Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security

by Acton; James

• ISBN13: 9780415681827
• ISBN10: 0415681820
• Format: Nonspecific Binding
• Copyright: 2011-04-13
• Publisher: Routledge

Summary

There is a broad sense in both Russia and the United States that deep nuclear reductions#xE2;#xAC;#x1D;a goal endorsed by both governments#xE2;#xAC;#x1D;would constitute a risky step into the unknown and could undermine international security. However, until now, the reasons behind these concerns#xE2;#xAC;#x1D;and whether they are justified#xE2;#xAC;#x1D;have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in both Russia and the United States, this Adelphi maps out these concerns as they relate to the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence), the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and nuclear multipolarity. Contrary to popular belief, there is evidence against which these fears can be assessed. The practical experience of deterrence at low numbers that was acquired by the Soviet Union and the United States early in the Cold War, as well as by other nuclear-armed states, is highly relevant. Based on this experience and insights from deterrence theory, this Adelphi concludes that most of the challenges associated with low numbers are not really a consequence of arsenal size and, accordingly, that there are good reasons to believe that deep reductions would not undermine international security.

Author Biography

James M. Acton is an associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Table of Contents

Introduction	p. 7
Why is there renewed interest in nuclear arms reductions?	p. 9
Assessing the effect of deep reductions: deterrence effectiveness and strategic stability	p. 15
Parameters and assumptions	p. 21
Central deterrence	p. 25
The case for the efficacy of small arsenals	p. 27
Mirror imaging	p. 31
Countervalue targeting	p. 35
Russia and tactical nuclear weapons	p. 36
Extended deterrence	p. 39
Damage limitation	p. 40
How effective is damage limitation?	p. 44
Looking back: the Berlin Crisis	p. 49
Extended deterrence and conventional power	p. 52
Would a larger US nuclear arsenal help offset conventional weaknesses?	p. 53
Crisis stability	p. 57
Russian concerns	p. 59
How much of a problem is crisis instability?	p. 61
Managing Russia's fears	p. 64
Basing modes and crisis stability	p. 65
Rearmament stability	p. 71
Armament drivers during the Cold War	p. 72
What might prompt a state to be the first to rearm?	p. 75
If one state rearms, will the other follow?	p. 79
Nuclear multipolarity	p. 83
Alliances	p. 84
Opportunism	p. 88
China's 'sprint to parity' and proliferation	p. 89
Conclusions	p. 93
Appendix: Where are we now?	p. 101
Glossary	p. 107
Endnotes	p. 109
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