm?p. 75
If one state rearms, will the other follow?p. 79
Nuclear multipolarityp. 83
Alliancesp. 84
Opportunismp. 88
China's 'sprint to parity' and proliferationp. 89
Conclusionsp. 93
Appendix: Where are we now?p. 101
Glossaryp. 107
Endnotesp. 109
Table of Contents provided by Ingram. All Rights Reserved.

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